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J A E P L 
The Assembly for Expanded Perspectives on Learning (AEPL), an official 
assembly of the National Council of Teachers of English, is  open to all those 
interested in extending the frontiers of teaching and learning beyond traditional 
disciplines and methodologies. 
The purposes of AEPL, therefore, are to provide a common ground for 
theorists, researchers, and practitioners to explore ideas on the subject; to 
participate in programs and projects on it; to integrate these efforts with others 
in related disciplines ;  to keep abreast of activities along these lines of inquiry; 
and to promote scholarship and publication of these activities. 
The Journal of the Assembly for Expanded Perspectives on Learning, 
JAEPL, meets this need. It provides a forum to encourage research, theory, and 
classroom practices involving expanded concepts of language. It contributes to a 
sense of community in which scholars and educators from pre-school through the 
university exchange points of view and cutting-edge approaches to teaching and 
learning . JAEPL i s  especially interested in helping those teachers who 
experiment with new strategies for learning to share their practices and confirm 
their validity through publication in professional journals. 
Topics of interest include but are not limited to: intuition, inspiration, 
insight, imagery, meditation, s ilence, archetypes, emotion, attitudes, values, 
spirituality, motivation, body wisdom and felt sense, and healing. Articles may 
be practical, research-oriented, theoretical, bibliographic, professional, and/or 
exploratory/personal . Each issue has a theme. The theme of the 1 996- 1 997 issue 
is Writing, Thinking, and Teaching in the Borderland. 
Membership in the AEPL is $ 1 2. Contact Nat Teich, Department of English, 
University of Oregon, Eugene, Oregon, 97403-1 286 for membership informa­
tion. Membership includes that year 's  i ssue of the JAEPL. 
Send submissions, address changes, and single copy requests to Mary P. 
Deming, Assi stant to the Editor, JAEPL, Department of Learning Support 
Programs, Georgia State University, 720 One Park Place, Atlanta, GA 30303-
3083 , (404) 65 1 -3360; Fax : (404) 65 1 -4377. 
Address Letters to the Editor and all other editorial correspondence to Alice 
G. Brand, Editor, JAEPL, 2 1 7  Brittany Lane, Pittsford, NY 1 4534. Phone: (7 1 6) 
248-9638. Fax: (7 1 6) 395-239 1 .  E-mail: abrand@acspr l .acs.brockport.edu 
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The Editor's Message 
T he prospect of bringing off a new journal is character building, I have come to believe-particularly when it is published only once a year and by a 
fledging organization. The Journal of the Assembly for Expanded Perspectives 
on Learning (JAEPL) had to be good, very good, especially the inaugural issue. 
That this was the first issue also meant, I hoped, that readers would tolerate 
mistakes.  Surely, mistakes could be corrected with the next issue. But on second 
thought, that was a long year away. 
Nonetheless ,  I celebrate the occasion of the inaugural is sue of JAEPL. 
The logo is derived from the Egyptian hieroglyph, akhet. The sign represents 
the horizon from which the sun emerges and behind which the sun disappears 
daily. The logo depicts mountain peaks with the sun appearing between them 
on the horizon . The des ign was  chosen because the image graphical ly  
embodies both the quieting and broadening vision of language that this journal 
indeed speaks to. 
The theme of this first issue is  Contemporary Composition Studies:  Steps 
Beyond. What it does not mean is  abandoning the solid armature of knowledge 
and skills. What it does mean is  that we reflect our history but we question it. We 
resist its safety. Let me rephrase that. It means that we hold tradition up for 
scrutiny at the same time that we push boundaries back, follow intuitions, test 
and record them. What this also means is  that JAEPL is  different from other 
publications in the field. Unlike establishment journals,  an occasional expres­
sive essay, for example, will not merely seep into JAEPL, valorized by a special 
few who, only after playing by the rules, are allowed to break them. The forms of 
the articles, as readers will see, are not only empirical, theoretical, and practical, 
but also exploratory/personal and imaginative. This journal is  for all thinking­
feeling instructors who learn and teach, so to speak, to the beat of a different 
drummer. 
JAEPL serves as an alternative forum for teachers and writers with 
establishment professional affi liations but whose profess ional beliefs may 
straddle several perspectives .  For this  i s sue  articles  are contributed by 
professionals using unorthodox methods in mainstream language teaching-play, 
drama, kinesthetics .  Readers will also hear the voice of educators working in 
related fields or those who feel marginalized because they serve marginal popu­
lations: the disabled, the neurologically impaired, the underrepresented; and do 
so in alternative locations (By this,  I mean not only physical settings but also 
bodily locations. ) .  Individuals who do not know which professional forum to trust 
will find the door open here. But if I were asked to characterize the authors of 
those articles, more than anything else, I would say that they believe in things 
they cannot see. 
A few stati stics about the inaugural i s sue of JAEPL: Inquiries about 
submitting articles numbered 3 3 .  Actual submiss ions numbered 29. Of the 
contributions received,  readers requested only minor revis ion  on three 
manuscripts . Five manuscripts were returned with recommendations for major 
revision. Eight manuscripts were rejected, five by both readers and three by me 
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because their subjects and the j ournal were clearly a mismatch. Seven came back 
with recommendations that were split between major and minor revision. And six 
submissions were returned with a split between maj or revision and rejection. 
Twelve pieces are published in this issue, producing an acceptance rate of 4 1 %. 
The inconsistencies in  ratings were not surprising, given our amoebic-like 
subspeciality. Pairing manuscripts and readers was not easy. A few manuscripts 
were returned when reviewers said they recognized the author. Resending those 
submissions added three to four weeks to the review process .  Readers willing to 
speak with potential contributors also lengthened reviewing time but usually made 
for stronger pieces .  
With personal experience submitting and publishing scholarly articles, I 
devised the JAEPL manuscript review to work like thi s :  A manuscript arrives and 
is logged in .  Two readers are identified and the submission is sent out with 
Reader 's  Guidelines and a Reader 's  Form. Reviewers have about three weeks to 
read the manuscript and return their comments and the manuscript. If they feel 
unqualified to evaluate a particular submission or believe anonymity has 
somehow been compromised, they return the article unreviewed. 
Just as authors, readers need to be accountable for their comments. I ask 
reviewers to sign their name at the bottom of the Reader 's  Form and to indicate if 
it  may be made known to the author. When permission is  granted, the ensuing 
dialogue, written or oral, often turns into an opportunity for substantial 
clarification.  As does collaborative learning, the peer review process  has 
obvious virtues. Potential contributors reported that they were generally enriched 
by pre-publication conversations. 
After reviewers ' comments are returned,  I read the articles carefully, 
leaning heavily on reviewers' judgments. I send reviewers' comments to the 
author with a letter of my own and any emendations written on the manuscript. 
When major revisions are requested, I often send the revised manuscript to the 
original readers, though in the end, it is  I who makes the final decision. The 
procedure generally takes between two and three months. 
The first time readers are sent contributions, I send along guidelines, asking 
readers to: 
1 .  Observe some version of the golden rule. Respond as if you were 
writing to a friend whom you want to keep as a friend. Use a natural 
and respectful tone. 
2. Feel free to point out significant, related publications that the author 
may have overlooked. 
3. In a rejection give earnest, concrete, supportive advice. It might even 
be helpful to suggest another outlet for the piece. 
4.  If an otherwise acceptable article exceeds the page limit, mark parts for 
deletion. However, emphasize what should be saved in a manuscript, 
not only what should be changed or edited out. 
When a contribution has been accepted, I start copy editing. If I don ' t  
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already have the submission on disk, I ask for one plus a short abstract and 
biography. At this point I usually call the contributor to set up a time when we 
can go over the piece. I try to do the line editing by phone, even though it may 
take an hour or two. After considerable experience with this method, I find it 
exquisitely effective. We all know how illuminating it is  to get our words into 
our muscles, into our vocal chords, as we try to be clear for someone who is  truly 
trying to understand. It is the dialogue of negotiating meaning, jockeying for 
clarity and understanding. 
Most reader responses were gentle and specific, generous and sympathetic. 
A few reviews produced several cursory comments but only one yielded a harsh, 
off-putting reaction. Unlike in the review processes of establishment journals ,  I 
did not come across any bad mouthing because a contribution infringed on a 
reader's own research program. On the contrary, reviewers seemed only too happy 
to see work out there, getting read, getting published. 
There was no right kind of essay. Essays were downgraded or rejected if 
they were conceptually shallow or chaotic, or inaccurate and out-dated. Readers 
in general wanted nothing heavy or pretentious. They resented jargon. Corn-ball 
sentimentality, syrupy or purple prose also jarred them. Readers took a dim view 
of stylistic awkwardness or redundancy, or an egregious number of typos and 
spelling errors. 
Accepted were generally pieces that added something substantial to our 
body of knowledge or provided insight into the complexity of that knowledge. 
Or the contribution posed a new i ssue, bringing it to bear on some question in 
language teaching or learning. As other editors have stated, contributions should 
be enlightened and fresh. Authors should have a sense of what is happening 
in the disciplinary debate. They should try to engage practicing professionals 
at the same time that they say something important to them. Critical rigor, 
imaginative speculation, and a graceful, felicitous writing style also worked in 
authors' favor. 
Why did I choose APA style over MLA? An interesting question. The virtues 
of the MLA style are that it  is most famil i ar to the greatest  number of 
contributors and readers. It calls for a Works Cited list that conforms to standard 
punctuation and capitalization conventions. For example, full first names in a 
Works Cited list means more information, so that citations for, say, writing 
specialists Charles Cooper and Marilyn Cooper could not possibly be confused. 
In contrast, APA style requires a number of curious conventions. In the 
References full first names are replaced by initials ,  which I find unnecessarily 
telegraphic.  Unlike the third edition of the APA Publication Manual, the first line 
of each entry in the references is now indented while the lines following are 
flush left. Because the entry names are now buried on the page, I find locating 
citations visually more difficult. For books, only proper nouns and first words of 
titles and subtitles are capitalized; the rest are lower case. But not titles of 
journals .  They are virtually the only document capitalized as in MLA style-the 
logic of which escapes me. Titles of essays ,  book chapters, and articles in 
periodicals are capitalized like book titles. But unlike MLA style, quotations marks 
are virtually extinct on APA's Reference list. 
However, the big ticket item for me was the in-text documentation. I like to 
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know when things were done, said, written, or published. What stuck most in my 
craw was the fact that the MLA style does not require dates in intratextual 
citations.  So unless authors insert dates into their text, readers may be left 
without chronological grounding. MLA adds abbreviated titles to authors' names 
for intratextual c itations to di stinguish among several works by the same 
author-which to my mind are irredeemably intrusive. This is precisely where 
APA style carries the day. Although I think readers could do without the 
abbreviations, p. or pp. that precede page numbers, APA style calls for the publi­
cation year as part of every intratextual citation. 
For this volume I drew reviewers from within the ranks of AEPL because I 
did not know enough about the professional pursuits or publishing record of our 
larger special interest constituency. We continue to need book reviewers and 
manuscript readers. Among the ways to participate in the JAEPL process are 
to attend AEPL sessions at the annual meetings of the CCC or the NCTE, 
participate in the AEPL summer retreats, write and publish, and become a self­
studied specialist on some aspect of the domain beyond the cognitive. Drop a 
letter to me or to Assistant to the Editor Mary Deming. Identify your areas of 
interest and describe what professional experiences (presentations, publications, 
workshops) you have had in these areas. Feel free to recommend individuals whose 
interests intersect with ours but who may not be affiliated with the Assembly. 
And of course, same time, next year. The theme of our next issue is Writing, 
Teaching, and Thinking in the Borderland. By this I mean stories of personal and 
professional discovery or renewal, administrative or community cooperation, and 
theoretical epiphanies ,  so that advances in language education are being 
realized in enabling and constructive ways. 
We have already made some adjustments for the next volume. We have 
increased the maximum number of pages to fifteen. We will start a Letters to the 
Editor section provided we receive some. Although I read all material, determine 
the reviewers and its ultimate publishability, submissions are now sent first to 
Mary Deming for logging in and manuscript management. 
S ubmi s s i o n s  c ont inue to come i n .  If they were too  l ate for t h i s  
inaugural issue, I a m  holding them for consideration for the next issue. Potential 
contributors should refer to page 1 1 0 for submission guidelines. The deadline is  
February 29, 1 996. 
I hope with this journal that we are keeping some old friends and making 
some new. Of the old friends ,  let me thank the SUNY at Brockport Educational 
Opportunity Center for being my weigh station during my sabbatical year. Both 
Georgia State University and the English department at SUNY at Brockport helped 
with every form of communication available to them: e-mail ,  fax, postal service, 
phone, and duplicating. What else is there? Gracious thanks to the Lifebridge 
Foundation for funds for this inaugural issue of JAEPL. I also thank Martha Goff 
Stoner, Mary Deming, and her staff member, graduate student David Olliff. 
JAEPL promotes self-definition, emotional wisdom, and an openness to 
experience. Please consi der this Editor ' s  Message your invitation to join  
AEPL, to  write, to  listen, to  understand. cQ 
Alice G. Brand 
SUNY at Brockport 
Writing Reality: 
Constructivism, Metaphor, and Cosmology 
Mary C. Daane 
W hen language instructors teach from the conviction that "words form the floor, walls, and ceiling of our existence" (N ouwen, 1 98 1 ,  p. 3 1  ) , from 
a recognition that language is both the foundation and reflection of students' 
reality, value systems, experiences, and ways of being in the world, instructors 
receive and evaluate their students '  di scourse as far more significant than 
accumulations of discrete achievement skills .  This constructivist (Ortony 1 979) 
or experientialist (Lakoff & Johnson, 1 980) perspective sensitizes teachers to a 
holistic view of their students '  linguistic lives;  often constructivist teachers 
assign activities that encourage students to use "expressive" language, language 
that is  "close to the self' and gives signals about [students] as well as signals 
about [ s tudents ' ]  topic [ s ] "  (Bri tton, 1 9 82 ,  pp. 96-97) .  By doing this ,  the 
"constructivist" teacher becomes privy to the recurrent themes and metaphors 
by which students render their identities. 
In recent years epistemic theory in many disciplines has drifted from 
taxonomy to "linguisticality" (Foucault, 1 973 ), resulting in a burgeoning of 
publications on metaphor. Surprisingly, though, the trend has given rise to very little 
discussion about the significance of metaphor in writing theory. In fact, Seitz's 
"Composition's Misunderstanding of Metaphor" ( 1 99 1 )  notes a paradox in the field's 
persistence in viewing metaphor as something to be isolated, controlled, even 
expunged from student writing and discussions about writing, for the sake of clarity. 
As Booth ( 1978) reminds us, "The quality of any culture is in large part the quality of 
the metaphorists that it creates and sustains" (p. 72). 
Metaphors help thinkers and writers forge new connections, relevancies, 
realities and, at the same time, control the way they view the world. For this 
reason the discussion of metaphor should no longer be closeted in the literature 
class; a theoretical understanding of language, metaphor, and the reality they 
embrace is as essential to contemporary composition pedagogy as it is has al­
ways been to poetry and metaphysics.  Those who take language seriously and 
acknowledge its power to change lives and, consequently, the world, recognize 
that composition classes must be more than laboratories to dissect syntax and 
paragraph patterns;  composition classes must become studios where students'  
inchoate potentials can be transformed by the magic of metaphor from the 
unspeakable within to an articulate without. 
Basic Philosophies of Language 
Since the time of Aristotle and throughout the history of Western thought, 
Mary Daane is Assistant Professor of English and reading and Chairperson of the Division of 
Developmental Studies at Waycross College, Waycross, Georgia. 
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"objectivi sm" (Johnson, 1 987) has dominated philosophical approaches to 
language. Briefly, the objectivist understanding holds that language relates in a 
one-to-one, precise manner to a reality that is disembodied or separate and out­
side of human thought, i .e . ,  words have exact meanings that fit the properties of 
the world we live in. Collaterally, the objectivists consider knowledge fixed and 
accessible; for them, "the cat sat on the mat" means one and only one thing to all 
competent speakers of English. Objectivity is  possible and necessary for reason; 
absolute and knowable truth exists and may be derived by impersonal and 
rational analysis .  Moreover, the vocabularies of philosophy and science are 
accurate, and the formulations of these disciplines can correctly describe and 
predict the universe. 
In the twentieth century an alternate understanding of language evolved from 
the work of such philosophers as Kant ( 1781 1 1 965), Ricoeur ( 1976), Vygotsky 
( 1962), and Whorf ( 1 956). This new approach is  aphorized in Wittgenstein's 
( 1 953)  often cited statement, "The limits of my language are the limits of my 
world."  This new point of view led to the now widely-held conviction that the 
language we generate both creates and communicates a constructed reality, 
shaping our value systems and our ways of being in the world. Indeed, accepting 
the breach between the world and the word accounts for the postmodern view of 
an indeterminate reality. 
Those who hold this view of reality argue that truth is a product of our cultur­
ally determined thought system and our particular experiences within that 
culture, not of some absolute or neutral set of pan-human concepts. Rorty 's  ( 1 990) 
comment, "Truth is  simply a compliment paid to sentences seen to be paying 
their way" (as  c ited in Klepp, 1 990,  p. 1 1 8) ,  makes this very point.  For 
constructivists, objectivity is  not nullified but understood to remain possible 
within the framework of cultural supports and limitations. From this stance, ra­
tionality appears to rest on both logic and imagination. Therefore, a set of infor­
mational propositions may yield many validly reasoned conclusions that will vary 
individually depending on the experiences, imagination, and available linguistic 
resources. Accordingly, any individual 's  understanding of "the cat sat on the mat" 
is shaped by earlier personal encounters with, and cultural perspectives on, both 
c ats  and mat s .  Philosophers who acknowledge the human propens ity for 
"seeing-as" (Wittgenstein, 1 95 3 ,  p. 1 93 )  are known as constructivists  or 
experientialists .  They view language and imagination as endowments that 
l iberate us from the constraints of absolute meaning and thereby elevate 
linguistic expression beyond the skill category to a "phenomenon of freedom" 
(Steiner, 1 989, p. 1 5 1 ) . 
Constructivism and Metaphor 
In order to derive a correspondence between metaphor and cosmology, I settle 
on one point of view as to how metaphors operate or what they do. There are 
generally three positions on this issue. 
First, the substitution view considers metaphors "fuzzy and vague, inessen­
tial frills, appropriate for the purposes of the politician and of the poet, but not 
for those of the scientist, who is attempting to furnish an objective description of 
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physical reality" (Ortony, 1 979, p. 2). This objectivist approach holds that "meta­
phors are essentially linguistic ornaments for which their more prosaic equiva­
lents can be readily substituted" (Ortony, 1 985 , p. 1 53). In that view, Yeats '  ( 1 927/ 
1 962) lines from "Sailing to Byzantium" : "An aged man is  but a paltry thing,/ A 
tattered coat upon a stick . . .  ," are simply an unnecessary embellishment having 
the semantic equivalent of the literal, drab, but more precise, "An old man is 
insignificant, frayed, brittle and frail" (p. 95). 
A second position on metaphor, the comparative view, has its roots in 
Aristotelian philosophy. Aristotle in "On Poetics" defines metaphor as "the intuitive 
perception of the similarity in dissimilars." This belief that metaphor allows language 
users to propose otherwise similarities differs little from the substitution view, for the 
comparison view finds "every metaphor to be a condensed or elliptic simile" (Richards, 
1 936, pp. 35-36). Thus, the comparison view, just another spin on the substitution 
view, would find Yeats' line an expendable, implied simile approximating, "An old 
man looks like a tattered coat hanging on a stick." 
A third view of metaphor, one that is consistent with the constructivist view, holds 
that the terms of a metaphor interact to set off a chain of associations that give rise to 
an altogether new meaning, one that conjures far more than the meaning constituted 
by the original terms .  This view, arising from Richards '  discussion of the 
"interanimation of words" (as cited in Black, 1 979), holds that new meaning arises, 
not from the words themselves, but from a new or startling juxtaposition of words. 
The interactionist position on Yeats' line would hold that readers bring their own 
associations, thoughts, feelings, reminiscences about old men, tattered coats, and sticks; 
thus, individuals '  interpretations of the line will vary. The interactionist view is  
consistent with contemporary reader response theory in describing meaning, not as 
captured ideas inalterably preserved by the page, but as variable incantations at the 
juncture of the word, the reader, the culture, and the moment. 
In the constructivist universe, both the substitution and the comparison views 
are inadequate, for if all language is  seen as a reflection of the user's view of 
reality, and if an objective reality is  understood to be a myth, then all language is 
seen to be more or less removed from the objects and phenomena to which it 
refers . If nothing in the lexicon conforms directly and absolutely to reality, then 
everything in the lexicon is a metaphor for that reality. Thus the difference 
between literal and figurative language is quantitative rather than qualitative. 
The issue is  not whether or not an expression is  metaphorical but whether it is 
metaphorical enough for the average, competent language user to recognize its 
metaphoricity. Black ( 1 979) and others have differentiated between "live" and 
"dead" metaphors. A live metaphor is one that is syntactically jarring enough to 
catch the attention of a reader or listener. On the other hand, dead metaphors are 
those that have become so automatic that average users barely note their 
metaphoricity; head of the family, arm of the chair, and foot of the bed are 
everyday metaphorical expressions we rarely note as such. 
Metaphor and Reality 
Several commentators have taken exception to the objectivist position that 
finds metaphors "unimportant, deviant, and parasitic on 'normal usage"' (Ortony, 
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1979,  p. 2) .  Levin ( 1 979) maintains that when we respond to metaphorical 
constructions, we do not construe "the utterance so that it makes sense of the 
world, we construe the world so as to make sense of the utterance" (p. 1 3 1 ) .  
Encountering a metaphor, w e  complete a quick mental check o f  the meanings of 
the terms and conjure an imaginary reality to make that anomalous expression 
sensible. Thus, the notion that metaphors are aberrant expressions is  superseded 
by the idea that the language is impeccable;  j u st the facts are deranged.  
Metaphors are to be taken literally; "They mean what they say-what gives is  
the world" (p. 13 1 ) .  
For those who see truth a s  a matter o f  "fitting words t o  the world" (Lakoff & 
Johnson, 1 980, p. 1 96), concession to a new reality can imply falsehood and lies. 
Empson ( 1 951) noted that the truth or falsity of literary works is  not the issue; 
when contracting with a text, readers are expected to rearrange the world to match 
the writer 's  creation. 
A prototype of the notion that metaphor creates truth was reified in the works 
of literary Romantics .  Coleridge's  "willing suspension of disbelief" (as cited in 
Salingar, 1966, p. 89), the condition necessary for the reader 's  transaction with 
the text, and Keats' ( 1 8 17/ 1967) "negative capability" (p. 399), the tolerance for 
the ambiguity of paradox, and Shelley 's  ( 1 8401 1 967) "Defense of Poetry," which 
argues that poetry "creates anew the universe" (p. 483) are all concepts that fore­
shadowed the constructivist position on language. 
Identifying poets as seers and visionaries popular to Western stereotypes 
attests to an understanding that the metaphors of poetry do not stand as merely 
juxtaposed to logical descriptions of reality, but actually create a transcendent 
reality for reader consideration. In other words, the truth of language is located 
in its removal from the world-its otherworldliness.  The concept of objective 
reality makes a faulty backdrop for interpreting linguistic constructions. One 
contemporary humorist concisely settled the conflict between the objectivist and 
constructivist points of view: "In cases of major discrepancy [between literature 
and life] it's always reality that's got it  wrong . . . .  Reality is frequently inaccurate" 
(Adams, 1 980, p. 38). 
Just as any consideration of metaphor on a scale polarized between truth and 
falsity is untenable, so is any attempt to fix discriminations between the literal 
and the metaphorical. In the constructivist or experientialist view, literal and 
metaphorical expressions are not separate species but variants of a single breed­
human language. We cannot claim that metaphors are present in some texts and 
absent from others. All texts are rife with metaphors, a few arresting, most veiled 
in everyday use. This blurring of the literal/metaphorical distinction reflects the 
postmodern mischief which aims to deconstruct and level many of the pet valua­
tions in Western philosophy's  collection of hierarchical opposites, including true/ 
false, real/fictional, objective/subjective, and literal/metaphorical. 
A Constructivist Cosmology 
In the objectivist system, metaphor is considered the sole province of the 
literary mind that is interested in the subtleties and amenities of language. It is  
not. I t  is  at  the very core of our learning, thinking, and writing. Noting the 
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omnipresence of metaphor, Seitz ( 1 99 1 )  reminds the field of the futility of its 
recommendations that figurative expressions be replaced with literal explana­
tions ;  "we cannot catch up to the speed of figuration nor somehow hold it still 
with literal language" (p. 290). We have also seen that the literal can be called 
metaphorical, that metaphor can be taken literally, that through language humans 
create their own reality. To complete the circle, we can even claim, with Galeano 
( 1 989/ 1 99 1 ), that "[p]erhaps we are the words that tell us who we are" (p. 1 8)­
that it is  the language that has created the human. 
Biolinguists assert that language defines humans and separates them from the 
animal kingdom; words elevate us "above the silence of plants and the grunts of 
beasts" (Bartel, 1 983,  p.75) .  Dennett ( 1 99 1 )  refutes Wittgenstein's  comment: 
'"If a lion could talk, we could not understand him"' by claiming " [If] a lion 
could talk that lion would have a mind so different from the general run of lion 
minds, that although we could understand him just fine, we would learn little 
about ordinary lions from him" (as cited in Johnson, 1 99 1 ,  p. 60). To paraphrase 
Primo Levi ( 1 989), the "whine of an animal" is not a text (p. 1 72). While animals 
may s ignal  with their whimpers and whinni e s ,  their noises  are neither 
paraphrastic nor inventive. 
The equation of language with creation is  nearly as old as Western culture 
itself. The first chapter, third verse, of Genesis tells of a God who speaks cre­
ation (And God said, Let there be light: and there was light) and names our exis­
tential opposites, night and day, heaven and earth. The opening chapter of the 
Gospel of John, first verse, repeats this theme; "In the beginning was the Word, 
and the Word was with God, and the Word was God." The last verse of "The 
Revelation of John" lists those who will be excluded from messianic Jerusalem: 
"dogs, fortune tellers, and the sexually immoral, murderers, idolaters, and every­
one of false speech and false life," reflecting both a pre- and post-modern stance 
on the power of language to define reality. The kingdom of God is gained by 
utterance, not grace. 
The great prophets and mystics have always known this ,  and that is why the 
great religious texts are built on allegory, parable, proverb, and magical imagery. 
Jesus, Lao-Tzu, Muhammad, Siddhartha, the Zen Masters, and the Hasidic Zaddiks 
all worked from a tacit understanding that humans recoil from the bald truth, that 
seekers are more l ikely to accept new theological premises when they are 
presented indirectly. Often the new religious values are disguised in stories 
involving commonplace s i tuation s ,  such as  al legories  and parables ,  or  
paradoxical puzzlers like those found in the Old Testament book of "Proverbs," 
the Tao Te Ching, and Zen koans. 
Ben Shahn's ( 1 954) telling of the "The Alphabet of Creation," a legend from 
the Zohar, the Kabbalah ' s  primary mystical text, derived from ancient Gnostic 
tales begins: 
Twenty-six generations before the creation of the world, the twenty­
two letters of the alphabet descended from the crown of God whereon 
they were engraved with a pen of flaming fire. They gathered around 
about God and one after another spoke and entreated, each one, that 
the world be created through him. (pp. 1 -2) 
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According to the legend, the Lord chose to fashion the heavens and earth with 
the masculine Beth and the feminine Aleph. Aleph's selection was a reward for 
her modesty (a conceit that has had for millennia a profound effect on human 
expectations about women). 
In a recent article on quantum cosmology, Primack and Abrams ( 1 995) 
remind us of another account of creation involving language found in Jewish 
midrashic literature. "Genesis Rabbah 1 : 1  says :  'The Holy one in creating the 
universe, . . .  worked from a plan-the Torah' "  (p. 7 1 ) . Moreover, the notion that 
language can form the universe is not peculiar to the traditions of Judaeo­
Christian creationism. The Buddhist monks' chant, "Aouhm," vocalizes from 
back to front of the mouth, a gloss of all the speaking positions .  The gloss itself 
functions as an auditory metonymy, a symbolic reiteration of the act of creation. 
If, mythologically speaking,  language created the universe, and if we, as 
members of the universe, have been given power over language, then we, too, 
have been endowed with the power of creati on.  "The exerc ise  of human 
language enacts, albeit on a microscopically humble scale, the divine reflexes of 
creation, the Logos or ' speaking into being' of the universe" (Steiner, 1 97 1 ,  
p .  75) .  "One word can cripple a human relationship, can do dirt on hope" 
(Steiner, 1 989, p. 58). 
Language and metaphor are our human trust; through them we spell our 
v i sion of the now and the forever. As humans,  our nature is to use them 
constructively. As teachers, it i s  our responsibility to empower our students to 
use their linguistic and metaphorical birthrights to construct and re-construct their 
intellectual, political, and even their spiritual lives; for by their own metaphors 
will they be known and will they know. We must teach with the conviction of 
Vaclav Havel: "Transcendence is the only real alternative to extinction" (as cited 
in Primack & Abrams, 1 995,  p. 73).  If we fail in this obligation, we risk revert­
ing to the abyss of unspeakability. c::::J 
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Earthworm Hermeneutics 
Derek Owens 
The Omnipresence of Boundaries 
T he markers are everywhere. Riding through Queens at 7 a.m. on the Q3 1 bus, I begin to tally the obvious barriers: Metal doors barricading unopened shops; 
graffiti on walls, sidewalks, stoops-hundreds of tags on a single block, city as 
strata of palimpsests; concertina wire strung around apartment balconies; iron 
gates built across a street leading to a school; parking garage stairwells dead­
ending in plywood; bars on windows. And from where I sit on the bus, invisible 
lines of separation surround every face.  In the standing-room-only crowd I search 
to find cracks between bodies where my line of sight might leak out a window. 
I get off at the University for my 8 a.m. class, note the iron fence enclosing 
the campus;  the security booths; combination locks in the doors of the buildings ;  
m y  office cubicle where the walls don't  quite reach the ceiling, blurring public 
and private space; the raised platform in my classroom where instructors are 
expected to stand behind a podium twelve inches taller than students. 
At the end of the day, waiting at the Jamaica train station I see concessions 
where porn magazines are sold by men bunkered behind their counters ; sitting on 
the train, I keep my elbow from touching the woman's  next to me, my eyes from 
hers; on the ride home through Nassau and Suffolk counties I realize that I can' t  
look out the window for more than 30 seconds without seeing chainlink fence, 
the one ingredient "nice" neighborhoods, industrial parks, and vacant lots all have 
in common. 
At 7 p.m. I walk home through empty suburbia. It is dark, and I trigger 
motion detectors above garage doors, spotlights clicking on as I come within 
range. When I walk into my own yard I am, as always, momentarily conscious of 
my feet making contact with the ground. This is our new house, and the first 
thing my wife and I want to do is surround it with an attractive fence. 
Boundaries as Psychosocial Inevitabilities 
The boundaries stratifying our communal and psychic landscapes are more 
than omnipresent. They are nothing less than prostheses, psychotopological 
extensions shooting out from mental into physical space. Not only are we 
cyborgs, as theorist Donna Haraway ( 1 989) taught us,  but we are the very lines 
of territorialization and demarcation that we navigate every waking hour. 
Boundaries are social constructs, as integral to our construction of the world as 
language. In fact, while it has been said that language is  a system of boundaries, 
it  might be more apt to say that we are systems of boundaries painted with 
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something called language. 
Consequently, talk of dismantling boundaries and eliminating once and for 
all the lines of attraction and repulsion that are our physical signatures ,  of 
moving beyond boundaries into some pure, perimeter-less space is  at best a 
fantasy, at worst fascism (conscious or otherwise) .  It is human to construct 
boundaries on top of boundaries, to create boxes of influence and resistance. 
Hedgerows, avenues, voting districts, grids, lines of latitude, every utterance and 
signifier-the blanket hung over the rope between the beds in Clark Gable's and 
Claudette Colbert's motel, those two reluctant lovers in It Happened One Night. 
They're all signs of our need to preserve and redefine the spaces that are ever 
extensions of our bodies. While the forms our markers take are infinite, at a base 
level we are all dogs constantly marking our territories and just as obsessive in 
our constant need to seek out scents made by others. 
Of course, no boundary is  ipso facto permanent. The walls of Jericho can 
and do come down, as Gable says in the movie-and are of course always in 
states of potential flux. But if boundaries crumble they leave in their stead not 
vacuums but newer walls, mutations, and hybrids. Even Deleuze and Guattari 's  
( 1 987) idea of the body without organs is  not to be confused with the fantasy of 
the transcendentalist's transparent eyeball passing through the environs, but "is 
a limit" (p. 1 50) and thus a horizon point toward which our tribes of selves 
continually slide and yearn. We are all border writers, to use D .  Emily Hicks' 
term ( 1 99 1 ),  and it must be within the ability of every one of us to "present the 
world with a new multidimensional holographic ordering of desire" (p. 1 23) .  
Because constructing boundaries is so inherently human (Perelman, 1993,  p.233),  
we need to imagine newer, richer ways of articulating whatever boundaries we 
seek to build with and over the old.  But before we introduce some routes toward 
this end, it is necessary to expose what's wrong with binary thinking that wants 
either to preserve final boundaries or transgress (through inclusion) "all" of them. 
Binary Assumptions in Centrist and Pluralist Thinking 
The problem with boundaries is not that they exist but how people pervert 
them. The most obvious abuse comes in the form of those who define themselves 
as the Center and need to maintain that image of power and self-promotion through 
systematic oppression of all who do not meet their image of Being. First world 
countries,  militaries, corporations, elitists, men who destroy women, adults who 
destroy children, all read boundary as weapon. Those who do not exist in the 
Center do not exist. They are threats and as such must be erased or converted. 
For the Centrists there is only one border, the edge of the world. The battle to 
maintain a State of purity, an anaesthetized zone of sameness is waged against 
pagans threatening to rise from the abyss.  This (patho)logic of the Center has 
been expressed countless times but perhaps nowhere more thoroughly than in the 
work of Argentinean philosopher Dussel ( 1 985) .  
Equally sinister but slightly less obvious than the Us versus Them rhetoric 
of the Centrists is the supposedly "multicultural" agenda of romantics  who 
claim to promote difference but in reality are engaged in a project where differ­
entiation is imposed on others in order to preserve another centrism, this time 
10 JAEPL, Vol.l ,  Winter 1995-1996 
calling itself Pluralism. To distinguish humans by cataloging them under differ­
entia (such as race, class, sexuality) too often amounts to assigning the "Other" a 
title through which it can be made recognizable: The once exotic, like a butter­
fly, is now safely pinned in its appropriate box. The unknown is now "ours" and 
thus no longer a threat. Soundings from the periphery are "brought in" by the 
Pluralist, made canonical and palatable, in a word, legal (whereas "the inevitable 
position of liberation [is] subversive illegality," [Dussel, 1 985 , p. 66]).  Any origi­
nality, any true difference is  now subsumed by the (always fictitious) rubric un­
der which it has been assigned. Difference "in the name of" multiculturalism is 
racism-often unintentional, but racism nonetheless.  It reflects a desire to clas­
sify and regulate humans and their works under a desensitizing, awe-inhibiting 
grid' of familiar, dead terms (Black lesbian writer; young Asian-American artist). 
To fetishize difference this way is  to cultivate a different kind of sameness .  This 
is why multicultural anthologies are sanitized, nonthreatening, and interchange­
able. "Difference" here is not so much that which is genuinely new-and thus 
not just a threat to existing canons but the notion of canonicity itself-but that 
which will best "fit" within the pluralistic project. Its marketability determines 
its value. Even Giroux ( 1 992), who rightfully articulates the violence of binary 
oppositions, does so in a discourse predicated on an assumed dualism where 
"radical" theory exists to right the wrongs of conservative and leftist ideology 
(pp. 23-28) . Many of the sentiments embedded in so-called radical educational 
theory are laudable, but we still have to admit that all parties involved in the 
debate are related in some embarrassing but undeniable ways.  Fundamentalist 
conservatives, Afrocentrist theorists, and postmodern feminists alike all collect 
paychecks from institutions with questionable if not reprehensible politics .  We 
(I do not leave myself out of the equation) own property, want more money, con­
sume more than we need, and think constantly of our careers .  And we all waste 
dangerously limited natural resources in our race to publish. Seen from this angle, 
we are all on the same side of a fence that few are willing to acknowledge. 
"The smell of totalitarianism is  in the air," wrote Giroux ( 1 989, p. 2 1 8) ,  and 
we are all gagging from the stench as hateful dimwits infest an already infected 
federal legislature. But there is a problem when we become too caught up in our 
own us-versus-them rhetoric ;  even the best of us have the little voice of the fas­
cist lurking somewhere deep (and too often not deep enough) within our psyches. 
"Perhaps now it is only the impure which might claim any kind of authenticity," 
writes one of the editors of Out There: Marginalization and Contemporary Cul­
tures (Ferguson, 1 990, p. 1 2) .  But none of us is pure. None exempt. Which ren­
ders the very notion of a viable "out there" dangerously suspect (particularly an 
"out there" desperate to "claim" authenticity. For if one is indeed the real thing, 
why beg the question? ) 
Both the centrist and the pluralist rely on boundary markers of exclusion; 
the latter simply permits more variety in its territory than the former. But of course, 
even for the pluralist there are still voices and activities "way out there" which 
will never appear in any made-for-profit anthology or surface in any politically 
correct pedagogy of multiculturalism. Such works can only be declared obscene, 
pornographic, unsuitable even for the most permissive of canons. And, of course, 
that which is  truly different-that which is unclassifiable, terrifying in its strange 
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and alien beauty-is precisely pornography but not i n  the sense o f  the body 
hatred found on newsstands, but as magic, gnosis (Bey, 1 99 1 ) . 
Earthworm Hermeneutics 
To address "the boundary question" I am trying to flesh out a stance from 
which we might begin to rejoin our selves and our environments; in the process 
we move ever away from the homogenized emptiness that characterizes any cen­
ter in order to locate the truly different and dangerously authentic. To peel away 
the inevitable film of cynicism that coats all of us living in the late twentieth 
century and reach the potential for amazement and fascination I believe still lies 
dormant within anyone not totally anaesthetized by television or theory. 
To translate the self to itself on its own terms, unmediated by the State. My 
thinking-which to be sure on this matter is  still in the infancy stage-draws 
from Enrique Dussel  ' s  philosophy of liberation through exteriority and 
antifeti shism, the writings of Hakim Bey, and the ecopolitics of Paul Ryan. 
I have chosen the worm motif for the moment not just because of catchy 
alliteration (although the sounds of the terms are now at least as important as 
what they contain) but because it helps us focus on a three-pronged pedagogical 
initiative embedded within a hermeneutics concerned not with textual exegesis 
or reinterpretation of the social, but with poeisis .  That is ,  the project of writing 
the world, again and again, from scratch, each time. 
First, earthworm hermeneutics finds value only at the periphery, the 
wildness "outside" the outside that has been tamed, appropriated, turned outside 
in. I believe with Dussel that liberation can be found only in the periphery, for to 
be of the center (which is to be the center) is  to consume ourselves in the name of 
stasis .  Exteriority brings consciousness as much as centrality induces stupor, and 
it is the investigation and cultivation of each person's private exteriority that is 
the rightful business of education. 
Soil surrounding a healthy earthworm population is  usually fertile. It pro­
motes greater diversity of flora and fauna. Poor soil, which likely indicates a thin 
earthworm population, invites aggressive and invasive weeds that spread quickly, 
monopolizing the system inefficiently and unproductively. A few aggressive, 
"opportunistic species" (Hawken, 1 993) take over, discouraging variation. Cen­
trist theories are built on sour soil; what makes them thrive will ultimately de­
stroy them because the ecological balance they promote is  severely restricted. 
Romantic pluralistic theories, on the other hand, want rich soil but limit what 
will grow there. The carefully shaped Victorian garden may be more aestheti­
cally pleasing than a sea of weeds, but it is every inch an indicator of someone 's 
need to control and restrict. Where the centrist impulse risks inbreeding in long­
ing for supreme homogeneity, the pluralistic stance encourages contradiction: it 
claims to want the conditions for variety, but simultaneously limits that variety. 
Earthworms respect boundaries not by usurping them but by providing the 
conditions that support such surface variety. Earthworms tunnel beneath bound­
aries while not appropriating them. Boundaries rise and fall on the surface, and 
the earthworm assists that random rise and fall without seeking to contain or 
restrict the variation on the surface. 
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The educator may be seen as a chaos gardener. Not conventional gardeners 
limited by the tiny range of seeds reserved for them in stores ,  but those who help 
create an environment receptive to all variety. Educators reject neither the 
canonical nor the extreme but wish to surround themselves with human and 
natural works so long as they induce fascination and amazement. Such educators 
seeks to share, to return to others that sense of mystery, primarily because this 
enhances the sense of awe. I bring particular material into my class not because 
it is  "great" and "ought" to be taught, but because I find that to be amazed also 
involves a need to share that amazement. In essence, we become that mystery by 
entering into it, perpetuating it. 
What thi s  means in my own writing classes is  that I try to introduce 
materials that my students will  not find on television or in most American 
bookstores .  In fact, unless it i s  unavoidable, I do whatever I can to ensure that 
discussions directly or indirectly related to television, adverti sing, and the 
unimaginative business of the world do not enter the classroom. To spend an 
hour critiquing the Cult of Sameness (examining misogyny in a cigarette ad, 
"deconstructing" Beverly Hills 902 1 0) is to have one hour of one 's  life owned by 
advertising executives .  Dismissal of televi sion is  still promotion of the beast, 
since the medium continues to control the conversation. 
It also means that I try not to entertain all the old stunted pseudo-debates: 
death penalty, abortion, euthanasia, legalization of drugs, etc. "In every single 
'issue' cooked up for 'debate' in the patternbook of the Spectacle, both sides are 
invariably full of shit" (Bey, 1 99 1 ,  p. 50).  And just as the fiction of binary 
debates distracts us with their seductive "arguments," so too has the fashionable 
tug-of-war embodied in the Centrist-Pluralist politics become the essence of 
academia. As a way to resist the limitations of this split, I ferret out works 
located "off to the side" by visionary, intuitive, and utopian thinkers. As a result, 
I have students investigate communitarian sects, early American "dropout" 
cultures, underground "zines," "art brut," and "outsider art," visionary treatises 
on business and economics, and so forth. Obviously shaped by my own needs 
and interests, the material I teach focuses on those who have thought to rebuild 
the world through controversial and restorative thinking. In writing about these 
themes, students are also encouraged to compose in exploratory forms (Owens, 
1 994) . 
Whereas the firs t  in i t ia t ive  behind earthworm hermeneut ics  i s  the 
privileging of extreme variation of ideas, the second condition is  more pragmatic. 
It is a mistake to encourage modes of construction (thinking, writing, perfor­
mance) still dangerous in the eyes of the academic community-if students re­
main at risk. Students, of course, need to learn academic discourse not so they 
can become better puppets but because they need camouflage. Developmental 
writers attract attention; mistakes in grammar trigger raised eyebrows. Such out­
side attention restricts private intellectual activity. To have the freedom to pur­
sue our intellectual goals,  we need a certain amount of time alone. Consequently, 
a considerable portion of any writing course these days must be aimed at helping 
students pass-that is, pass for academics-in-the-making. Those who can, at least 
grammatically and verbally, know how to fit in, have greater opportunity to 
disappear, and follow their own pursuits. 
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Earthworms are "nightcrawlers ."  They move under cover of darkness,  know 
how to get things done. They work behind, beneath, and under the boundaries 
without drawing attention to themselves. To engage in Dussel's idea of illegal 
philosophy means knowing how, when necessary, to travel incognito. Just as be­
ing alive means navigating through and constructing numerous boundaries, so 
too it means knowing how (and when) to wear masks. 
Finally, there is a moral function to earthworm hermeneutics .  To privilege 
variation just because it's funky and exhilarating could be enough, but not today. 
Today we are in a fix unlike any we have ever known. A friend of mine says that 
the first required reading for every course in every discipline should be the most 
recent State of the World ( 1 993) distributed by the Worldwatch Institute. We live 
in a time when, at current rates of population growth and ecological devastation, 
the earth will become irreversibly damaged within our lifetimes. Few of us even 
know how to begin to conceptualize this fact, let alone address it. But it is the 
responsibility of educators to make nothing less than new pedagogies in response 
to this news of the world. To promote variation is to foreground that which is 
truly strange. At this point in history the thing strangest to all of us is something 
called the earth. Although postmodernists like Hicks separate the world into the 
territorialized and the deterritorialized, all of us can now be said to inhabit the 
latter. Women, gays, people of color, and just about everyone who looks, walks, 
and talks differently from me are simply the more obvious "borders" subletting 
or squatting in power zones constructed and commandeered by other, usually in­
visible figures (white-male-heterosexual-capitalist-you know the litany) .  But 
we're all border riders, straddling not one but an array of unstable, impermanent 
fences. Those who would claim centrality, who truly believe that to occupy terri­
torialized havens, to be the hubs and the nuclei of society, are simply more far 
gone than the rest. These people have the wetiko psychosis analyzed in Forbes' 
Columbus and Other Cannibals ( 1 992) in which carriers "consume another's life 
for their own private purpose or profit" (p. 34).  But while such individuals (or 
more appropriately institutions) do indeed wield violent power, the figures we 
associate with such centers of hate have turned from humans into witches (I use 
the term in the traditional Native American sense), and besides, it is too late for 
blame; my discussion here is aimed at the remaining humans .  
In  order to  combat the cynicism that permeates our present historical mo­
ment, we need an inventiveness borne of urgency and visionary ideals .  One such 
example is Paul Ryan's Video Mind, Earth Mind ( 1 993) which documents his 
attempts over several decades to articulate strategies for an ecology of mind. 
Ryan begins his book, like the State of the World, by reminding us that in under 
four decades "we pass a threshold of irreversible environmental destruction. The 
door to a healthy life on earth dead bolts behind us .  We watch our grandchildren 
garbage-pick their way through life in ecosystems that are terminally ill" (p. 1 ) . 
Seen from this angle, we are all deterritorialized in the most literal sense: We 
have come to think of ourselves as nomads detached from our bioregions. Deleuze 
and Guattari's  ( 1 987) "Body without Organs" ultimately fails as a metaphor be­
cause the fact is we have organs, and they are not just the soggy things inside but 
the chloroplasts, bugs, and atmospheric conditions "out there ."  Of course, out 
there is always in here, in our guts and cells :  It is empirically obvious that we are 
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not only children, sucking at our earth-mother 's  breast all of our lives, but that 
we are also mixed with, and part of, that which Europeans choose to call "the 
environment."  For us,  truly, there are no "surroundings." 
I can lose my hands and still live. I can lose my legs and still live. I can lose 
my eyes and still live. I can lose my hair, eyebrows, nose, arms, and many other 
things and still live. But if I lose the air I die. If I lose the sun I die. If I lose the 
earth I die. If I lose the water I die. If I lose the plants and animals I die. All of 
these things are more a part of me, more essential to my every breath, than is my 
so-called body. What is my real body? 
We are rooted, just like the trees. But our roots come out of our nose and 
mouth, like an umbilical cord, forever connected to the rest of the world. Our 
roots also extend out from our skin and from our other body cavities (Forbes, 
1 992). The job of the educator is to make accessible the secrets that remain 
hidden, repressed, censored. The strange zones of activity in between the 
boundaries, those glitches in the grid, those sites of shared strangeness  unfamil­
iar to all of us require our attention. One obvious zone is the earth. Regardless of 
the contentious political, ethnic, sexual, and class backgrounds of our students 
and ourselves, we all ultimately occupy the same zone. Certainly matters of race, 
gender, sexuality, and class are intricately involved within such an ecological 
project, and Merchant ( 1 992) presents useful strategies for making these connec­
tions in a pedagogical context. But the reality of a dying ecology is  the umbrella 
under which all other realities and pursuits must be assembled. By this I do not 
mean the romantic dream of some pure, boundary-less heaven of multicultural 
unification. Instead, we need methods of tunneling under the walls and borders, 
into a common bedrock seen for the first time, in order to discover, literally, the 
bioregions we drive over, sleep in, eat, and dismantle. rQ 
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Strictly Ballroom? 
Dancing along the Borders of 
Movement and Writing 
Tim Doherty 
When we imagine a typical scene of writing, we probably have an image of a seated writer, who occasionally paces ,  stretches, but is mostly stationary 
and alone. Certainly a glance in the doorways of most writing classes would re­
veal seated writers, either composing or talking. In an attempt to expand our 
sense of the possibilities beyond this static image, to broaden our vision of how 
writers'  bodily experiences and various intelligences may be involved in the act 
of writing, Karen Klein and Linda Hecker ( 1 994) have recently advocated two 
teaching strategies, "hands-on manipulatives" and "walking the structure," which 
exploit the ideas of 'learning-by-doing,'  cross-fertilizing students' 
linguistic abilities with spatial or kinesthetic intelligences. By work­
ing directly with students and observing their writing difficulties, 
[they] found that many individuals struggling to express their ideas 
on paper could build models of how ideas relate using colored pipe 
cleaners, Legos, or Tinkertoys, or they could walk those ideas across 
a room, changing direction to indicate changes in logical structure. 
(p. 89) 
In the latter approach, the exact shape of an individual 's  "walk" or explor­
atory movement is "arbitrary" (Klein & Hecker, 1 994, p. 93) .  Gross-motor 
experiences of ideas are more important than following the movement patterns 
set out by Klein and Hecker: "[I]n fact, individual students are encouraged to 
invent their own sets of moves, if that feels more comfortable to them . . . .  It is the 
gross motor movement of arms and legs, hands and feet that makes the abstract 
both concrete and tactile" (p. 95) .  
Klein and Hecker 's  work illustrates the utility of movement in teaching 
writing. What impact, what contribution, can movement make in a given act of 
composing? Could we claim that, by attending to feeling and thought through 
movement, our expression is facilitated? Or are the modalities of movement and 
writing impermeable, untranslatable? Or, for writers, does movement altogether 
change what Alice Brand ( 1 994) calls the "valuative" experience, the various 
ways thought and feeling may intertwine in mental activity (p. 1 56)? 
Tim Doherty, graduate student at  the University of Massachusetts, Amherst, is  completing a 
dissertation entitled, Out of Our Heads: College Writing and the Resources of Theatre. He thanks 
his students, and Peter Elbow, Ellen Kaplan, Jenny Spencer, and Anne Herrington for their advice. 
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Translating Intelligences: Moving Words 
Of course, it is tempting to be simplistic. Movement is suited to "hot," 
vibrant expression; stationary writing lends itself to "cool," conscious, rational 
processes (Brand, 1 994 ). On the one hand, it seems common sense that move­
ment is  more closely connected to emotion than is  the act of writing. Feeling and 
movement are both somatic-feeling happens "in" the body; movement happens 
"because of" or "with" the body. It is tempting to focus on the gulf between what 
we experience when dancing, compared to when talking or writing. Howard 
Gardner ( 1 985),  for example, claims that the bodily-kinesthetic mode of intelli­
gence is  identifiable in how we use tools ,  in how we dance, and in how we mimic. 
He posits this mode because, presumably, other intelligences somehow cannot 
capture its modality. Gardner provides a sense of these limits by quoting famous 
dancers on how "untranslatable" meaning is in dance: 
And indeed, it  is difficult to get dancers (or even dance critics) 
to characterize their activity in a straightforward and concrete 
way. Isadora Duncan . . .  summed it up in her well-known remark, 
"If I could tell you what it is, I would not have danced it" . . .  
[and] , Martha Graham . . .  has made the intriguing observation, 
"I have often remarked on the extreme difficulty of having any 
kind of conversation with most dancers which has any kind of 
logical cohesiveness-their minds just jump around (maybe like 
my body)-the logic-such as it is-occurs on the level of mo­
tor activity." ( 1 985,  p. 224) 
Why use movement in a writing classroom if the boundaries allow little in 
the way of immigration? Because the boundaries are not impermeable. And 
Gardner is quick to emphasize that no single "intelligence" ever solely produces 
a given performance. In thinking about these boundaries or relationships between 
our intelligences, we have two approaches :  First, we can go about our business,  
relatively unconscious of co-existing intelligences working in a coordinated way, 
such as when we dance. As my former student, Jen, once described: "You're lis­
tening to music, utilizing an aural mindset and musical intelligence, and uncon­
sciously, you 're translating what you hear into kinesthetic intelligence, and put­
ting it literally into motion." The second relationship is  of a different, trickier 
sort. We can consciously try to create contexts in which various intelligences 
cross-fertilize, translate, or mingle. This may be the case, for example, when we 
present a painting to students and ask them to write their responses to it, the 
visual and linguistic intelligences orbiting one another, so to speak. Or when we 
ask children to listen to music and draw what they hear. This second kind of 
cross-fertilization of intelligences is ambiguous because it involves both a con­
scious mingling of how we act and know in different domains. But it also in­
volves "a letting go," listening to the music, allowing associations to occur, mov­
ing image to page, at times consciously, or semi-consciously, or unconsciously. 
Perhaps this "trickiness"  is the paradox of conscious, creative intentions ;  
success depends on the degree of unconscious "release," an openness to  "peak" 
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or "flow" experiences, once we have consciously set ourselves in a creative 
direction. It is  also tricky in the sense that, phenomenologically, the moment­
to-moment relationship between the intell igences involved in heari n g ,  
imagining,  a n d  drawing i s  hard t o  p i n  d o w n :  I s  i t  o n e  of cause/effect? 
Translation? Hybridization? 
We know so l ittle about the nature and creative poss ibilities of this 
conscious coordination of intelligences. I believe it  i s  worth our time as writing 
teachers to explore it, warranting the use of movement as a way of shifting 
student awareness of thoughts and feelings into and out of somatic and linguistic 
action. A back-and-forth movement. Note how, having to say something about 
dance, Graham, in the earlier quote, does in fact capture a sense of how meaning 
operates in dance-it "jumps," perhaps in the same way our visual intelligence 
operates by discrimination and gestalt. 
Body sense is  present across our experiences and actions, whether we are 
aware of it or not. Seated writers, consciously or not, have bodies involved in the 
act of writing, whether that involvement comes in the form of a felt sense, a 
frustration, the excited j iggling of a foot, the pauses and breaths between j ot­
tings, the voicing of words, or the subterranean murmur of inner speech. Indi­
vidually, movement and writing are both tools that are expressive extensions of 
our bodies, in the sense described by Polanyi ( 1 958): "We pour ourselves out 
into [our tools] and assimilate them as parts of our own existence. We accept 
them existentially by dwelling in them"(p. 59).  My own wish, therefore, is to 
wonder about the role that a more extensive, deliberate use of "the body 's  
wisdom" can play in writing events. 
We have a number of pedagogical strategies that can help students attend to 
their physical experience during composing: freewriting, Perl 's  ( 1 994) exercises 
for felt sense, Klein and Hecker 's  ( 1 994 )"walking structures" and "hands-on 
manipulatives," guided imagery related to a particular topic, visual representa­
tions, or even doodling. Presumably, by cross-fertilizing our different physical 
and cognized emotional lives, we ground or inhabit the moment of writing more 
cogently, successfully, or perhaps even surprisingly. Or, as Brand ( 1 990) observes, 
"Learning that includes emotion has more stick-to-the-ribs quality than does 'cold' 
cognition and influences performance years later" (p. 306) . However, the present 
culture of most classrooms limits our vision of what is "appropriate" and helpful 
to better writing. Movement in a writing course seems tantamount to "dirty danc­
ing" in the ballroom. What can movement offer writers? In given composing 
scenarios, how can movement shape their emotional and cognitive experiences? 
I am trying to make more room culturally for the vital role that intrapersonal 
intelligence can play in this process. Nevertheless ,  I also embrace the caveat made 
by Klein and Hecker that movement-based approaches to writing "do not work 
for everyone," but should be presented as valued options in a student-centered 
pedagogy ( 1 994, p. 98). 
Two recent experiments suggest directions for those interested in this line of 
inquiry, teaching, and learning: a collaborative one between the philosopher 
Robert Schwarz ( 1 993) and the dancer Christina Svane; and the other, a project 
completed by Jo-Ann, a student dancer in an experimental course I co-taught 
with Margaret Daisley at the University of Massachusetts, Amherst. In the latter 
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instance, I functioned as a participant-observer, seeking to understand how one 
student conceived of movement-writing connections, and how both I and her peers 
responded. I will tell both of these anecdotes and then conclude by reflecting on 
their implications for the teaching of writing. 
Dancing into a Different Space 
In October of 1 992, the contact dancer Christina Svane and philosopher Rob­
ert Schwarz conducted a seminar at the School for New Dance Development in 
Amsterdam, entitled "Spatial Orientation: A Key to Meaning in Thought and 
Movement." Schwarz ( 1 993) collaborated with contact dancers, exploring con­
cepts of space and "the role that body postures and movements play in the pro­
cesses of abstract thinking" (p. 45) .  In effect, Schwarz and Svane wanted the 
dancers to try to change their sense of space as a separate "thing," around which 
bodies move, to an understanding that space i nheres in the experience of 
movement itself. They encouraged the dancers to experience spatial concepts as 
the metaphors they are, linguistic constructs for the human experience of motion 
and mass .  
Drawing on  the works of Lakoff and Johnson ( 1 980, 1 987), Schwarz first 
provided lectures describing the central metaphors that can be found underlying 
the discourses of philosophy, law, religion,  and science (verticality and 
hierarchy being the most obvious), and the relationships of these metaphors to 
"motional meaning": " [T]he key words which seem to advance any discourse are 
words of motion" (Schwarz, 1 993,  p. 47). He deduces that motion guides all 
thought processes, and that 
[s]pace, time, mass, gravity, inertia, and countless other essential 
abstractions from which our reality is formed are not so much 
external a priori givens as they are a posteriori creations out of 
the matrix of body experience. (p. 48).  
Schwarz ' s  objective was to help the dancers realize this new body- space 
relationship. A conceptual transformation of space i s  created "inside" their 
experiences of moving. Movement and thought become inseparable. 
After the lectures by Schwarz, Svane led the dancers through movement 
sessions,  intended to effect new, non-reified, body-centered orientations to 
space. Svane's term for this phenomenon is the "now-plane" (Schwarz, 1 993, 
p.44 ) .  While dancing, participants attempted to "turn about" a spatial concept in 
their minds, trying to locate the way in which they conceptualize through the 
motions of their body. The dancers' journals suggest that they moved with a spa­
tial term in mind, such as "along" or "beside," and then somehow attempted to 
release that word into the motions of their bodies, "letting go" of the "idea" of 
the term. Integrating thought and movement, the dancers were re-orienting or 
"mingling" their physical and conceptual senses of "movement," "space," "dance," 
and so on. Svane and Schwarz sought to effect these "conceptual transforma­
tions" for the dancers through a conscious interpenetration of movement, discus­
sion, and writing. In their journal reflections, often in imagistic, metaphoric, 
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associative form, many of the dancers report powerful transformations in their 
approach to contact dance: 
Mary Overlie: I had a very strong and amazing experience when 
I worked by myself with the word 'through' in conjunction with 
moving without the concept of space. I suddenly had a whole new 
movement vocabulary available to me (p. 44) . . . .  It was astonishing 
to me that when Christie and I did some Contact work with these 
words [with, until, carry ] ,  we were able to be in the Contact dance 
with such completeness and clarity. (p. 50) 
Katinka Bosse: It was new, every single little sensation, sound, 
emotion, posture . . . .  While this [dance] went on . . .  l O% of my con­
scious mind . . .  was still able to put labels on the "happening":  phrase 
it, recognize it, compare it, evaluate it. (p. 52) 
Christina Svane: So many layers to be aware of. This process has a 
preparation phase . The Now Plane does hinge upon the body. The 
body needs time to remember its own complex chords. One doesn't 
hear all the instruments in the orchestra at once. Roving is part of 
Now. Images fleet. A fleet of images. An association seems the next 
step. Images first. Awareness.  Image. Association. (p. 48) 
Jo-Ann's Movers and Witnesses 
In the Spring semester of 1 993,  Margaret Daisley and I co-taught an 
experimental writing class in which we explored with nine students the ways of 
integrating the arts of performance and writing. The second half of the course 
was entirely devoted to student projects and experiments, one of which, Jo-Ann's,  
involved us in forging movement-writing connections. Based on her past train­
ing and experience in dance, Jo-Ann believed in what she termed "the body 's  
voice,"  "a nonverbal voice,"  a way in which the moving body itself  has 
something to "say." What intrigued her most were the "connections and gaps" 
between embodied and textual "voice."  Her inquiry into these possible relation­
ships involved us in "deep movement" exercises,  which were followed by 
freewriting. Jo-Ann's  sense of the "connections and gaps" are best summed up in 
this excerpt from her project narrative: 
Rhythm is a central defining feature in dance and in writing. Voice, 
in writing and dance, becomes apparent in the pauses; shaped by 
where one stops, and for how long, and at what level. Are you left 
hanging in the air, or heavy on the ground? How does the writing/ 
dance flow, how intense is it? Does it creep low, slowly, timidly 
with caution or tendernes s ,  or is it running, leaping, spinning 
so fast that it seems like the ground/page will explode? And 
breath . . .  where does the writer/dancer stop to breathe? Are you 
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breathless or deeply sustained in full breaths that give lustre to 
every word/gesture? ( 1993, p.2) 
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To begin her project, Jo-Ann asked us to stand in a circle and to warm up 
physically through stretching and relaxation exercises. Then, she dimmed the 
lights and divided us into two groups, five lounging on the floor, five others 
standing, encircling them. As her project unfolded, her voice was steady and 
soothing: 
The group on the floor are movers ; the group standing around them 
are witnesses. In your own time, movers, close your eyes, and al­
low your body to move, any way it wants, and when it does, let 
whatever thoughts happen, happen-impulses, intuitions, images. 
This is  like freewriting: freedancing. Witnesses, all you need to do 
is  to keep the movers safe, keep them from hitting the walls or one 
another. Just watch, but al so pay attention to your own thoughts 
and reactions. (Doherty, 1 993) 
Now, almost a year later, I remember well my partiCipation in Jo-Ann' s  
project. During the movement phase, vivid images and thoughts came t o  m y  mind. 
Concurrent with an upward reach, I saw a brilliant night sky. Concurrent with a 
wing-like movement, I recalled images of dreams in which I could fly. Jo-Ann 
urged us to envision our bodies and movements as extensions of our writing selves. 
Because she was interested in the "connections and gaps" between the embodied 
and written voice, the last phase of her project had two parts : a mixture of dance 
and utterance-what one student later called "movement poetry"-and then quiet 
freewriting, intended to connect the page to our previous movements. In the first 
part, the group spontaneously danced together without music, some gliding, 
others just gesturing slowly. As we moved, Jo-Ann urged us to express words 
spontaneously, and after our initial nervousness and laughter, out they flowed, 
pell-mell. It was hilarious and exhilarating. Needless to say, we were a trusting, 
tight-knit group. 
After the exercises, we sat quietly, freewriting in our journals :  
len: Can't  put words t o  what I saw. N o  words i n  emotions, n o  words 
in movements, no words in reaction. Just movement. 
David: I felt like I could go on forever like that.. .. the movement 
poetry was also enlivening. I felt like I took it to heart, and kept 
expressing that lonely line [sic] I had explored in the pure move-
ment exercise . . . .  I found movements shaping words, words form-
ing movements . . .  . 
From Tim 's journal: I began to have images of a night sky, trees 
outlined in blue and black shadow, and the green shoots of garlic in 
the garden . . . .  As a witness, I tried to imagine what was happening 
22 JAEPL, Vol. l ,  Winter 1995-1996 
for each person. Were they simply moving on impulse-like Glenn 
seemed to be? Was Nicole rocking and almost motionless most of 
the time because of some deeply felt connection? The voices of 
their bodies-a sleeper, one yawning and gathered into motion, one 
rocking in a center. ( 1 993) 
Stacey: How can we express ourselves w/o the constraints of 
words? . . .  Movement. Movement seems so natural and uninhibited­
that's the way I imagine a dancer must feel-uninhibited-so flex­
ible to stretch their limbs gracefully, diagonally, horizontally. Stand 
up tall and extend your muscles, point and flex your toes, Roll your 
head. A goal of mine w/my writing is to abandon all of these 
constraints and be able to dancE with my pen [sic. ,  an illustration 
trailing off of the "E" ] .  ( 1 993) 
Movement along the Continuum 
In thinking about both of these experiments, to make sense of the many 
ways movement and words interact, involving different cognitive and emotional 
experiences for writers, we can draw on the work of Alice Brand ( 1 994). To un­
derstand the various ways emotion and thought co-exist, she uses the metaphor 
of a continuum, along which we might plot shifting ratios of cognition and 
emotion, depending upon the kind of experience we are having: From the "cool," 
"slanted toward cerebration," to the "hot," "weighted toward feeling" (p. 1 55) .  
Even though the "entire person" i s  the site for learning, there i s  heuristic, 
analytical value in such metaphoric separations, helping us appreciate the 
nuances of interrelated thought and feeling. 
Adapting Brand's  ( 1 994) "continuum," we can try to make sense of the ways 
movement and writing produce, in conj unction,  a variety of "valuative 
experiences"-Brand's  term for the complex interaction of arousal, motivation, 
cognition, and emotion. On the one end, as we move, we may experience some­
thing akin to arousal, what Brand and others call "felt sense" or "protoemotion." 
Such an experience is  prelinguistic, precognitive because it involves no "names." 
On the other end, as we move, we may have something akin to a cognitive, lin­
guistic experience, a fully felt and named emotion or thought. In the middle, 
movement and reflection are ways of bringing felt sense into conscious aware­
ness. Movement is  a way of "attending," the entire physical body participating 
in the process of thinking and feeling, moving toward greater consciousness and 
verbalization. 
By virtue of this sort of continuum, we can appreciate a progression among 
the experiences of both the contact dancers ( identified by last names)  and 
Jo-Ann's  participants (identified by first names), a progression from relatively 
unconscious ,  non- verbalized movement, to experiences of images ,  to a 
word-richness triggered by, or continuous with, movement itself: 
"No words in movements. No words . . .  " len 
For Jen, no words could capture the kind of knowing and experiencing of 
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movement. Words are absent in what Jo-Ann called the "body's  voice." Svane's 
"now-plane" seems comparable. 
"1 0% of my conscious mind . . .  " Bosse 
Just as we begin to attend to meaning in the course of moving, things may 
begin to make sense. Images ,  words, and feelings may be only vague "blips" at 
first, as on a radar. My own initial reaction was relatively uncognized. Immedi­
ately after, I recorded it as "impulses to move a limb-not very conscious, but 
sometimes moved because of an intruding thought 'have to move, '  or a sudden 
awareness of witnesses or noise upstairs." The dancer Bosse, as well, seems to 
describe this phenomenon: "While this [dance] went on . . .  1 0% of my conscious 
mind . . .  was still able to put labels on the 'happening. "' (Schwarz, 1 993,  p .  52) 
"Images fleet. A fleet of images. An association seems the next step. " Svane 
Insofar as images and memories are evoked during movement, our post-move­
ment, freewritten record of them may begin to capture the texture and substance 
of a movement experience. The image-word interaction is  also another dimen­
sion of "mingled" intelligences. During movement the visual and auditory modes 
are triggered simultaneously. The majority of my own movement experience was 
imagistic: "I began to have images of a night sky, trees outlined in blue and black 
shadow, and the green shoots of garlic in the garden." 
"1 found movements shaping words, words forming movements. " David 
For David words "happened" while he was moving, but he also seemed to 
explore a "line" in both the "pure movement" and "movement poetry" phases of 
Jo-Ann's  project. Here, as in improvisation, censorship loosens. Movement be­
comes heuristic, opening the door to linguistic performance. To the extent that 
ideas themselves are evoked as we move, words may begin to mix with, or cap­
ture, the knowing and experiencing of movement. As a moment-to-moment phe­
nomenon, such a relationship is indeed "tricky," hard to put into words alone. 
Schwarz and Svane also encouraged the dancers to begin with a "motional term" 
like "through" or "around." Overlie's experience attests to the power of this 
approach: "I suddenly had a whole new movement vocabulary available to me."  
(Schwarz, 1 993, p .  44) 
"to dancE with my pen " Stacey 
Finally, there may be a post-movement effort to translate in words that "feel" 
right. Through the medium of words,  we "feel through" or "convey" the move­
ment experience. Most of the dancers in Schwarz and Svane' s  experiment use 
writing as a post-movement processing of the subtle and intricate discoveries 
and experiences they have had (Schwarz 's  essay describing his project includes a 
total of fifteen written "reports" by the dancers). 
The above "progression" mirrors Brand 's ( 1 994) continuum, though I should 
echo her cautions about overlap and complexity (p. 1 56).  In general, I speculate 
that the emergence of sense through movement and into words depends on 
our motives for using movement: to experience the "body 's  voice" for 
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its own sake; to discover meanings and felt sense; to explore a pre­
determined word or idea; 
the confidence, ease, mood, or attitude of the mover, itself shaped by 
the immediate context and its climate; 
the trust of the group; 
the intensity of the movement experience; 
the highly particular experience in space-time; 
the nature of the emerging and often simultaneous emotions, images, 
and sensations; and 
the kind of writing we are doing, before, during and/or after the 
movements (recording, freewriting, reflecting, integrating into a larger 
essay) .  
It  seems clear from their writings that Schwarz and Svane's  dancers per­
ceived afresh the central ideas of their art. Jo-Ann's movers and witnesses, through 
combined movement and writing, experienced sensations, images, words, and 
ideas that writing without movement would not have produced. Moreover, these 
dancers literally and figuratively moved beyond verbs, the traditional words of 
action, transforming prepositions and adverbs into a new "movement vocabu­
lary." The material in both experiments may be viewed as reflective, linguistic 
cross-fertilizings of somatically transformed thinking. They seem shaped by the 
movement experiences themselves, leading the dancers into memories, associa­
tions, metaphors-the stuff of poems. Both of these "movement-language events" 
reveal a strong bond between what was felt and what was uttered; as a result, 
learning had a "stick-to-the-ribs" quality. 
As teachers, we can integrate movement into writing classes in different ways 
and to different degrees, depending on several factors. From the systematic con­
nections made by Klein and Hecker between movement and the progression of 
thought in writing, to Jo-Ann ' s  more open-ended, intuitive approaches to 
freewriting and "freedancing," our choices depend on our objectives and our 
willingness to take risks. We might ask students who are reading and writing 
about social issues to examine the metaphors of their own and others '  writings, 
to detect the emotional-cognitive "movements" of thought, and to weave within 
their reading and writing processes their own movement explorations. 
But there are simpler, easier beginnings: I use movement for writers to warm 
up and explore persona in text through physical, gestural activities such as facial 
expressions or "walks" used in conjunction with oral reading (see Johnstone, 1 9 8 1 ,  
on "status").  Peter Elbow ( 1 995) also offers a number o f  ways o f  incorporating 
physical performance into reading and writing activities, such as choral readings 
and tableaux. 
Clearly, movement takes time, and often the movement-writing connection, 
in its complex manifestations, is  not an efficient, instrumental means to finished 
written products. It is  more about expanding our sense of what learning can be 
and about connecting our multiple intelligences. To do this as teachers, we must 
try to create a reassuring climate that diminishes self-consciousness and embar­
rassment. We may feel safe relegating movement to a pre-writing stage of com-
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posing, and no doubt any greater role summons a changed vision: writers out of 
their seats ; writers moving their bodies; writers transforming these experiences 
into meaning. In essence, such images are a challenge to the prevailing culture of 
what counts as learning, knowledge, and writing. cQJ 
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The Subversive Element of Play: 
Using Play, Dream and the Body 
in the Classroom 
El len W. Kaplan 
0 n the summit of Mt. Grey lock, mid-hike on a Sunday, my family and I wit 
nessed an event that transformed us from casual observers into enthralled 
spectators. Three "actors" were engaged in an extraordinary performance: They 
were preparing to leap off a cliff. We stood spellbound as they unfurled their 
gear, strapped themselves into it, and soared aloft. The performers,  who received 
warm applause from the folks gathered around, were hang gliders. As an actor 
and acting teacher, I was struck by the analogy to theater: the concentration, the 
risk, the resistance to obstacle (gravity). 
Acting, at its best, i s  like jumping off a cliff: intense, detailed preparation 
followed by a jump into the unknown; playful improvisation within constraints; 
clarity and precision in observation; responsiveness to minute and ever-changing 
stimuli, and, above all, trust of our resources, trust of the body ; feeling, reacting 
in the moment to catch a current and stay aloft. 
Hang gliding, like acting, is an embodied experience; the knowing is in the 
doing. And learning to do it, so gliders say, comes from the "playing around" 
they can only do in the air. Knowing, doing, and playing are inextricably linked 
through the body-which is not to suggest that intellectual knowing is irrelevant. 
An ability to understand and analyze the engineering principles behind glider 
design or the aerodynamic principles that govern wind currents is essential 
knowledge for anyone wishing to leave the ground. But, plainly, one can 't fly if 
one doesn't fly. 
An embodied experience puts body knowledge at the center of learning, the 
sensate often unvoiced and unexamined knowledge that is part of a body 's  
history. But, like that which exists in dream and fantasy, what the body can' t  
tell us i s  valid precisely because it  is  often farthest from the reach of  social 
prescription and the authority of others. 
The mind abstracts experience, names, and categorizes it, bringing it into 
conformity with the already known, the normative, the accepted. But the body 
resists. It knows and has the capacity to act on its knowledge. Dance theorist 
Randy Martin ( 1 990) finds that the body in action threatens to subvert rational 
order, because it may well be a more reliable source of knowledge than the 
"polluted" ( i .e . ,  socially influenced) mind. In this sense valuing embodied 
experience is  fundamental to personal autonomy, to what Bruno Bettleheim ( 1 960) 
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calls a person's "inner ability to govern [him or herself]" (p. 74). The very ma­
teriality of the body makes it a subject, a site of agency; its actuality, its "pres­
ence," is  intrinsic to agency. 
Meaning, like agency, is directly linked to bodily experience. Mark Johnson 
( 1987), formulating a position that "put[s]  the body back into the mind" (p. xxxvi), 
contends that much of our understanding of the world takes the form of "meta­
phorical projection from the realm of physical bodily interactions onto so-called 
rational processes" (p. xx). In other words, meaning is derived from our bodily 
experience; the meaning of balance, for example, (literal and conceptual; the 
latter elaborated in metaphor) emerges from physical acts of balancing. 
Acting-performing-is body-centered knowing. There is  a chasm between 
my everyday self and the body that reveals itself in performance. When I act, the 
shift in my physical life alters my perception. My understanding shifts with al­
terations in alignment, adjustments to my spine, changes in my center of gravity, 
pauses in the rhythms of my breath. Paring my toenails with a rusty knife, grip­
ping the earth with strong ankles and bare toes as the peasant Agata in Betti 's  
Goat Island ( 1 966), profoundly alters my preverbal, precognitive understanding. 
I play the lover of a woman (with whom I am unacquainted) and inhibition is 
replaced by intimacy; I act differently until "the act" is  over. What I experience 
in those moments is an alternative self, a way of processing experience that comes 
from re-ordering it, the stuff of creativity. 
Repression and Subjugation of the Body 
Society demands regulation of the body ; we contain it: what flows from it, 
the space it occupies, the magnitude of its gestures, the loudness of its sounds .  
But  prohibition, censure, the filtering of impulse have corrosive effects on  
individuals and the larger community, both of which are diminished by their 
inability to use the unexpected gesture as a source of knowledge. Reclaiming the 
body, unlocking and welcoming it also releases the voice. Helene Cixous ( 1 98 1  ), 
speaking of women's  bodies as "confiscated," says,  "Censor the body and you 
censor breath and speech at the same time. Write your self. Your body must be 
heard" (p.  250) .  Fluency, expressiveness,  and the body 's  disinhibition are 
interconnected qualities, with social and political implications beyond personal! 
psychological ones. The needs of communities to regulate themselves are valid, 
but so too are the need of individuals '  to assert themselves, to question, to advo­
cate, to find and use their voices. Henry Louis  Gates Jr. ( 1 992) makes a strong 
point about the ownership of meaning: "[Language/the word] exists in other 
people ' s  mouth s ,  in other people ' s  conte x t s ,  s erving other people ' s  
intentions; . . .  one must take the work, and make it 'one's own'"  (p. 44). A plural­
istic, participatory society needs individuals who can make the word their own 
and become the authors of that experience. 
Playing and Doing 
The body knows because it does. Doing relates to the world; we are social 
"actors," and we change the world with our acts.  Play, an "as if' doing, may be 
a rehearsal for life, but it  is also a rehearsal for social change. Perhaps, echoing 
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Augusto Boa! ( 1 979), we could take the idea further: "Theater i s  action ! Perhaps 
not revolutionary in itself; but. . .  a rehearsal of revolution" (p. 1 55) .  
When we play, we set up alternate worlds; we create an artifice, a structure 
of rules that may mirror, invert, or negate the restrictions of everyday life. We 
re-arrange, explode, connect, juxtapose, by virtue of our curiosity alone. Play is  
both unruly and rule-bound, expansive and subversive; the release of energy, 
desire, voice and power that emanates from playful bodies is disturbing and of­
ten liberating. 
In Art as Experience ( 1 934) John Dewey traces the Western predilection 
for opposing play, the arts, all things physical, material, and actual with an 
emphasis on abstraction and the ideal. But the serious play of art, doing, being, 
and making contains within it the potential for transformation, the possibility of 
redefining ourselves (and our students) as meaning-creating beings. 
Going Inside 
For several years while working in rural Pennsylvania and inner c ity 
Philadelphia, I gave workshops in writing and creative drama for special educa­
tion students (i .e . ,  those identified with severe mental and physical impairments 
or social maladjustment), ranging in age from kindergarten to high school. In a 
room of rowdy and rambunctious kids who had been classified as disabled or 
disturbed, I asked who in the room considered themselves a poet. Not too many 
students responded "yes." Very few teenagers are eager to call themselves poets 
under any circumstances, certainly not in front of their friends and especially not 
to some stranger who ' s  dumb enough to admit to being an actor and, worse, a 
writer. Yet, these were kids with more passion and poetry and vivid insight than 
could fit on the page. By what definition were they not budding, incipient poets? 
What didn ' t  work in these classrooms was instantly apparent: I couldn ' t  go 
in and say, for example: Let's  get out on the floor and act; Let's  pretend to be 
other people, move from impulse, or be playful. Using your body is  a commit­
ment; dignity and psychological candor are at stake. The deep silent breathing, 
guided imagery, and free play with music that comprise the typical entry for be­
ginning actors was out of the question; the risks for these students were too great. 
Every age group presented different challenges, of course. But what worked 
consistently was finding the "group temperature," a sense of the dynamics, per­
sonalities, issues, and weaving a story with them that spoke out who they were in 
that moment. Responses to a simple set of questions (Where would we be if we 
weren 't here? Describe it, envision it, see it, say it. Who's  there? Who's  talking? 
What do you see there that makes you angry? What do you do about it? How 
does it change? Is there a lesson?) became an out-loud story we created and shared. 
From there we would make an environment and live in it, move through it, 
respond to it: a riverbed, a drive-in. And trust a story to emerge. 
With some groups the work remained preverbal; with others, dialogue and 
role-play allowed for reworking dramatic material from students' own lives. In 
one third grade class, for example, Aesop's  fable, "The Lion and the Mouse," 
developed into a parable about an uncle j ailed for selling drugs and the child' s  
ambivalence toward him. She understood the dramatic action b y  embodying it. 
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She scurried, nibbled, squealed, and hid in the face of danger (in her neighbor­
hood) , and he protected her from harm. But when he needed her help (in this 
case, her acceptance), she had to make choices about loyalty and her own sense 
of moral behavior; she communicated her inner struggles eloquently and acted 
on her decisions; in fact, she felt she couldn' t  stick by him, contrary to the mouse 
in the fable. She and her classmates explored and considered the implications of 
all this in the context of play. 
Through this work I found voices and bodies responding accurately to inner 
impulses. Two years ago, in Orange, Massachusetts, I developed a theater piece 
at a literacy center that celebrated the history of this rural town and the grit of its 
inhabitants. At first the adults who wrote and performed Hometown Tales looked 
at the blank page as a mortal enemy (the empty stage filled them with an even 
greater degree of terror). They began slowly, telling stories about their working 
lives, then recording and rewriting and shaping those stories into monologues. A 
few brave individuals began to improvise, writing on their feet, so to speak. And 
little by little they faced down the empty page, some beginning to express them­
selves in bursts of raw, gutsy writing. Others worked with dialogue, exploring an 
issue from two perspectives .  Many found that not only had they something to 
say, but they could say it and enj oy the experience. As one student stated after 
the performance, "You know, you can act. You can really act. A lot of people out 
there, they don ' t  really realize what they can do . . . .  When you do it, . . .  you ' d  be a 
lot more stronger about things" (Kingsley, 1 993,  p. 1 5  ) .  
Principles and Strategies 
How do we make the body and i ts  experience available to writers/ 
performers ? The trick i s  to find the strategies that unhook buttoned-up 
creativity in students and channel it into forms that strengthen their expression. 
The problems of self-censorship and stereotypical thinking haunt every class­
room. With my special students (many of whom were highly expressive verbally 
and physically but unable to articulate their insights), I used some of the same 
basic strategies that I use in teaching acting, strategies designed to unleash the 
stream of imagery and association we carry with us, and designed to connect this 
inner life with physical impulse. 
Crossing the Border 
In acting classes I often layer in core images and texts, myth, music,  
fragments of poetry, and dream journals to provide stimuli. In one class we used 
myths of transformation to create a theater collage entitled Crossing the Border. 
In small groups the class worked through a process of physical exploration, 
j ournal and poetry writing, mimesis, interview, and historical research to create 
short improvisational piece s .  The texts included selections from Ovid ' s  
Metamorphosis, a n  Inuit creation story, a Japanese legend about a geisha who 
turns into a cat, and fragments of a tale from The Arabian Nights. 
The process (which took place over several weeks) follows: First, the myths 
are read aloud to the "dreamers," all the actors who are in a quiet state; they then 
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draw their dream/responses without giving thought to the literal content, but 
working from sense impressions and fleeting images.  With music serving as a 
focus,  the actors envision and slowly move into the landscape they have 
imagined. Supported by quiet side-coaching, they use movement and sensory 
response to create an evocative terrain of obstacles,  attractions,  fearful and 
forceful objects. Actors then focus on a powerful sensory event: the sound of an 
axe, the smell of plantains. They allow it to act on them, to effect movement, 
motive, and imagery. Voices might whisper in the shadows ;  others might live 
here . Actors begin to find a character, what that character wants , how that 
character experiences this place. The actor then creates a ritual activity with 
significance to his or her imaginary life. Finally, each actor recovers something 
of value and leaves. 
The private experience of the actors now needs to be shaped and shared. The 
actors, working in the voice of their embryonic characters, write poems and read 
them aloud in small groups. The groups are able to discern motifs, points of 
connection and contradiction; this leads to discussion and the initial staging of 
the myth. 
As the rehearsal progresses the groups research sources, keep a dream 
journal, and write personal response material, including a dramatic monologue. 
Music is  chosen, visual images are collected, text is  written, and the piece i s  
rehearsed. Each actor within the group takes o n  the function o f  writer, designer, 
director, or choreographer. The final phase involves structuring a group piece 
that often incorporates elements of the myth with poetry, music, staging, and 
dialogue. 
Lynne 
The progress that one student, Lynne, made through this work illustrates both 
its effectiveness and its drawbacks. Lynne is a nontraditional student with no 
background in writing or performing; her reasons for taking the class were, she 
said, shyness and discomfort with her body. In one preparatory activity in which 
the class began from silence and gradually connected movement to breath, Lynne 
remained virtually frozen on the floor. When we added text (using phrases like 
"Voice," "My voice," "I can speak," and then bits of poetry), she whispered 
softly but began to move more freely. Only when we wrote short passages after 
the experience, however, could she explore and expand on her feelings.  
Things changed for Lynne when she was asked to come to class as a seven­
year-old child. "That' s  when I got past the adult part, the judging part. I got to 
the child . . .  the one I wanted to be, not the one that I was . "  She was becoming 
attuned to the impulses beneath her movements as well. When her group chose 
to work on "Orpheus and Eurydice," they contemporized the story. It became one 
of betrayal and loss of self; Eurydice w as lost in a private hell, mesmerized by a 
musician boyfriend who seduced her and saved her only to hurt her again in a 
cycle of abuse, abandonment, and rescue. Lynne found this character' s  voice in a 
powerful, beautifully rendered monologue of a battered woman. (She told me 
later that she had not experienced this herself but had gained insight through 
empathy, role-play, and research.) Cheryl, her Eurydice in the monologue, seemed 
Kaplan/The Subversive Element of Play 3 1  
to  disappear in her lover, living through and for him, justifying h is  behavior, 
unable to extricate herself. Eurydice's hell was the loss of her own identity and 
the abuse she withstood. The rescue of the myth was turned on its head. Cheryl 
finally had the courage to leave her abusive lover. 
Keys to the Kingdom 
In staging the myths students found connections between their own lives and 
the texts that were released and enriched by the playful and uncensored use of 
their bodies. Let me list the basic elements which need to be integrated into this 
work: 
Physical warmups, not calisthenics, but free movement connecting 
body, breath, image, and impulse; 
Inner listening (deep relaxation, meditation, focus on breath) to become 
aware of the flow of images inside; 
Sensory work to sharpen perception; 
Countering the inner censor that is  tied to shame (This means working 
against an atmosphere of discomfort with oddity, emotion, the "too­
big" response.);  
Respecting muscle memory, following physical impulse; and 
Welcoming the random, the chaotic, the unpredictable. 
There is a need to "three-dimensionalize" learning, to consider body, emotion, 
intuition, and imagination as partners with intellect. There are strong pedagogi­
cal reasons to consider teaching literature through rhythm, science through 
simulation, and politics through role-play. As we endorse playful ways of 
learning, we also move toward interdisciplinary, less field-specific approaches .  
Play is  work or  a t  least it might be .  Anthropologist Victor Turner ( 1 982) 
wrote a series of essays subtitled "The Human Seriousness of Play" in which he 
explains how play, which is a form of work for a child, may also perform work in 
society. In preindustrial cultures, he suggests, play contains "the seeds of 
cultural transformation, discontent with the way things are culturally, and social 
criticism" (p. 45). The opportunity to "play" with variables, to experiment be­
yond the limits of the norm, to offer freedom from constraint, i s  what makes play 
ergic or work-like; play changes society, or rather, allows the experimentation 
beyond constraint that contains the seeds of change. The ergic potential of play 
is restricted in industrial societies; the question is to what extent might we be 
able to make use of its power. 
Through play we meet a different order of knowing, a way of knowing in 
which, to paraphrase Henri Bergson ( 1 946), we place ourselves directly at the 
heart of the subject. We do with our bodies, and doing is a way of knowing. Play, 
which is  an unencumbered doing in an "as if' world, is  a crucial part of the way 
we know. cQJ 
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The Found Play: 
Learning and Teaching the Value 
of Interpretive Reading and Writing 
Randi Patterson and Kim Jern igan 
What is important is not to elaborate and 
disseminate knowledge about literature (in 
"literary histories ") but to show literature 
to be a mediator of knowledge. 
Roland Barthes 
I n traditional langu�ge education, the value of interpretive reading and writing is  usually taken for granted. As educators, we focus on reading literary works 
and writing critically about them with the underlying assumption that this type 
of reading and writing is valuable. However, many entry level students aren ' t  so 
sure. "Why must we take apart this story or poem? Isn ' t  the experience of read­
ing it enough? Surely the writer didn't  intend for us to waste time thinking about 
this structure or image pattern. Where do you get all thi s?" Despite some resis­
tance, students and educators are comfortable conceptualizing a literary text (ca­
nonical or not) primarily as a "thing," an artistic artifact or cultural icon worthy 
of study for its own sake, aesthetic pleasure, or historical-cultural representa­
tion. By conceptualizing the literary text as aesthetic object, we encourage both 
mute aesthetic response and thematic and/or cultural criticism. This approach i s  
itself necessary, but limited. Students are unsure o f  the value o f  interpretation 
itself, the importance and utility of the practice of critical reading and writing. 
Consequently, we must teach the nature and value of interpretation explicitly. 
If we focus on the work as both artifact and interpretive act, two types of 
interpretation are involved: authorial interpretation (the act of writing as both 
conscious and unconscious interpretation) and readerly interpretation. Because 
both are acts of interpretation, what the reader does can be seen as an extension 
of what the author does, rather than, as some students believe, antithetical to it or 
nonexistent. As such and arguably most important, the text is  a medium that 
enables us to see the value of our own acts of interpretation, our own readerly 
processes . 
What is at is sue here i s  not simply the difference between product and 
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process, but between our conceptualization and separation of "knowledge" as 
fact or artifact and "knowing" as a meaning-making process. While we strongly 
agree with critics such as Louise Rosenblatt ( 1 978) and Stanley Fish ( 1 980) that 
a transactional or interpretive theory of reading is necessary to effective reading 
and writing, most educators today are under pressure to acknowledge the role 
played by factual knowledge. However, we believe that this notion must be con­
sidered in any comprehensive articulation of the nature of "knowledge," a word 
which, after all, has both noun and verb forms. 
Theorists as disparate as the hermeneutic philosopher Paul Ricoeur and the 
progressive educational psychologist Howard Gardner agree that interpretation, 
as a conscious cognitive skill, is invaluable in the search for self-knowledge and 
the need to overcome unconscious, limiting habits of thought. For Ricoeur ( 1 98 1 )  
hermeneutics involves not only a resolution of conflicting interpretations, but 
more importantly, the search for self-understanding by means of cultural works, 
particularly works of art. Gardner urges "education for understanding," whereby 
one attains "a sufficient grasp of concepts, principles, or skills so that one can 
bring them to bear on new problems and situations, deciding in which ways one's 
present competencies can suffice and in which ways one may require new skills 
or knowledge" ( 1 99 1 ,  p. 1 8).  
In order to focus our students '  attention on the l i terary work as  an 
interpretive act deriving both from the author's  conscious and unconscious 
shaping of experience and the nature of language itself, we developed an 
exercise that requires students to eavesdrop on an actual conversation and then 
transcribe and shape this conversation into a short dramatic scene or "found" 
play. This exercise allows them to come at a literary artifact from the perspective 
of writer, performer, and critical reader by finding, enacting, and responding to a 
drama in their own domain. As we discovered, three types of interpretation are 
juxtaposed and made conscious in this project. When students turn actual dia­
logue into a play, they discover for themselves that the literary artifact is  itself a 
work of interpretation-their own. When the work is performed, they discover 
that there are additional levels of mediation (such as casting, setting, symbols, 
and word choice) which also influence interpretation. Finally, when evaluation 
takes place (self, peer, and instructor), students engage in the act of critical 
interpretation with which we are most familiar. By identifying these types of 
interpretations, we had been privileging literary criticism as evaluation and not 
teaching the value of interpreting the text as itself a work of both authorial and 
readerly hermeneutics. 
In order to take readers through our process, we outline the origins of the 
found play project, present a brief found play, examine the types of interpreta­
tion at work during the three main phases of the project, and articulate the peda­
gogical advantages of the project as a whole . 
Origins of the Project (Kim) 
I devised this exercise for a first-year genres course (i .e. ,  short stories, drama, 
novels ,  and poetry), the sort of course that attracts both students for whom it will 
be the only English course they take at the university and those for whom it is 
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the entry course into an English major. In Ontario first year students are 
typically 1 8  or 19 years old, though a number of second and third year students 
and returning students extended the age range to 45.  Consequently, students 
diverged both in their ability and their enthusiasm for the kind of close analysis 
we practiced in class. For some, criticism seemed to diminish their emotional 
response to a literary work without increasing their intellectual or aesthetic 
engagement in it or their understanding of the way language, inevitably, shapes 
their own experience. The question of authorial intent was often the stickler, that 
is ,  the question of whether criticism is a matter of perceiving or interpreting 
meaning or of simply extracting what the author has "put into" the text. Students 
were willing to accept both the constructed nature of the text and also the 
possibility that the act of construction might be partly intuitive, conditioned by 
the author 's  own psychology, culture, or historical and economic position. But 
they felt confident neither of their ability to divine the author 's  intention nor of 
their right to interpret the text. 
The term hermeneutics means not only to interpret but to translate into one's 
own idiom. I wanted an exercise that would help my students see how they 
selected, framed, and patterned the details of ordinary life in order to make it 
meaningful. I wanted them to understand that shaping the play was eased or 
frustrated by language, that is, how language both reflects and constructs the 
world. By having them play author, and then allowing the class to respond to 
their work, I hoped to demonstrate how a text can sustain a variety of 
interpretations, not all of which are subject to the author 's  control. 
A number of other educators have demonstrated the effectiveness of creative 
writing as a means to critical reading ( see Bowen, 1 993 ;  Gebhardt, 1 988).  Of 
particular relevance to the found play exercise is  Peter Parisi 's  ( 1 979) contention 
that creative writing, when offered for class discussion, can focus students'  at­
tention on the indeterminacy of their own language and on the way both the writ­
ing of a primary text and its subsequent reading are interpretative acts.  By ob­
serving what students make of their own work, their peers come to appreciate 
that language is not so much "the transparent garment of the writer 's  thought" as 
"a locus of . . .  possible meanings" which an adept reader or writer can "sense, con­
trol, and ultimately exploit (p.64). 
The Found Play (Randi) 
The project began with this basic intent: to personalize both authorial 
intent and critical interpretation. The students were not asked to create a play, 
but to form actual dialogue, so they could experience how the author molds and 
thus interprets experience without the overwhelming task of imagining a play. 
Kim introduced it as an impromptu exercise, marking the transition from their 
study of short fiction to drama. I subsequently wrote the project into the course, 
supplementing class discussion with written responses from students in their dual 
role as playwright and critic. 
The plays ranged from social realism to theater of the absurd, from farce to 
self-reflexive metadrama, plays that call attention to the process of their own 
construction. Circular forms were popular; and most, like the one below, pre-
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sented a slice of student or family life. The following play is typical of what 
students produced or found, both in its personal subject matter and its seeming 
inconsequentiality. 
Dinner Table Talk (Ang Vachon) 
Characters : Mom, Dad, Teenage Daughter, and Younger Daughter. 
Mom: [yells] Dinner! 
[Mom, Dad, and Younger Daughter all sit down at the dinner table. Mom and 
Dad are discussing their days.] 
Mom: I was talking to my sister today, and she told me that Brian cries every day 
when she drops him off at school.  He says he hates his teacher. 
Dad: [uninterested] Oh, yeah. 
Younger Daughter: [whining] Mom, cut the fat off my meat. 
Mom: [yelling] Becky ! It's dinner time ! 
Dad: [sarcastic] She's  probably on the phone again ! 
Younger Daughter: Why do we always have to have salad? 
Mom: Because it's good for you. Now stop asking questions and eat your dinner. 
[Older Daughter sits down at the table. ] 
Older Daughter: Pork chops are so gross ! They're fattening and I don' t  want one. 
Younger Daughter: [whining again] I have to eat my salad so she has to eat her 
meat ! 
Older Daughter: [says to sister] You be quiet ! [turns to mother] But Mom ! I ' m  
o n  a diet! 
Mom: [frustrated] I don't care. Do what you want! 
Younger Daughter: Danny had to sit in the thinking chair today because he spit in 
Jenny 's  hair. 
Older Daughter: We're eating ! Don't tell us your gross stories now ! 
Dad: Be nice to your sister. 
Older Daughter: Well, tell her not to . . . .  
[Telephone rings. The Older Daughter jumps up to answer it. ] 
Older Daughter: I ' ll get it !  [She exits . ]  
Levels of Interpretation 
The Play as Artifact: " Writing " the Found Play (Kim) 
Our instructions were minimal as to what constitutes a play. We asked 
students to listen for a bit of dialogue that had some sort of dramatic tension. We 
stressed that they need not reproduce the found text exactly, that they could trust 
memory to select the significant detail, intuition to shape it, and intellect to name 
it. Supplying a title was the one overtly interpretive gesture they needed to make. 
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The first thing the students were able to see was how the most mundane 
exchange became significant as soon as they lifted it from the quotidian, framed 
it, and set it before an audience. Presenting life as a literary artifact creates the 
illusion that everything is significant and connected. Because the found dialogues 
were isolated and transformed, the class saw them as cohesive texts and auto­
matically treated them as meaningful and the details symbolic. 
The intention of the author of Dinner Table Talk was to present a slice 
of ordinary family talk-fragmented and discontinuous-as opposed to sitcom 
family conversation. She claimed not to have given much thought as to how to 
give it aesthetic form. However, the class saw the telephone as a framing device. 
The teenage daughter is  presumably late for dinner because she is on the 
telephone. She subsequently uses the telephone to escape from the dinner table 
and the tension she has helped create. What is ordinarily a vehicle of communi­
cation becomes, ironically, a symbol of the failure to communicate. The teenager 's  
refusal to hear her younger sister ' s  concerns is  prefigured by the father's failure 
to attend to the mother and undermines the sincerity of his imperative, "Be nice 
to your sister." The play contains a number of passing references to culturally 
engendered values (for instance, the importance that teenage girls attach to being 
thin) and the whole argument around food is perhaps emblematic of a larger 
conflict in the family about what's "good for you." 
Such discussion focuses attention on the construction of meaning and on the 
degree to which a literary text is fluid or fixed. The "finder" of this play had not 
put in this symbolic detail in any conscious way. However, she could see in 
retrospect that in making her decisions about how to shape the play-where to 
begin and end, what to juxtapose-she had recognized, without fully articulat­
ing, the patterns inherent in the situation itself. 
As we hoped, students reported that the found play exercise gave them 
insight not only into literature but also into their own experience. One student, 
recording a conversation with an older relative which took place while they were 
raking leaves, thought he had written a simple play about male bonding when in 
fact, he had written about his sadness on his father 's  aging. When another 
student focused attention on a passing inquiry about the student's father (then 
severely crippled with arthritis), he began to see how much the whole interaction 
was overshadowed by his father's absence, the father ' s  inability to do such simple 
things as rake leaves, and how the setting (the time of year, the falling leaves, 
and other details he had thought to include) underscored a loss he was feeling but 
had not yet articulated. 
As their classmates responded to the plays, students began to relinquish the 
egocentric attitude that the author controls the text. At the same time, they 
discovered how many supposedly l iterary devices-the use of metaphors, 
repetition, silences, circular structures-are akin to their strategies for making 
experience intelligible. This helped them read with greater attention and begin to 
appreciate criticism. 
The Play as Enactment: Performing the Found Play (Kim) 
If creating the play as artifact allowed students to see how art can 
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determine as well as reflect what is significant in the world, then performing the 
plays in class allowed them to see how many different forms interpretation can 
take. This had two positive consequences:  It made criticism seem less daunting, 
and it empowered a different segment of the c l a s s  by fac i l i tating l e s s  
language-centered types o f  interpretation. 
Drama is a particularly useful genre for demonstrating the naturalness 
and value of interpretive response because of its inherent levels of mediation. 
Words of a play are not sacrosanct but are "interpreted" by the casting, the 
staging, the pacing-modes of interpretation more easily enacted, though no less 
telling, than conventional academic criticism. The playwrights were asked 
whether their plays turned out in performance as they had envisioned them. 
Often casting, vocal tonality, expression,  gestures ,  and timing shifted the 
intended meaning. For instance, the author of Dinner Table Talk could see 
how her play could be enacted humorously (for the comic predictability of the 
s ibl ing rivalry, the parents ' helples s resignation,  the audience ' s  benign 
identification with the scene) or more soberly (as  a sociological inquiry into 
family breakdown). 
Students were directed to consider not only the more obvious theatrical 
devices at work, but also the cultural context and how that affected their recep­
tion of the play. What was the effect of university students playing older or younger 
characters? How might people of different ages or economic classes react to the 
play? How do changes in the race or gender of given characters affect our sense 
of the power relationships at work? They could see, for instance, how, without 
changing a word of the text, casting women in a male locker room drama imme­
diately changed the impact of the scene. Thus, they were prepared to accept that 
a work's  professed ideology and its implicit ideology can be at odds. 
Gardner ( 1 99 1 )  proposes that intelligence is  not single but multiple, that 
students have disparate learning styles depending on the form of intelligence that 
dominates .  Humans possess to varying degrees the following seven "intelli­
gences": linguistic, logical-mathematical, spatial, musical, bodily-kinesthetic, 
interpersonal, and intrapersonal. Gardner argues that many "who exhibit the ca­
nonical [scholastic] mind are credited with understanding, even when real under­
standing is limited or absent" while others "who are capable of exhibiting sig­
nificant understanding appear deficient, simply because they cannot readily traf­
fic in the commonly accepted coin to the educational realm" (p. 1 2-1 5) .  Our 
educational system increasingly favors language-centered learners. Gardner urges 
educators to teach to a variety of learning styles. An unanticipated side effect of 
the found play was the sense of community it built in the class. The quality and 
engagement in class discussion increased as types of learners who had been re­
luctant to participate felt their disparate learning styles validated. Bowen ( 1 993) 
also found that the use of creative writing as a mode of critical inquiry levels the 
playing field and that student involvement in play production as well as in re­
sponse leads to richer discussion of the critical issues raised by the primary text. 
It also increases awareness of both the techniques available to writers in a given 
genre and the effects these techniques create. Both Bowen and Gardner envision 
a topic as a room with many doors; students will enter it differently depending 
on their learning styles. 
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The Play and Criticism: Evaluation as Interpretation ( Randi) 
The play as artifact and the play as enactment are forms of interpretation 
and also incentives to a third kind of interpretation. In order to help students 
discover what and how they know intuitively and to use that knowledge and 
experience to enhance critical interpretation, I subsequently developed several 
evaluative techniques. The first two times we tried this exercise, we focused on 
authorial interpretation and the levels  of mediation inherent in dramatic 
performance. In an effort to stress the importance of this kind of experiential 
exercise or performance-based learning, I graded each found play and provided a 
written assessment of how the play made meaning through the use of symbols, 
word choice, non-verbal dramatic devices, and so forth. For instance, one found 
play presented two roommates discussing an unspecified event taking place off 
stage that the characters ostensibly could see, but the audience could not. The 
result was a comic Theater of the Absurd. While the class could articulate why 
the play was funny, my interpretations not only provided a critical vocabulary to 
facilitate interpretation but also eased the transition from authorial intent and 
performance-based response to criticism. 
In order to encourage students to take part in  this type of criticism, I 
scheduled more time for in-class discussion of each play (7-8 minutes for each 
2-3 minute play).  To stress transferring oral criticism into critical writing, after 
hearing and contributing to class discussion, students were required to fill out a 
one-page written evaluation of two found plays. I assessed and graded this 
evaluation and returned it to the student playwrights. In addition, the playwrights 
were free to comment in class on the performance of their plays and were 
required to submit a brief evaluation of their play as performed, with particular 
attention to levels of mediation that resulted in unexpected interpretation.  
Consequently, all students received oral and written feedback from other 
students and the ins tructor, as  well as  experience in writing authoria l ,  
performance-based, and critical interpretation. 
In my evaluation of Dinner Table Talk, I focused on how the title influences 
our interpretation of the play as an example of "talk" and lack of communication 
or genuine "conversation."  The students were comfortable naming the play as 
social realism which used both the telephone and the entire family situation sym­
bolically. What was most satisfying for the students, as the playwright herself 
noted, was the interaction between shared personal experience as dramatically 
portrayed and the pleasure of articulating how this experience worked as a play. 
Bridges had been built between personal experience and authorial, performative, 
and critical interpretation, bridges that facilitated a sense of the personal value, 
limitations, and pleasure. Having had several interpretive experiences in relation 
to their own found play and the accessible and assessable plays of their peers, the 
students were able to apply these kinds of interpretations to the anthologies stud­
ied in the course. 
Then for us came the process of interpreting what the project had achieved and 
how. When we repeat the project, we will stress the movement of the play from arti­
fact, to enactment, to authorial and readerly interpretation. We will stress how both 
literature and criticism are ways of knowing and of creating knowledge. 
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What may resist articulation to some extent but nevertheless  be enacted in 
class is  the value of interpretive reading and writing. To some degree, the 
interpretation of a literary cultural artifact is used to provide justification for the 
value of a work. The text as literary artifact is a useful concept for reading in 
relation to historical and cultural concerns which must be recognized and used 
responsibly. But it must not be given priority over the pedagogical and personal 
value of learning about the nature of interpretation itself. Like particle and wave 
theories used to describe the nature of light, the nature of the text (and the nature 
of the text as knowledge) encompasses this basic act. Literary interpretation, then, 
not only operates within this epistemic system, but also provides us with the op­
portunity to foreground the nature of interpretation itself, to foreground the ways 
that we both know the world and create verbal knowledge. As the found play 
playwrights seemed to experience, interpretive reading and writing is  not valu­
able for the purpose of dissection or even to interpret a work for its own sake. 
By becoming conscious of different types of interpretation as we work in rela­
tion to literature, we become conscious of how we limit ourselves with private, 
disconnected interpretations, how we can expand our ethical and cultural hori­
zons by grappling with other interpretations, and why we should take pleasure in 
the human experience as it is  enacted in both literature and interpretive reading 
and writing. cQj 
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Subjectivity and Academic Discourse: 
Apples, Cupcakes, and Beige 
Frances Jo Grossman 
Pain gives of its healing power 
where we least expect it. 
Martin Heidegger 
P aul Ricoeur writes,"What asks to be brought to language in symbols ;  but which never passes over completely into language, is  always something 
powerful. . . "  ( 1 976, p. 63). This "something powerful" precipitated a search when 
I believed my writing held nothing ever to say again. Poet-philosopher Martin 
Heidegger describes poetry "as saying which, in preparing the sayable, simulta­
neously brings the unsayable as such into a world" ( 1 97 1 ,  p. 74). Heidegger places 
language in the context of disclosing and opening: "Language alone brings what 
is ,  as something that is ,  into the Open for the first time" (p. 73) .  I had not been 
aware of "something" needing to be brought into the Open. I was simply lost, 
and the world was colored gray. 
I kept remembering Camus'  first line from The Stranger: "Mother died 
today. Or, maybe, yesterday; I can' t  be sure" ( 1 95 8 ,  p.  563) .  And, I remember the 
coldness I felt not knowing exactly which day. That stranger ultimately gazed at 
"the dark spangled sky from a prison chamber with his heart open to the benign 
indifference to the universe" (p. 640) .  The stranger' s  tale presented difficult 
questions for both me and a sophomore class. During my early college teaching, 
I fell in love with Existentialism and such phrases as Camus'  "condemned to 
freedom" ( 1 966, p.  3 0 1 ), Sartre's  "existence precedes essence" ( 1 966, p. 277), 
and Pascal 's  "you must wager . . .  which will you choose" ( 1 966, p.  223). I still 
hold close those books, but my perspectives on responsibility, teaching, and choice 
have been tempered by sharp encounters with mortality . 
• • • 
My mother died on September 7th. I know the day, a holiday denoted to honor 
laborers, September's  first Monday. I remember the scene. That early morning I 
heard my name called by a stranger in a North Carolina mountain camp. Turning 
from the breakfast line, I set down the cold metal tray and followed the camp 
Frances Jo Grossman teaches composition at Georgia State University. A graduate of Emory University 
in the interdisciplinary fields of psychology and literature, she also writes poetry. 
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director. Something within me began a deep beating because the retreat had 
specified, "No telephones,  except in emergency." The director pointed to a tele­
phone in the kitchen. I listened, then sank into the chair brought by another 
stranger to whom I had waved, "Come, help." Help translate the words from my 
youngest daughter, calling long distance with her message, incomprehensible, 
yet the familiar language of sorrow-language of death. 
There had been that other death-my brother, my blue-eyed twin. Seeing my 
tears on his last visit, he held my hand, "I didn't  mean to hurt you." His wound­
ing words, spoken moments earlier, had merely been the truth. My daughter 's  
critical illness could no longer be hidden behind the mask I wore, pretending 
against such reality. Seeing my confusion, he gave a prescription to return from 
grief. "Be with people," he prompted, knowing my penchant for seeking refuge 
in the words of poets rather than in the presence of others. 
And then he was gone. Outrageous humor, boots, tall brother. Gone. I cannot 
remember the day he died. Several seasons have turned, and although that Sun­
day morning scene is  still vivid, I can never remember the date of that call. Alone 
in my bedroom, I was told of storms, icy curves, car destroyed, and a coroner' s  
findings. Someone later offered, "Died instantly." Just a season t o  remember, a 
time preceding the South's  early spring, about daffodil time. What now of my 
brother and my mother gone too? Both birthdays arrive in April, but neither i s  
here t o  receive flowers o r  telephone calls. Time t o  mark this interim o f  floor 
sitting, reading poetry, Matthew Arnold's "The Scholar Gypsy" ( 1 959),  the title I 
have always transposed to "The Gypsy Scholar." Does it matter whether one is a 
gypsy scholar or a scholar gypsy? It quite likely matters. A colleague counsels ,  
"Claim the voice you already know; you have no other time. What fear binds you 
rather than lets you assert your knowing?" My responses are feeble. I say, I 
don' t  have enough depth; I need another degree or a deeper understanding of 
Heidegger 's  being and Kierkegaard's  caritas (as cited in Brown, 1 955)  . 
• 
• 
• 
I had forgotten my exhortations to my students, "Write what you know." 
Truest writing emerges in stages not clearly defined yet somehow discernible. 
Writing develops through story; the extended narratives tell what happened. With 
familiar guidelines students choose sequences of temporal order or re-ordering 
the telling of the hour, the day, the event. Find the pictures, describe them, feel 
the scene. See the images in your mind's eye; re-create them with words as your 
resource. 
And they write stories that beguile with their sincerity and bravery and alert 
me to dangers in their lives. The class applauds stories that capture what it is to 
be the only white kid, the only black kid, the one assigned a seat behind the 
bookcase where she could hear but barely see the teacher. We read of a high 
school senior's battle to extricate herself from gang membership in the Blades. 
She knew the inevitable confrontation must be set in a public place; the police 
would be called if anyone were cut or shot. And someone was shot, and the po­
lice did come. The summer ends. Students' papers mix graduation and college 
with funerals for friends, a suicide, and a drug-related street killing. Accessible, 
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extraordinarily vivid, the stories speak, "This is me-the self who writes ."  
Then, moving toward more formal discourse, the students blend personal 
narrative with critical reflection. Some students make this transition without strain, 
yet few retain their natural voice, wry humor, or assured sense of "I know where­
fore I write."  
Again, on the floor surrounded by  the texts of  Yeats, Eliot, and Arnold, all 
who have given the world a "scholar gypsy" (gypsy scholar?), I cannot write. 
Not just my story seems lost,  but the autonomy and assurance that I earned in 
teaching term after term feel broken. I do not yet recognize this incertitude as a 
deep struggle to reclaim writing, my voice. Yet, my body knows that special sen­
sitivity of entering the classroom to eager and not-so-eager students, where I live 
the role of teacher in the manner taught by Louis Agassiz (Shaler, 1 957),  or Jo­
seph Conrad, or Maya Angelou, or Annie Dillard and all those who have guided 
our seeing. 
But in this moment, my questions spiral darkly. What do I see? What do I 
have to say? Where is my story? My story is loss-loss and fear of being aban­
doned with no one to notice or care whether I ever write again. 
Then I remember this gypsy-the scholar and the wonder of Arnold's story. 
I return to the old legend, the tale of the run-away scholar who learns of powers 
and ancient mysteries and never comes back, though he has promised to share his 
newly found secrets to fellow scholars. Yet, Arnold does not condemn the gypsy's 
failure to return; instead, he accepts the truant and makes a plea to "keep thy 
s olitude" and "unconquerable hope ."  Arnold creates a poetic world where 
enchantment, timelessness, and immortality prevail. 
Perpetually at play, the gifted scholar portrays one of many heroes in 
literature who pose questions about losing intuition or suppressing impulses. As 
literary critic, Arnold affirmed that the effect of literature on readers must be 
given serious consideration; he considered essential those "qualities which for­
tify readers" (Trilling, 1 959,  p. 589) to help them become more resolute in con­
fronting a world of difficult change. In writings marked by concern for imagina­
tion, the validation of emotion, and fear of loss of the power to feel, Arnold, the 
poet, cared. 
Now, the poet's  caring restores me to what is already known-stories must 
be told; stories must be written. I guide myself as I guide reluctant students. 
"Begin with your own story. You can' t  get it wrong." It is  then that I begin 
writing my stories: 
Growing up in the western Pennsylvania's foothills,  I watched 
the seasons turn in majestic autumns,  long winters, with spring 
colors not seen until May. Mother, from Alabama, told us about 
early spring-February with daffodils blooming down "home."  We 
never believed her. We thought, just another story of longing for 
the red dirt farm of her girlhood. 
When no family in our neighborhood owned an automobile, buses 
were transportation to any "where."  On Mother 's  Saturday trip 
downtown, she brought me a red apple from the open-air stand. I no 
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longer remember what she bought for my brothers and sisters :  
Encircling her, we scanned packages placed on the kitchen table. 
She brought me a single apple. I remember. 
This fall, about a month after Labor Day, I began buying apples, bags and 
bags of apples. 
In seventh grade I packed my lunch with Mother's lunch "stuff''­
bologna, cold cellar apples, and chocolate cupcakes in store-bought 
packages of three. Mother cut open the packages of cakes, and we 
rewrapped them in packages of two in wax paper. We seventh grad­
ers, the silliest beings inhabiting our planet, pointed, and shrieked. 
I noticed other cupcakes in neat cellophane, vanilla squiggles across 
the top, filled with cream. 
This fall ,  about a month after Labor Day, I began buying cellophane 
packages of chocolate cupcakes with vanilla squiggles and creamy filling.  
I sometimes bought three packages and ate them all at once. 
Mother wore beige, beige blouses,  sweaters, suits,  shoes, and 
several coats . When I was seven, she chose brown velvet for my 
Christmas pageant dress.  A long time ago I wore beige or tan until a 
day came when I realized that my entire wardrobe was some shade 
of brown. After that, I bought black, fuchsia, blues, burgundy, and 
gray and wear blue and black until this day. 
This fall, about a month after Labor Day, I bought an old beige corduroy 
jacket (reversible, beige inside and out) at my favorite thrift store. I wore it 
every day. 
By the end of January my sense of days and nights was confused. I ' d  awaken 
in a cold sweat wondering, "What time is it? What has happened?" And with a 
sharp blow, I would blur back to awareness-it is a new year. Then friends told 
me, "Eventually a sleep deficit takes its toll .  You need to rest and release your 
mind from the burden of this wakeful watching." Maybe I was guarding the night 
universe so no more brothers or mothers would get lost. And then I wrote: 
Apples, Cupcakes, and Beige 
I began buying apples 
green, golden, 
granny apples, 
beautiful heart shaped, 
red delicious, 
little blue circles claiming 
prize quality 
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I bought more apples 
adding to the bottom 
refrigerator drawer already full 
more green, more red, more gold 
I did not eat any 
I bought chocolate twinkies 
seventh grade cupcakes 
with cream filled centers 
I bought three packages of two 
and ate them all at once 
I bought an ugly beige corduroy jacket 
and wore it every day 
and finally 
I awoke in the middle of the night 
screaming 
I am not a dying frail old woman. 
I have not yet burned the jacket 
but the chocolate crusade is over 
and I really like oranges and bananas 
and today 
I saw a red headed woodpecker 
and a tiny little, 
nondescript, as they say, 
brown bird 
and, I am not as afraid 
of spring as I was. 
45 
And my friends cried with me, "We're glad you're back." I did not know I had 
gone away. Until I became conscious of my deep waking sleep of guarding the 
world, I had not noticed the calendar turning. It was daffodil time, the season of 
my brother 's  death. I did not know that my longing for his presence had been so 
strong that I would forget his formula for living and instead become the mother 
who joined her first son. Fragile little woman who had completed her l ife, gone 
now with no more April birthdays on earth . 
• • • 
Once our body ' s  buried grief is recognizable in the light of language, it can 
be named. Phenomenologists differ on many issues but largely agree that human 
beings embody consciousness. Merleau-Ponty ( 1 962) states,  "My body knows 
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more of the world than I myself' (p. 276). In order to exist, the thoughts and 
visions that seek completion become embodied in words. "The naming of objects 
does not follow their recognition, but is this recognition itself' ( 1 962, p. 207). 
Remy Kwant ( 1 960) writes, "To name is to bring to light. As long as a thing is 
unnamed . .  .it is submerged in a realm of obscurity. Through being named it emerges 
as a point of light in the world" (p. 38) .  Thus, grief moves from silence, to faint 
vision, to fragile wording, and then into a written-albeit fragmented-story. 
And story releases the "lost" writer back to the work of the world. 
Writing, too, has been waiting, because I have abandoned several projects 
in the middle. Frank Kermode ( 1 967), exquisite scholar-writer, tells us there are 
no beginnings. We always arrive in the "middest," to use his language (p. 39) .  
We always come in the middle, but that is our beginning. Writers, professionals, 
and novices need reminders that we are always beginning and ending; each 
ending is a beginning, with each moment unlike any other. 
Research demonstrating that the very act of composing is an epistemologi­
cal tool (Bruner, 1 987 ;  Emig, 1 977) confirms experience and returns us to 
primary questions. Does any single plane of language describe the encounter of 
subjective experience with objective existence? Metaphor promises illumina­
tion; empirical evidence provides data. Different domains of experience require 
different ways of seeing. The ambiguity of some experiences obliges us to under­
stand them at multiple levels. And some individuals do not know that or they 
need reminders of simultaneous meanings. To select an interpretive strategy from 
such a multiplicity of choices holds potential confusion for any writer. 
Yet, liberation for writers lies in the awareness  that we need not follow an 
orientation that challenges our own integrity. We can remain on chosen ground. 
Herbert Fingarette ( 1 963) articulates this concept: 
The question is not how to introduce what is alien in spirit into any 
of these visions . . .  [but] ,  rather, to shift from one great vision to an­
other so as to maximize our total vision, to deepen it, to build in 
many dimensions, to render what was opaque into that which is  never 
transparent but increasingly translucent. (p. 235) 
Writers live in a world so paradoxical that at  the very moment of fixing words in 
print, they may become inwardly aware of changes which can only be addressed 
in retrospect. The more critical the writing, the more likely perception shifts, the 
more likely other perspectives will emerge, complementary or contradictory, 
though not essentially canceling the others .  There is more to tell than I can ever 
say, and I know this even as I write. The challenge of "writing what you know" 
chooses a stance of informed naivete, not burdened or burdening others by 
assertions of absolutes. Yet the challenge remains to stay open to sharper visions 
of experience. Kwant ( 1 969) notes the paradox: "Strange as it may seem, our 
intellectual interpretations can sometimes make us blind to the original given" 
(p. 1 40). Bringing light to our questions rather than losing them in labyrinths of 
theory is essential to our goals .  
Now, I again remember Camus ( 1 955)  and his last line from "The Myth of 
Sisyphus" that I have often repeated: "One must imagine Sisyphus with joy" 
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(p. 9 1 ) . I do not know the exact day of my brother ' s  leaving; I simply cannot 
remember. However, awake, I returned to teaching where my students are simul­
taneously serious and outrageously funny. 
Despite Peter Elbow ' s  ( 1 99 1 )  free writing and Gabriele Rico ' s  ( 1 99 1 )  
clustering, at times students have trouble beginning. Possible responses : 
"Focus. Be present to your thinking. A writer 's  Now is the beginning and the 
ending." The writing surprises with the unexpected. The readings delight with 
recognition. Thoreau, Rodriguez, Welty, Walker, and all those beloved writers 
who cared to capture a reality so transitory that writing is the barest suggestion 
of what is. Most important, they cared not only to write for themselves but they 
cared enough to write for us,  too. 
I remember now other tasks, questions to research. How do personal stories 
connect to external contexts, to academic issues? I am not alone here. The 
very mentors who grounded my philosophical orientation offer more than an 
understanding of classroom dynamics; they defy any mandate that composition 
teaching is  limited to traditional discourse, questioning not just the language of 
sophisticated formality but a writing stance of detachment, the impersonal, the 
lack of emotion (see Berthoff's  concept "the consciousness of consciousness ."  
1 98 1 ,  p.  65) .  Expressive thinking and critical distinctions support the writer in 
merging objective and subjective knowing-although we have come to under­
stand that such designations of knowing are not sufficient. James Moffett 
affirms the whole student, expressing concern that the absence of spiritual val­
ues seriously inhibits writing, that isolated writing in artificial contexts divorces 
writing from "all octaves of our being-physical ,  emotional, intellectual, and 
spiritual" (Brand & Graves, 1 994, p. xi) .  The parade of scholars, theorists ,  
and perhaps gypsies proceeds along with the ongoing debate of the permeable 
boundaries connected to teaching writing both personal and academic, both 
critical and creative (Gleason, 1 993 ;  Wyche-Smith & Rose, 1 990). Within this 
multiplicity, some embrace a dialectic between the poles of the personal and the 
public ,  for although rhetorical traditions have separated narration from 
exposition, they can be considered an  "interdynamic continuum" (Dipardo, 1 990, 
p. 84 ) .  The theories of Paul Ricoeur ( 1 980) and Jerome Bruner ( 1987) provide 
the scholarly basis for accepting narrative as a way of knowing. 
Writing moves toward wholeness when students engage in the struggle to 
give passionate expression to their own issues .  Racism, abuse, and family 
dilemmas evolve from personal stories to rhetorical situations appropriate in 
academic circles .  Students generally do not  think of themselves as writers, but  if  
their work is  read aloud and applauded, they can no longer deny that possibility. 
Other times when students hear each others ' voices, the silence creates a space to 
name a tacit dimension that had existed prior to the writing but had not found 
expression. This is the mystery of intersubjectivity. By beginning with the real, 
the true, the issues emerge subterranean from the stories as each writer finds 
affirmation in, "As I see this ,  it i s ."  
We can create an honest space for silence to move into words. We do this by 
being open to mystery, to silence, to the resonance of language-by not being 
afraid of unstructured assignments, not fearing the secret, unspoken questions of 
discovery. The students write: I am light skinned in a dark skinned family; my 
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parents are angry when I do not speak Chinese at home; my mother cries since 
my sister ran away. All true. All stories connected to solemn questions in a world 
of conflicts within and wars without. 
And a body of scholars has emerged to challenge designating knowing to 
any single conscious cognitive realm, to explore ways of knowing previously 
under-studied or unstudied by composition theorists. Such ground is both brave 
and treacherous in the academy, bastion of quantifiable research, where emotion, 
intuition, inspiration, silence, and healing are likely to be met with disdain. If 
not lost in the academy, these topics are often perceived as threatening to more 
authentic research. Alice Brand ( 1 989) researches from a cognitivist's perspec­
tive the territory of therapy, emotions, the psychology of writing. In his preface, 
Richard Graves ( 1 990) names writing "spiritual agony and exhilaration," reflect­
ing lived research in spirituality and silence, the interface between the rational 
and the mystical. Willing to face the impalpable, the inscrutable, these scholars 
bring together colleagues who research topics heretofore deemed inexplicable 
(Brand & Graves, 1 994) . Allowing the words "feelings" and "heart" is  indeed 
"beyond the cognitive." 
Knowing that all  writing is  ultimately time alone, with sometimes precari­
ous boundaries, I still must write. So, too, students need to write of their losses 
or hidden searches until they are free again to pursue other issues. Whether we 
call such dim awareness affective barriers or writing blocks, when sleep, choices 
of food and clothing are governed by unconscious yearnings, all that we know of 
whole being and whole spirit tells us the body holds memories and understand­
ings that must be spoken before the body-mind can move to other subjects. Stu­
dents find validation for where they are in the story and confirmation that where 
they have been is a story well worth telling, well worth writing. 
Ricoeur's ( 1 976) philosophy of language encompasses an awareness of sen­
sitive intersubjectivity. Because of our essential singularity in the world, we are 
beings of solitude, in the radical sense: 
what is experienced by one person cannot be transferred whole as 
such and such experience to someone else. My experience cannot 
directly become your experience. Nevertheless ,  something i s  
transferred from one sphere o f  life t o  another. This something is  
not  the experience as experienced, but  i ts  meaning. Here i s  the 
miracle. The experience as experienced, as lived, remains private, 
but its sense, its meaning, becomes public. (pp. 1 5- 1 6) 
Ricoeur believes dialogical discourse appears as a way of overcoming the 
fundamental aloneness of each human being, and he names such communication 
"an enigma, even a wonder" (p. 1 5) .  Although writing brings complex issues 
different from those in speaking, the language events of writing and speaking are 
interrelated. Ricoeur expresses the paradox in universalizing the audience with 
a written text as opposed to face-to-face spoken dialogue, making written 
discourse "more spiritual" (p. 3 1 )  in the sense of moving beyond immediate 
personal encounter. The paradox suggests written dialogue includes the self-as­
other in the writer's  audience. 
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The gypsy told his fellow scholars that his knowledge needed a "heaven­
sent moment" (Arnold, 1 959, p. 6 10) in order to be imparted. He never told his 
secrets. We are earth-bound beings in body but we do know moments sent from 
heaven when our prisons of silence are broken into by the light of language. Some 
words, once written, lead to other travelers willing to journey with us, to the next 
story, to other beginnings .  C2J 
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A Plea for Re-Form: 
Aesthetics in the Writing Classroom 
Anne Mul l in 
F rom the window of the plane I relish the geometric boldness :  green squares, brown crescents, yellow rectangles striped with beige and bordered with this 
Tuesday' s  blue morning. I realize, though, that the farmer on his red dot of a 
tractor moving in the midst of one brown curve cannot see this grand design, this 
whole made up of complex relating forms. Nor can any of us on the plane see 
what he sees, the seeds being drilled into the furrows,  the occasional scooting 
mole, the curious worm. 
This momentary reflection serves as a metaphor for a concern that is  funda­
mental, I think, to our teaching of writing: we and our students "see" the writing 
in different ways, from differing perspectives. Our constant involvement with a 
panoply of professional and student writing gives us an aerial vista. We view a 
particular essay as a whole with its parts in relationship. We have probably, 
consciously or not, developed our perspective through the aesthetic appreciation 
of form in the work we have read, done, dreamed, loved, hated. 
I believe from experience that the more we help our students appreciate the 
aesthetics of form in writing, the more effective we become as writing teachers. 
Yet, I also believe that our training in teaching composition may not have 
prepared us explicitly to do this. We are likely to see our major function as 
helping students discover and express content, their ideas . We know that conven­
tional usage provides a means for that end, and so we are concerned when uncon­
ventional forms or "errors" get in the way of those ideas. We have tended, I 
think, to link notions of form with notions of norms or standards, and to deal 
with them when we teach about editing and proofreading. 
Our approach, I would argue, has not been so much wrong as limiting. I would 
further argue that we can enrich our repertoire of writing activities and responses 
when we teach form with approaches based on the principles of aesthetics. To do 
so, we needn' t  be intimidated, although we may well be fascinated, by discus­
sions ranging across the centuries and involving myriad attempts to define form 
and its relationship to content or idea in works of art. We can trace positions 
taken by Plato, Aristotle, Aquinas, Burke, Kant, Bell, Beardsley and Langer vis a 
vis formal properties like smoothness, wholeness,  freedom from imperfection, 
unity, and variety (Dickie, 1 97 1 ). We can observe debates about whether art works 
"contain" specific properties,  whether the formal properties or the conceptual 
content should be privileged, or whether a beholder determines art through aes­
thetic experience (Dziemidok, 1 993;  Kennick, 1 966; Lind, 1 992). 
Anne Mullin is Associate Professor of English and Writing Lab Director at Idaho State University. 
Her interests include unconscious influences on the writing process, poetry, and creativity. 
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Rather than becoming entangled in such debates, however, we may simply 
wish  to recognize that traditional terminology such as "proportion" and 
"harmony" and "arrangement" can be useful for talk about writing, because such 
terms relate to considerations of organizational coherence, tension, and style. 
We may want to remind ourselves that aesthetics has much to do with pleasure, 
and indulge ourselves again in the pleasures we feel when the form and content 
of an artistic work mesh, as Coleridge ( 1 962)aptly demonstrates: 
The reader should be carried forward . . .  by the pleasurable activity 
of mind excited by the attractions of the journey itself. Like the 
motion of a serpent. . . at every step he pauses and half recedes, and 
from the retrogressive movement collects the force which carries 
him onward. (p. l l ) 
We would probably agree with W.E. Kennick's point ( 1 963) that form and con­
tent are "neither exclusive nor exhaustive concepts" (p. l 94 ) .  Yet, as he notes, 
there are useful distinctions to be made between them: "the distinction between 
WHAT is said, depicted, presented, etc . ,  and HOW it is said, depicted, presented, 
etc . ,  connects with the distinction between form and content" (p. 1 98).  
We may be sensitive to literary form. Indeed, as one-time English majors and 
rhetoricians we can't  help but be. Our students, though, especially students in 
our freshman composition classes, may not have acquired the taste. We may very 
much want them to understand something about coherence, wholeness, variety in 
unity, or tension as desirable characteristics of writing; but we know we shall 
have tough sledding through such abstractions .  
Ah,  but  the concepts don ' t  have to remain abstract. They can  become 
concretely experienced as properties of art objects. We can bring students the 
campus art gallery to demonstrate the harmony of colors, the balance of mass, 
the detail within a unified shape as properties of paintings, sculptures, or other 
pieces on exhibit. Slides of art work can do the same. I like to invite a painter 
friend into my classes to illustrate how he confronts problems of unity, detail, 
center of interest, backgrounding and foregrounding, relevance, tone, mood, 
contrast, balance-all the elements of his process of "composing." 
Students can "see" and "feel" how the colors of mountains in a painting's 
background are subdued versions of the bright tones of a building, the center of 
interest. They can follow paths ofHght that conduct a viewer through supporting 
details to the main event. They can perceive how one selected figure dominates 
while others are put in appropriate relationship. Or how, although some elements 
have been left out or obscured, viewers apprehend a sense of wholeness.  We need 
not engage professional colleagues for such demonstrations. In our classes are 
photographers, potters, jewelry designers, musicians, and dancers who will share 
their experiences in creating various aesthetic forms in different media. Once 
students focus on forms and their relationships in masses of paint or bronze or 
movement or melody, they can, with explicit assistance, begin to appreciate texts 
as made up of similarly relating elements. 
Such explicit assistance for me is  a response heuristic based on Anthony 
Petrosky 's  1982 adaptation of David Bleich ' s  ( 1 978)  "subjective criticism," 
Students and I use four categories for comments: Content, Affect/ Associations, 
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Form, and Expectations_ I emphasize the "form" category by asking in prompts, 
"What do you notice about patterns of language, about words and phrases that 
keep being repeated?" Students list these for each other when they give peer 
feedback, noting "You use questions a lot" or "Short sentences, like a child. So I 
believe this is what you remember" or "You use 'the beach' a lot. So I wonder 
what is it  you think is so important?" 
Student writers further sharpen their sense of form when they give self­
responses. Admittedly, looking at the form of one's  own writing is hardest of all. 
The pull back into the writer mode with its concentration on making meaning, 
akin to the tractor-driving farmer's  absorption within his furrows,  exerts a 
powerful force. But with practice, writers do achieve enough distance to spot 
certain patterns,  state what feelings these evoke, and speculate on what their 
significance might be (Mullin, 1 994 ). Students look at how their sentences and 
paragraphs are put together, whether long or short, questions or negations, or 
bursting at the seams with ideas . 
These observations can also be represented tangibly by felt strips or 
by cuisinaire rods of equivalent or disparate lengths or by Tinker Toys .  The 
representations can be arranged in parallel or contrary directions, in clusters 
containing similar or unequal numbers of strips, in configurations with conjoined 
segments or loosely dangling or separated pieces .  It is eye-opening for students 
to see such concrete, non-verbal depictions of what aestheticians from Aristotle 
to the present mean by "arrangement." Linda Hecker and Karen Klein ( 1 994) 
offer still other ideas, such as choreographing essays to develop awareness of 
kinesthetic and spatial dimensions in language, in "The Write Moves ."  Physi­
cally positioning and repositioning elements, seeing and feeling their effects give 
new meaning to the process of revision. Or students can sketch the shape of the 
essay to which they are responding; is it a straight-line path from Point A to 
Point B ?  A meander that connects several seemingly unrelated issues? A drawer 
with neat compartments? A pie composed of variously sized wedges? A trunkful 
of odd bits of fabric, outgrown boots, slats from a broken chair? 
Once aware of how the formal aspects of written language may operate to 
trigger response in much the same way as do elements of a painting or tapestry or 
a symphony, we may more truly appreciate the relationships of form and content 
and their effect on audience. Cloudy or not, these are the depths into which I 
believe we and our students should plunge. Coleridge ( 1 962) reminds us that 
connections between form and content are not always consciously perceived 
by the artist: 
In every work of art there is  a reconcilement [sic] of the external 
with the internal ; the conscious is so impressed on the unconscious 
as to appear in it .  .. He who combines the two is the man of genius; 
and for that reason he must partake of both. (p. 258) 
Freud, of course, offered a deeper analysis of how perception of aesthetic 
pleasure derives from form and how form may trigger unconscious impulses. In 
Creative Writers and Daydreaming ( 1 959) he wrote of the artist (in this case the 
writer) who 
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bribes us by the purely formal-that i s ,  aesthetic-yield of 
pleasure which he offers us in the presentation of his phantasies 
[ sic] . . . .  In my opinion, all the aesthetic pleasure which a creative 
writer affords us has the character of a fore-pleasure of this kind, 
and our actual enj oyment of an imaginative work proceeds from a 
liberation of tensions in our minds. (p. 1 53)  
Unconscious responses may mingle with the conscious in  the perceiver 
as well as in the creator of the form. As teachers, we may wish to disavow 
unconscious influences on our readings of student papers. But perhaps we will 
accept the notion more readily if we can appreciate how our response to form in, 
say, a piece of sculpture, may result from non-conscious associations to elicit 
feelings deep inside ourselves, some longing, some tension that needs to be re­
leased, some wish or inchoate memory. 
When, for example, I stand in the Portland, Maine Museum of Art before Ben­
j amin Akers' marble, The Dead Pearl Diver, my response is powerful:  white, 
smooth, solid marble conveys, however improbably, a sense of limp flesh and 
wet netting. The formal shapes and surfaces produce in me a wish to touch them 
and experience their coolness and textures.  They also evoke emotions, associa­
tions, further sensory reactions, and intellectual responses: awe at the artist's 
genius of design and expression, grief and longing to caress and revive that dead 
son, a whiff of kelp, and recollections of starfish collected during childhood 
summers. I reexperience delight at reading the description of this work in progress 
in Hawthorne's ( 1 882) Marble Faun. I remember admiring the sculpture in Port­
land once before with my daughter. I sense intimations of an existence beyond 
dichotomies of death and life, matter and spirit, ephemera and eternity. The mix 
of sensory, emotional, and ideational responses is obviously evoked by elements 
of both form and content. But I also acknowledge the impact of my unconscious 
reading of the formal properties, which are then brought into conscious associa­
tion to ideas, memories, or dreams. 
Understanding the complexity with which I respond to an aesthetic object 
enables me to understand my response to students' texts and, in turn, to facilitate 
their peer responses. Ideas about tension and release, pain and pleasure, and 
openness to possibilities abound in Eco ' s  The Open Work ( 1 989) and in writings 
on fractal imagery, such as those by Short ( 1 99 1 ) ,  Voss ( 1988), and Gleick ( 1987). 
An appreciation of "fields of stimuli" and the dynamics of seeming randomness 
gives teachers grounds for dealing with papers we may find stimulating but are 
tempted to fault for lack of "coherence" or "adherence to an organizational plan" 
or "not meeting the expectations of the assignment." Artistic forms that balance 
on the brink of instability do evidence more "liveness" as the artist struggles for 
mastery over ideas and materials ;  the "safe" paper fails to raise our pulse rate. 
We can explore with students how to establish bounds for instability and chaos.  
When asked, students will  identify places in drafts where tensions or con­
flicts appear. The selected "places" may involve ideas or narrations of conflict, 
or they may be sentences that contradict each other, have an important word left 
out, or string themselves together with too many commas or no punctuation at 
all. Students point out such troublesome areas, often affective descriptors such 
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as "I was confused," or "lost," or bothered by "too much going on," where the 
writing breaks down. Similarly, where the writing i s  devoid of intensity or 
liveness ,  responses suggest "it goes on too long" or "it moves too slowly." 
Teachers can use such responses as opportunities to show how form and content 
interact. 
For example, in response to a basic writer 's  paper about leaving her home and 
family to come to the U.S . ,  peer readers pinpointed three episodes where they 
felt "confused." Yet, the class also highlighted these as points of greatest inter­
est. Here are the three: "I always hated the smell of my father 's  cigar. Now I miss 
it." "It was a beautiful necklace. I was shocked. My sister and I had never got 
along." "My mother and I held each other so tightly. After we broke apart and I 
ran onto the plane." 
When as a class group we focused on the formal patterns in each of these 
examples, we noticed how clauses and phrases push up against each other, cling 
together with commas or, as in the last sentence, separate abruptly. We could 
then see the joinings or partings not only as problems in punctuation but as points 
of tension, calling attention to possibilities for exploitation-which is why class 
interest was piqued. Readers asked the writer what it was about the cigar smell 
that she hated, when she realized she missed it, and why; they wanted to know 
lots more about the necklace, whether she accepted it as a gift, what she thought 
her sister had meant by it; they asked if she and her mother had embraced again 
after they "broke apart" once. The writer was able to add details to enrich and 
clarify those points of liveness.  
On the other hand, one long paragraph about the train ride to the airport was 
questioned in ways that suggested a need for more variety and intensity. "Did 
anything happen on the train?" "Was it really a long way? Or did it just seem that 
way?" "Maybe it was all very noisy, with kids and everyone yelling, but you and 
your family were just sitting there quietly?" The writer decided to eliminate the 
whole section, which, she said, had described "just a long, boring three-hour trip 
on the train." 
This episode illustrates another benefit from a focus on form. Formal 
elements, as Langer ( 1 974) notes, may be seen as both presentational (what is 
seen) and representational (what is meant) (p. 94). In the above examples, pre­
sentational aspects such as incongruous juxtapositions or unexpected divisions 
of phrases and clauses in some sentences may be interpreted as representations 
of ambivalence or of enforced separation. The presentation of the drawn-out 
paragraph describing the train ride suggests deferment of the inevitable good­
byes once the train reached the airport. In other words, the form may express a 
meaning different from that purported by the words and expected syntax. As 
Derrida ( 1 976) has  alerted us, "gaps," or "erasures," or  "brissures" can be read 
as "traces" which open a text to meanings that are "beyond it." Similarly, Mina 
Shaughnessy ( 1 97 4) pointed out that students' "errors" often betray the strain of 
unfamiliar discourse patterns, mislearned or misapplied rules. She notes how a 
student "avoids crisp beginnings with real subjects," uses empty filler words 
and passive voice,  and "backs off in other ways ,  both syntactically and 
semantically . . .  out of a tentativeness that is not of his making" (p. 86) .  By 
perceiving as presentational forms omitted words or non-parallel constructions 
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or sentence boundary problems,  teachers can point writers to underlying 
significance that they may want to explore more fully and move into consciously 
represented content. 
Admittedly, considerations of aesthetic form are not necessary in order for 
writing teachers to respond effectively to student papers. But such considerations 
lead me to different and far more interesting responses than I once gave. In 
taking up a set of student drafts, I ask myself about their formal properties. I ask 
how these formal elements of balance, or breaks in a line of development, or 
shifts in tense or person are acting in what Eco ( 1 989) would call my "field of 
stimuli." My perspective on my task shifts .  
When students focus on the form as well as the content of their writing, they 
also shift perspectives. Their vision and their revision of their texts alter. They 
can break out of the trap of their ideas and play with arrangements, with effects . 
They, and we, can exchange vantage points and expectations. We can narrow our 
sights on formal convention and notice formal disruptions or broaden our view to 
range across contrasts and unities.  We can sense the "what" and the "how" of a 
piece in harmony or in conflict. We can be on the ground, or circling aloft, or 
anywhere in between, experimenting with angles of vision. C2J 
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Writing Ritual and the Cultural Unconscious: 
The Great Mother Archetype 
in the Composition Classroom 
Cramer Cauthen 
Re-vision and the Cultural Unconscious 
When an archetypal motif is activated by experience in the social 
world, it i s  filled in with the contents present in the society. The 
form that the [motif] takes in any given culture, then, is the bridge 
between the universal and the historical; it is the point at which the 
archetype becomes particularized into its s·ocial manifestations . 
(Pro goff, as cited in Rushing & Frentz, 1 99 1 ,  p. 390) 
Feminist scholars contest the hegemony of "objective reason" in Western epis­temology, noting that this Apollonian tradition leads to hierarchical binary 
oppositions, inflexible judgments, and a separation of the knower and the known 
(Wilshire, 1 989). Although feminist practices-most notably collaboration-have 
become increasingly prevalent in composition classes, lacking is fundamental 
change toward a feminist epistemology that welcomes affective and metaphoric 
ways of making knowledge as well as "logical" ones. One path for this change 
uses myth and archetype, which make and convey knowledge in intrinsically af­
fective, metaphoric, and communal ways. Yet, Jungian archetypal theory has thus 
far had very little influence on feminist composition pedagogy. My attempt here 
is to ground Jung's  theories more fully within feminist composition practices, 
and, in particular, to demonstrate that the Great Mother archetype, given its 
frequency and extraordinary allusiveness, is  an empowering and practical resource 
for teachers looking for alternatives to Apollonian, objectivist pedagogies. 
Two common arguments arise against using Jungian archetypes in a feminist 
context. The first is  an ad hominem protest against Jung ' s  social ideas about 
women, which seem to have reflected "the general prejudices of his time, his 
views often being no different than those of any other Swiss "burgher" (Samuels, 
1 985,  p. 2 1 5) .  The second is  that the archetypes are essentialized, ahistorical and 
apolitical, and thus unresponsive to the cultural needs of contemporary society. 
We may, I think, safely dismiss  the first argument, for although we cannot 
absolve Jung of his prejudices, we can read through them and can use in feminist 
inquiries those aspects of his theories that are appropriate. Thus psychologist 
Jean S. Bolen ( 1 984) says that Jungian and feminist perspectives, when taken 
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together, "provide binocular vision into the psychology of women" (p. 4 ) .  
We can find a response to the second argument in the work of rhetoricians 
Janice Rushing and Thomas Frentz ( 1 99 1 ), who, like Bolen, advocate reading 
Jung in synthesis .  Their central assertion is  that "the external world of historical 
conditions and the internal world of psychological processes are separate, but 
interrelated, domains of human experience" (p. 386).  Therefore, they postulate a 
psychic structure that they call "the cultural unconscious," which is comprised 
of Jung ' s  collective archetypes " and the repres sed contrad ict ions  from 
oppressive social formations" (p .  39 1 ). One of  our tasks as  writers and teachers 
is to identify these contradictions and work against the forces promulgating them. 
So accessing this cultural unconscious, learning an alternative history of hum\ln 
spirituality, and finding this history reflected within us,  in our personal stories, 
in dreams, and in our relation to the natural world once seen as the body of the 
Great Mother, seems to me essential. The benefits of studying the cultural 
unconscious in the composition classroom lie in what Adrienne Rich ( 1 979) called 
"writing as re-vision . . .  the act of looking back, of seeing with fresh eyes, of en­
tering an old text from a new cultural direction" (p. 35) .  
Some of the most useful revisions of  Jung 's  theories appear in  a 1 985 collec­
tion edited by Estella Lauter and Carol S.  Rupprecht, Feminist Archetypal Theory. 
In their introduction to the book, Lauter and Rupprecht summarize the feminist 
objections to the Platonic, ahistorical aspects of Jung 's  theories .  They then ask 
the central question of how the concept of archetype remains useful to feminist 
theory. Their answer is  that archetype works when it is  validated by women's  
lived experiences:  
We need a theory that will  allow us to take seriously the patterns 
we find in women's  thoughts and images while preventing exalta­
tion of any detected patterns .  In such a theory the archetype cannot 
be defined as an image whose content is frozen but must be thought 
of as a process, a tendency to form and re-form images in relation 
to certain kinds of repeated experiences. (p. 1 6) 
In search of these processes Lauter ( 1 985) examined visualizations of the mother 
by women artists' to see if there was a viable archetypal pattern in them. She 
noted that women artists prior to the twentieth century were almost wholly 
restricted by patriarchal conventions in their depictions of mother figures .  But 
more recent artists have been relatively free "to explore the internal stresses of 
mothering in the modern world" (p. 53) .  This stresses what we might define as 
manifestations of the repressed contradictions in the cultural unconscious.  
Citing among others the highly varied works of Frida Kahlo, Remedios Varo, and 
Camille Billop, Lauter concluded that the Great Mother archetype may be both 
artistically and politically useful if properly contextualized, and that " [t]he 
concept of the archetype could be, in the hands of feminists, a way of recovering 
and revaluing women's  experiences, of discovering nodal points in  women's 
history" (p.  80) .  Adrienne Rich 's  1 976 book, Of Woman Born,  is  a lengthy 
meditation on these "nodal points" and on the contradictions in our culture' s  
view o f  motherhood (Christ, 1 980). 
Composition students, I believe, can isolate similar ways in which the Great 
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Mother archetype i s  culturally manifested in their lives. These ways may be 
inspired by previous artistic or literary works, but they need not be. What i s  
essential is  t o  maintain a balance between the cultural and the archetypal. A s  
Naomi Goldenberg ( l 979a) pointed out, w e  must not deny the necessity for myth, 
although we are free to reject any particular manifestation: 
[W]hat binds us together as human beings is not, in fact, the con­
tents of our religious and psychic imagery but rather the continual 
process of producing and reflecting on imagery. It is  not necessary 
to cling to past documents of the imaginal process to maintain reli­
gious communities .  Instead, we could build communities around 
the observing and sharing of the imaginal process alive in all of us .  
(p. 65) 
The composition classroom is ,  of course, precisely where such communities can 
be built. The advantages of the Great Mother archetype in building them lies in 
the paradox of its ubiquity and its relative unfamiliarity: To many modern stu­
dents, it would not be a "past document" and thus static and fetishized; but all 
students might be shown how to recognize it within their own imaginal processes. 
Dualism, Difference, and Mythopoetic Language 
Because we have separated humanity from nature, subject from 
object, values from analysis, knowledge from myth, and universi­
ties from the universe, it i s  enormously difficult for anyone but a 
poet or a mystic to understand what is going on in the holistic and 
mythopoeic [sic] thought of Ice Age humanity. (Thompson, as cited 
in Sjoo & Mor, 1 99 1 ,  p .  79) 
The history and attributes of the Great Mother archetype may be a particu­
larly valuable means of bringing feminist concerns into the classroom and using 
them newly to engage student writers. By studying the archetype, they can be­
come poets and mystics and therefore begin to collapse the hierarchical 
binaries that Thompson described. The first step in doing so is simply to realize 
that the power of patriarchy is based in Western dualism; as Christ and Plaskow 
( 1 979) pointed out, any dualism immediately becomes a hierarchy and "a model 
for domination" (p. 5) .  
The Great Mother Goddess originally combined within herself the attributes 
of what we now call "good" and "evil";  these attributes were later separated into 
the defining characteristics of two opposing deities (Neumann, 1955 ,  p. 1 2) .  It 
would be valuable for students to trace the beginnings of Western dualism to the 
transformation from one deity to two. But it is most important to see, as Rich 
( 1 979) did, that dualism begins in the subjugation of woman to man, which be­
comes a prototype for further oppression. 
Studying the history of the Great Mother reveals these derivative oppressions 
as well as the aboriginal one. For instance, Pamela Berger ( 1 985) showed re­
peatedly that the struggle in Europe between the Goddess religion and Christian­
ity was as much a class struggle as a theological one, with the rural poor hanging 
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on to parts of the old beliefs despite the legal and financial power of the Church. 
Patriarchal dualism can also be found when we examine racism and European 
colonialism. Not only is there considerable evidence that the worship of the Great 
Mother began in Africa (Sjoo & Mor, 1 99 1 ,  pp. 2 1 -32) but, as Neumann ( 1 955)  
demonstrated, our "natural" fear of darkness, encoded later into racial prejudice, 
was unknown to goddess worshippers (p. 2 1 2). 
Given the position that contemporary culture takes on the poor, people of 
color and women, and Earth itself, one of the most important opposites to col­
lapse is  that between the present and the past-that past rendered to us by histo­
rian Stone ( 1 990) and Sjoo and Mor ( 1 9 9 1 ) .  As these authors envisioned, the 
very idea of a goddess,  a unifying cultural symbol, subsumes polar opposites and 
unites very different ideas and experiences. Ena Campbell ( 1 982) noted a con­
temporary example of this unifying power of the Great Mother in her study of the 
Virgin of Guadalupe, who combines the Christian Virgin and Aztec earth 
goddess,  Tonantsi.  The Virgin of Guadalupe therefore mitigates class differences 
and "integrates the folk and mainstream cultures of Mexico" (p. 5 ) .  She has 
become a politically-motivating symbol of the entire Mexican people, as Campbell 
showed by citing the cry with which Miguel Hidalgo y Castilla began the revolu­
tion against Spain: "Long live the Virgin of Guadalupe and down with bad gov­
ernment !"  (p. 9). 
Students may find an analogous synthesis  in their own lives; the very 
experience of motherhood, and, if we can but recall it, our infancy, discharges 
the illusion of dualism by the intermingling of mother and child. The best way to 
recall these experiences and to generate further meanings from the present and 
historical constructions of motherhood is through archetypal knowledge, which, 
Jung ( 1 969) stated 
leads to a restoration or apocatastasis of the lives of [a woman 's] 
ancestors, who now, through the bridge of the momentary individual, 
pass down into the generations of the future. An experience of this 
kind gives the individual a place and a meaning in the life of the 
generations, so that all unnecessary obstacles are cleared out of the 
way of the life-stream that is to flow through her. At the same time 
the individual is  rescued from her i solation and restored to whole­
ness. All ritual preoccupation with archetypes ultimately has this 
aim and this result. (p. 1 88) 
One of my hopes as a student of the Great Mother archetype and a teacher is 
that archetypal knowledge lead us to enantiodramia. In turn, enantiodramia, by 
which Jung meant that everything eventually becomes its opposite, returns us to 
the mythopoetic language that Nelle Morton ( 1 979) characterized as one of the 
casualties of the patriarchal culture. Sjoo and Mor ( 1 99 1  ), reading Robert Graves'  
description in The White Goddess of the original, matrifocal language of poetry, 
describe it as nondualistic. 
Paradox and ambiguity are not exorcised as "illogical demons,"  but 
are felt and synthesized . . . .  Subjective and objective merge into an 
experience of cosmic oneness.  Such a thought mode, of course, does 
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not build huge political and corporate empires like Rome or Gen­
eral Motors. For these purposes men have devised a language of 
logical precision, in which words can be used like knives to chop 
up one continuous life into mechanically unrelated parts; in  which 
the v i sible-i . e . ,  the i ntellectually possessible-dimension i s  
stressed a t  the expense o f  the aural, tactile, affective, and mystic 
dimensions. (p. 4 1 )  
Practical Applications 
To expect a mythopoetic language of college writers may seem implausible. 
However, various methods based on both Jungian and feminist practices provide 
a beginning . All these methods have in common Rich ' s  ( 1 979)  concept of 
"re-vision." 
Most initial exercises in description emphasize the visual dimension that Sjoo 
and Mor ( 1 99 1 )  noted. An exercise in affective description presents students with 
a number of symbols of the Great Mother: the moon, fire, all bodies of water, 
volcanoes, wells, blood, lions, sows, stones, mares, cats, cranes, apples, seeds, 
the cycle of the seasons (Starhawk, 1 969, p. 263), chrysanthemums, shells, 
chalices ,  and roses (Spretnak, 1 9 9 1  ) .  Students are asked to select particular 
symbols from the list and describe their feelings about them. The writers are able 
to find parallels among these feelings by keeping in mind the fact that the 
symbols- and the beings who observe them-are interdependent subjects within 
a larger unity. 
I have adapted another beginning exercise from the work of Graves and Becker 
( 1 994) who use the river archetype. They begin by dealing with the physical source 
of the archetype, asking students to brainstorm a list of words describing the 
river near their college. The students brainstorm a l ist  descriptive of "the 
inner . . .  abstract" river, listen to music and poetry about rivers, and begin an ex­
tended text (pp. 5 8-59). This procedure works equally well with the mother ar­
chetype because a class full of students embodies a variety of attitudes toward 
mothering. For brainstorming, variations on this procedure might include 
particular images of the mother-possibly contrasting "traditional" representa­
tions with some of Lauter's  ( 1 985) examples-and examinations of the motherly 
aspects of the self. 
Collaboration is also important in the feminist archetypal classroom; not only 
can it decenter individual authority, but it can also give rise to shared archetypal 
images. Goldenberg ( 1 979b) described a women's  dream workshop in which the 
dreamer first relates as much of her dream as she can remember. Then she closes 
her eyes and is  questioned about it, extending the dream landscape spatially and/ 
or imagining herself as other characters in her dream (p. 224) . 
This technique works well in the classroom, and demonstrates to students 
how the cultural unconscious as a whole can be revisioned in a concrete example 
of the combination of social and archetypal knowledge-making (Hillman, 1 975) .  
Another c ol l aborative exerc i s e  asks s tudents  to r e v i s i o n  an earl ier  
religious or  mythic text, paying particular attention to  how binaries might be 
Cauthen!Writing Ritual and the Cultural Unconscious 63 
avoided, and to write a reflection on how the process  has involved them .  
Students might b e  advised here that many myths and religious stories have previ­
ously been revisioned, most notably the Eden myth, in which, as Spretnak ( 1 99 1 )  
pointed out, tree, serpent, and Eve herself have seen their original, celebratory 
meanings inverted (p. 1 40).  
This last example raises the problem of student resistance, which can be 
minimized sometimes by using avatars of the Great Mother that do not directly 
challenge conventional Western belief. Jean Bolen's  work ( 1 984) is useful here, 
and is one of the most powerful ways for writing students to use the archetype to 
contemplate their own lives. Bolen used the qualities of Greek goddesses : the 
assertiveness of Hera, the creativity of Aphrodite, the wisdom of Athena, to ex­
amine both the interior and temporal lives of women. Furthermore, she encour­
aged her readers to use these goddesses as models ,  saying that, for instance, the 
continued practice of meditation can bring on the influence of Hestia, the most 
"spiritual" of the Olympian goddesses, or that excursions in the wilderness may 
evoke Artemis, the Huntress (pp . 3 1-32). She also warned that abdicating the 
choice of models allows "an instinctual or an archetypal pattern [to] take over" 
(p. 285) .  All told, she saw the knowledge of goddesses as a means of becoming 
more aware of our choices and our freedoms ;  writing students can use this knowl­
edge to evaluate their previous decisions, to rewrite them, and to focus their fu­
ture choices.  
Another challenging project asks students to do in writing the same thing that 
Lauter ( 1 985) described woman artists as doing, imaging the mother as numinous 
and frighteningly bound by society at the same time. A somewhat similar attempt 
could be made to examine, perhaps in consultation with Stone ( 1 990), how the 
Great Mother has been (disastrously) revisioned in the past, and how she may yet 
be revisioned to redress the balance. This could inculcate the idea that revision i s  
a continuing process .  
It also seems important to study a particular goddess in depth. My focus for 
such a study would be Inanna, the Sumerian Queen of Heaven, because, as Sylvia 
Brinton Perera ( 1 9 8 1 )  characterized her, she "provides a many-faceted symbolic 
image, a wholeness pattern, of the feminine beyond the merely maternal" (p. 1 6) .  
lnanna is  extraordinarily allusive; she is  goddess  of the harvest, of rain,  of  
borders, of  war, of sexual love; she is  the evening star, healer and songwriter. 
Suitably, the main story focusing on her, "The Descent of Inanna" (Perera, 1 98 1  ), 
is also extremely rich in symbolism. 
As do the more familiar stories of Orpheus,  and Demeter and Kore, Inanna's 
story is  that of a j ourney into the world of the dead, and thus serves as "a 
paradigm for the life-enhancing descent into the abyss of the dark goddess and 
out again" (Perera, 1 9 8 1 ,  p. 1 3). My own interpretations use this paradigm for 
purposes of writerly introspection. Certainly we may see the myth of descent 
into the underworld as a metaphor not only for psychological insight and health, 
but for any difficult attempt at making knowledge, and, specifically, during the 
writing process. This process, in my experience and the experiences I have ob­
served in my students, begins with straightforward expectations which are com­
plicated by the gates (and gatekeepers) we must pass . There is confusion and 
pain in the process, but only when the seed dies can it  grow. 
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Ritual and Writing 
Teachers do not generally think of the composition classroom as a place for 
mythopoetic language and spirituality. Here again, however, the Great Mother 
archetype can act as an agent to synthesize apparent opposites. Sjoo and Mor 
( 1 99 1 )  affirm that for the women and men who knew the Great Mother even the 
most quotidian aspects of life were spiritual: 
Religious rites were combined with industry. Women's  religions 
were organic, a unity of daily life tasks and cosmic meaning. Among 
the women weavers of the matrifocal Navaho, for example, this is 
still so. 
The women experience themselves as being directly inspired by the 
Great Spider Woman, the original weaver of the universe. They use 
no set patterns and feel no separation between art (sacred) and craft 
(secular, profane). (p. 5 1 )  
The craft of writing becomes energized b y  spirituality if we revision our ideas of 
subjectivity into a feminist archetypal model that does not separate the knower 
and the known, intellect and affect. The student who learns through the Great 
Mother archetype to observe herself and the external world as interdependent 
learns to observe clearly and lovingly, and to see even the simplest writing task 
as a path toward sacred knowledge. cQ 
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Emotional Implication: 
Performing Within Emotional Gaps 
Kristie Fleckenstein 
W riting is  a process in which an author cannot be divorced from a reader any more than he or she can be severed from a text: We are always writing 
something for someone. In addition, the we and the someone exist in a mutually 
defining relationship. Writers do not merely have readers; they also transact 
ecologically (Rosenblatt, 1 978),  with one inscribing the other. It is Buber 's  ( 1 970) 
I and Thou, a fluid process of becoming in which the writer exists dynamically in 
relationship to an "other" by means of a "between" called the text world 
(LeFevre, 1987) .  
Dialectic is  the term we use to describe this fusion of writer and reader at  the 
heart of composing. But dialectic may be too limiting a concept. Authors transact 
with more than their readers. In the act of composing, they constitute not only 
their readers and their text worlds, but also themselves. A primary means for 
enacting this fluid performance is through emotional implication, a term I use to 
describe the process by which writers create emotional gaps that they expect read­
ers to infuse with feelings, attitudes, intentions, and motives-that loose aggre­
gate we call affect (Aylwin, 1 985) .  The sense of shared presence occurs when 
readers perform the role of the emotionally implicated other invited by the gaps 
writers create in their text worlds (Barthes,  1 96711 992, 1 97711 992; Iser, 1 974). 
To gain a clearer sense of this performance, I became part of the efforts of a 
published author to create a science fiction short story. The author providing the 
data for this exploratory study was Gail Wickman, a freelancer who writes short 
stories, especially science fiction, children ' s  stories, and poetry. As part of a 
description of my methodology, I wish to explain my relationship with Gail since 
it inevitably permeates my reading of her texts: protocol text and story text. Gail 
and I met six years ago when I was soliciting volunteers to serve as case study 
subjects for my dissertation. Gail, at that time a master's  candidate at a large 
Mid-western university, volunteered because she was curious about all the 
jargon I used in my written solicitation. During the ensuing years, we have formed 
a close friendship that has extended over a 700-mile separation, 4 pregnancies 
(2 hers, 2 mine) , innumerable protocols, and endless sessions responding to and 
discussing our writing, our children, and our lives. 
We wandered almost casually i nto the j oint venture of intermittently 
studying her writing and reading practices.  Thus far, in addition to regular 
conversations and manuscript reviews,  Gail has generated over 45 hours of 
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talk-aloud protocols,  recorded as she wrote journal entries, essays, poetry, and 
short stories. Together we have taped many hours of conversations discussing 
our composing practices and our evolving texts. Initially, I assumed a detached 
stance, believing I could use the protocols to understand the interaction of cogni­
tive and affective processes in Gail 's  writing without the intrusion of myself as 
reader. Although the illusion of detachment lasted throughout my dissertation, 
my belief in that detachment disappeared midway. Now I view our multi-layered 
conversations as a process of mutual inscription, similar to that which we engage 
in as readers and writers. Thus, my insights resulting from my research grow out 
of my participatory stance. As friend, as critical reader, as inquirer, I am both 
participant and researcher, inscribed and inscriber. The protocol transcripts and 
my interpretations thus reflect our multi-dimensional flow of expectations and 
response, offering opportunities to examine the "authoring" of writers, readers, 
texts, and participant-researchers. 
For this portion of our study, Gail  provided 9 hours of think-aloud 
protocols in  which she talked through her first and second drafts of a 3000-word 
science fiction short story called "The Brother." In addition to the protocols that 
recorded some of Gail 's  thoughts and reactions as she wrote "The Brother," Gail 
and I discussed her experiences in informal sessions sometimes many days after 
she completed her protocols. Finally, just as we discussed various permutations 
and combinations of elements as "The Brother" evolved, so did we review ideas 
and drafts for this article. 
Briefly, Gail 's  story involves Kerek, a young man struggling against his 
assigned role within a culture dominated by a priest-led religion. Religious 
ceremonies culminate every generation in a ritual sacrifice of a young man 
designated as "The God Made Flesh."  Kerek, son of the high priest and brother 
to the sacrificial victim, struggles to escape a marriage arranged by his father 
without endangering his position as the next high priest. 
I transcribed Gai l ' s  protocols-five hours of drafting, four hours of 
revision-parsing the transcripts into clauses, identifying each clause as an 
ideational unit. As I analyzed those units, working between generated text and 
protocol text, I identified a contrast between an absence or gap in the story text­
especially an emotional one-and the presence of a comment filling that gap in 
the protocol text. 
Gail would create a scene or an interaction, select a name, or plot a sequence 
without articulating the affective matrix out of which all these elements evolved. 
Instead, she would leave spaces that she expected her readers to infuse with the 
same feelings that guided Gail ' s  creation of that text world. As Gail described in 
one of our innumerable conversations about "The Brother": "I figure out what I 
want the reader to feel and try to create elements that invite that response." 
I call this process of creating emotional spaces emotional implication. 
Through those gaps-an absence that elicits a presence-Gail engaged in a 
dialectic that mutually evoked her reader, her evolving text world, and, more 
significantly, herself. Let me explain in more detail this concept of emotional 
implication, then describe the ways in which such spaces allowed Gail to 
establish and maintain a three-part flow of becoming. 
Emotional implication might be a more familiar concept if we examine it 
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from the angle of a reader, and, instead of implication, we talk of making 
inferences (Flood, 1 98 1 ) .  Inferring is  the act of supplying information not pro­
vided by the situation or text itself. An inference is  a type of "inheritance" in 
which a single instance inherits all the characteristics of its class (Beaugrande & 
Dressler, 1 98 1 ) . For instance, no situation is fully fleshed, neither one we create 
cued by an author nor one we author ourselves. Rather, it is adumbrated, and we 
supply the lack through our inferences.  Similarly, the powerful role of the absent 
signifier has been amply demonstrated by Lacan ( 1 972/1 987) in "The Seminar 
on the 'Purloined Letter. "' Derrida ( 1 976) in Of Grammatology also asserts the 
essential interplay of absence and presence in signification. What is  not said 
exercises a greater power than what is said.  Absence both constructs and 
deconstructs the presence of the text world. 
Such inferential spaces are emotional as well as informational. Emotional 
implication occurs when the author implies without specifically delineating the 
emotional tonality (such as the intentions, motives, attitudes, and/or feelings) 
that gives rise to an experience or is  engendered by one. The author does not 
tell, does not show; he or she expects. A variety of scholars-from Vygotsky 
( 1 962) and Bates ( 1 979) to Bartlett ( 1 932) and Aylwin ( 1985)-contend that lan­
guage and thought are affectively based. Emotional implication draws on that 
affective foundation or matrix.  When authors leave an emotional gap, they re­
quire us to perform emotionally, to inscribe responses, feelings, motives, and 
intentions .  It is within these emotional spaces that Gail invites her readers, her­
self, and her text world to become. 
Inscribing the Reader, Creating the Writer 
Dialectic has been traditionally used to describe a reader-writer relationship ; 
thus ,  I would first l ike to examine the ways in which Gail uses emotional 
implication to create her readers and her persona as author. According to Gail, 
the following example from the story text was designed to evoke emotions she 
believed readers possessed concerning particular gender interactions. In "The 
Brother," an opening scene involves the protagonist, Kerek, repudiating his 
intended wife, Dayca. At one point Dayca falls to her knees, clasping Kerek' s  
legs .  H e  kicks her away. The actual text o f  the short story describes the visual 
dynamics of the scene, but nowhere does the wording explicitly delineate Gail ' s  
expectations of her reader 's  responses. 
However, as she creates this scene, Gail comments in her protocol text that 
the spatial arrangement of Kerek towering over Dayca will evoke a sense of pity 
in her readers: "Okay, so he' s  standing before her. So she's going to look up. 
That's gonna make her pitiful looking."  Since in the story text Gail never uses 
the term "pitiful" or a synonym, she expects the reader to fill this emotional gap, 
to inscribe the presence of a particular emotion within the textual space. 
As the scene continues through both dialogue and physical action, Kerek 
repeatedly rejects Dayca, who asserts she is pregnant with his child. Again, as 
Gail creates this cycle of assertion-rejection, she intersperses protocol comments 
articulating emotions that she expects her readers to inscribe as part of their text 
world experience. For instance, after designing Dayca's plea for an early mar-
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riage, Gail comments, first, "Kerek, being the asshole he is ."  Then she com­
poses a description of Kerek' s  state as one of exultation at Dayca's imminent 
dishonor. The story text, however, does not include descriptions either of Kerek's 
character or of his state of mind. Thus, for the scene to function as an effective 
part of Gail 's  intended plot, the reader must fill the textual gaps with emotional 
inferences that Gail articulates only in her protocol comments. 
Based on her protocol comments, then, Gail creates an emotional space that 
invites a particular kind of play with particular players. Gail designs a readerly 
presence as well as an emotional presence within the textual absence. This reader 
is one who will visualize a scene involving inequitable power lines between a 
man and a woman; it is a reader who can cast the woman as victim, sympathize 
with her, and condemn the man, perhaps even stigmatizing him with the epithet 
"asshole," "jerk," "fink," or "bastard," all terms Gail uses to describe Kerek in 
her protocols. At one point in her protocol comments, Gail responds to a situa­
tion she created involving Kerek by asking : "Is Kerek a bastard? He just wants 
to. Well, yeah he is .  He is ."  For the text world to function as she has planned, 
Gail expects her readers to infuse the Kerek-Dayca interaction with the same 
emotional resonance, thus evoking their attitudes and feelings on gender rela­
tionships. If these expectations concerning emotional implication are not met, 
the reader-writer dialectic is disrupted, and the text world may careen out of the 
author 's  control. 
If Gail inscribes her readers through her expectations regarding emotional 
implication, she is  also inscribing herself. She does so in two ways. The first and 
most obvious way is through her very expectations of a reader ' s  responses. She 
expects her "other" to react with a particular emotion because that is  one Gail 
experiences in response to this evolving text world. During the initial confronta­
tion between Kerek and Dayca, Gail creates a scene of unequal power. In doing 
so, she defines her own sense of equitable power lines between genders, then 
negates and unravels it. She expects her reader to view Dayca as pitiful (or later 
in the protocol Gail describes her as "sweet"), because that is how Gail initially 
sees her, thereby constituting through that revelation her sense of power in gen­
der relationships . Thus,  by the protocol comments reflecting her expectations of 
her reader 's  emotional responses, Gail also reveals the expectations that drive 
her own responses. 
Second, Gail defines who she is by her unacknowledged emotional gaps, 
unacknowledged because they are accepted as already filled space. It is  not what 
she comments on in her protocols that is so significant; it i s  what she does not 
comment on. Thus, just as gaps in the story text are important in tracing the 
presence of reader and emotion, so are gaps in the protocol text important for 
tracing the creation of authorial presence. And it is within these gaps that I, as 
the participant-researcher, enact my performance. For instance, because I am ac­
tively responding to absences in the protocol comments, I infer that Gail has 
automatically inscribed her presence within that textual absence, an absence that 
exists several levels below those that "exist" within her story text. In this "taken­
for-granted" emotional space, I read her as unknowingly inscribing the emotional 
truths that define her life, the default options that guide her unconsciously. Per­
haps the most dramatic example of this array of layered gaps is that of the father 
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in Gail 's  story text. 
Within the short story, Kerek and Taret 's  father, the current high priest, ap­
pears as a physical presence only in the final sacrificial scene of the story. Yet he 
is a powerful and controlling, albeit absent, force in the story. For example, the 
father betroths Dayca to Kerek against Kerek's protests; the father raises Kerek 
to spy on the populace; the father chooses Taret to live and die as the god-made­
flesh; the father perpetuates the status quo. The father is  the main mover and 
shaker in the story, not Kerek who dominates physically. Yet no where in her 
protocol comments, barring a question in her first draft about elaborating on the 
father as a force of nature or evil, does Gail comment on responses she expects 
the characterization of the father to evoke. Commenting is unnecessary because 
these emotional gaps are automatically filled by a culturally conditioned 
presence. For instance, in Western liberal society husbands do not sacrifice their 
wives; fathers do not cut the heart out of their sons, either psychologically or 
physically; fathers do not impregnate their son's bride; nor choose as their son ' s  
bride a woman whom the father has  impregnated. Therefore, any father who 
behaves as such is  reprehensible and should be the subject of negative responses. 
No protocol or story text comment is  necessary, and, within this unacknowledged 
and unfilled space, I "read" Gail as inscribing herself in terms of her truths about 
a father-child relationship. The same point can be made about the father ' s  
physical absence within the  story : fathers i n  our  culture are absent, but  
controlling forces (Luepnitz, 1 988) .  
Inscribing the Text World, Creating the Writer 
Finally, Gail defines and is defined by her evolving text world through the 
very emotional gaps she creates as a means to inscribe her reader. The characters 
acquire a life and force of their own, acting, then, as a force on Gail. Perhaps the 
best example of this is the change that occurs within Kerek during the course of 
the story. In the first scene, Gail attempts to establish Kerek as, in her words, 
"cruel" and "malicious," a "fink." The emotional gaps she creates are almost 
gleefully filled with protocol comments highlighting Kerek's less than admirable 
character. However, when Kerek begins to interact with his older brother, Taret, 
he starts slipping away from this negative representation. 
Gail runs into difficulty when she tries to fill the emotional gaps caused 
by creating a close sibling relationship. As she constructs Kerek and Taret's 
interactions, she infuses Kerek with feelings and motivations she can identify 
positively with, particularly brother love. For instance, at one point Gail puzzles: 
"Kerek is  stuck between Scylla and Charybdis but that doesn't  mean he loves his 
brother any less; he's really torn up by the whole idea. So how's  he going to react 
when his brother says, I ' m  glad I ' m  going to get to be in your wedding before 
I die." 
Gradually, the change in Kerek, even while created by Gail, creates her as 
well. The search for motives and feelings to justify Kerek's reactions inscribes a 
tension in Gail that she is unable to resolve. By the end of the first draft, Gail 
admits that Kerek has "over time has gotten nicer," while Dayca has gotten "nasty." 
She asserted within her final drafting protocol that "there ' s  no reason for this 
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change; I ' ve got  to  figure other ways for this to  make sense because I don 't want 
to change it." In the process of creating a character who deeply loved a brother, 
Gail was unable to cast that same character as repudiating, without some cause, a 
female with whom he was physically intimate. She was in essence defined by 
this conflict within the text world. During a discussion session between drafts, 
Gail said that she discovered that she couldn 't write about a "bastard." The very 
process of inscribing a character thus created a backlash that forced her to 
re-define who she was in this context. 
Inscribing a Text, Creating More Text 
So who creates whom? My answer resembles the progressive song, "This Is 
the House that Jack Built," so popular with small children: Presences are inscribed 
in the emotional gaps of a story text that writers create for readers to fill; the 
play within spaces boomerangs to create the writers who carry within themselves 
their own unacknowledged gaps. Like a progressive song, the performance tumbles 
forward. Writers and readers are inscribed even as they inscribe, and, on an equally 
important level, so are the participant-researchers who perform with them. The 
chain that links Poe, Lacan, Derrida, and Johnson ( 1 97 81 1 987) suggests the 
infinite regress of performance within gaps. No real end, no real beginning, just 
the ebb and flow of expectation and response, absence and presence. Within this 
flow, however, we are left with some interesting observations concerning the 
reader-writer-text world transaction. 
First, reading and writing may be a product of emotional as well as ideational 
coherence. For instance, the very act of emotional implication seems to be built 
on the belief that an imagined reader will attempt to empathize with an author' s  
vision o f  the text world, not a n  unexpected conclusion concerning poetic writing 
given the wealth of research on emotional involvement in aesthetic reading. Not 
only do proficient pleasure readers suspend disbelief, but they also actively 
attempt to identify emotionally with a text world. If the reading process goes 
awry-if, for instance, no empathy or no engagement occurs or if an unexpected 
perhaps inappropriate response takes control-we might wish to examine the 
territory of emotional gaps. How was an absence perceived, if at all? How was a 
presence infused? The construction (and the deconstruction) of a text world is  
an emotional as well as an intellectual endeavor; therefore, unexpected turns may 
be the result of affective factors. Burke (as cited in Foss, Foss, & Trapp, 1 985) 
describes coherence as the arousing and fulfilling of desires.  If the arousing and 
fulfilling of emotional expectations derails, a type of emotional incoherence could 
result, holding as much potential for disruption as ideational incoherence. 
In the s ame vein,  a writer may be the v i ctim of her own emotional 
incoherence. For instance, if the trail of absences goes awry for the writer, as it 
does for Gail with Kerek and Dayca, perhaps the place to begin investigation is 
not with the concept of ideational coherence but with interpersonal coherence. 
The emotional relationship between reader, writer, and text, may have derailed, 
yielding a sense of fragmented meaning. Coherence, an unimpeded flow of ex­
pectation and response, is  as much a product of the heart as it is  of the head. Gail 
explained in a conversation following a protocol session that she "gets into an 
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emotion" and writes from that basis. However, she added that she couldn ' t  "think 
about the emotion [because] it interferes ."  Such interference of the heart with 
the head, or the reverse, offers a new view of writer-based prose. 
A second observation ari sing from studying emotional gaps involves 
socio-cultural factors. Inscribing a presence within an absence, as we do with 
emotional gaps, inevitably evokes patterns of socio-cultural practices. The site 
of an emotional absence and the infusion of an emotional "something" offers a 
fruitful area for examining cultural codes.  A problem in both cultural studies and 
writing research is that cultural codes tend to be treated as blueprints or molds 
that exist prior to and determine individual development. But cultural codes, 
like linguistic codes, like schemata, are not deep structures but active processes 
traceable only in an action, such as the creation of meaning (Turner & Bruner, 
1 986). The process of filling an emotional gap is a point of emergent meaning 
and thus a moment during which we can "freeze" those cultural codes and exam­
ine their influence in inscribing identity: self, other, and text world. For instance, 
not all cultures would infuse a scene in which a woman kneels weeping at a man's  
feet with negative emotions: pity and distress for the woman, condemnation and 
dislike for the man. Thus, the flow of implication and inference can be examined 
from the perspective of cultural influences. 
My tentative conclusion on the bas i s  of this study i s  that dialectic,  
especially reader-writer dialectic, is  too restrictive, perhaps even inappropriate. 
Dialectic, with its implication of duality-even a mutually defining duality-is 
misleading . Gail constituted not only herself as a writer and perhaps even herself 
as other-the reader-but also her text world in a three-part relationship: an I 
and Thou and This. In addition, as the participant-researcher in this performance, 
I, too, was invited to inscribe myself as I inscribed Gail. What replayed itself 
through her protocols and our collaboration was a intricate play of evolving writer, 
reader, researcher, and text worlds as we performed within the space of emo­
tional gaps. Identities merged, shifted, transformed, and reconstituted themselves 
throughout these instances of meaning-making. I ' m  not sure what term or meta­
phor best captures this fluid shift of absence and presence that yields so many in­
separable identities. But regardless of the terminology, as we examine the emo­
tional dimension of the writer-reader performance, we must also factor in the 
impinging plane of the text worlds, no small task. Q:j 
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Mental Imagery, Psychology, and Rhetoric : 
An Examination of Recurring Problems 
Linda T. Calendrillo 
A s writing specialists we often cross into psychology to inform our composing theories and practices. However, mental imagery in our field is 
not fully recognized as an area of inquiry from which to draw our theories. This 
is a mistake for those of us interested in enhancing our thinking about writing 
from the fullest possible range of disciplines. But this neglect is not surprising. 
Research into mental imagery is fraught with debate over its nature and the 
legitimacy of studying it .  Indeed, by examining the parallels between the 
contemporary debate in psychology and the class ical  rhetorical debate 
surrounding the use of the mnemonic image, I show that the marginalizing of 
mental imagery in rhetorical theory and pedagogy is an old phenomenon. 
In this article I look at the conceptual problems psychologists face as they 
describe, test, and apply mental imagery to show that we can trace similar problems 
in rhetorical history. I look at the contemporary debate between the pictorialists­
those who believe mental images are like photographs in the mind-and the 
descriptionalists-those who hold that mental images represent ideas or sentences in 
the mind (Finke, 1 989; Pinker & Kosslyn, 1983; Tye, 1984). 
Let me summarize the problems that psychologists discuss when they 
describe empirical difficulties in experimenting with mental imagery. Ronald 
Finke ( 1989) in Principles of Mental Images isolates what he sees as two basic 
problems in studying mental imagery. Finke says mental images are first, 
subjective and second, elusive. Their subjectivity comes from their idiosyncratic 
nature (different individuals will image a bird differently), and so researchers 
have difficulty testing mental images (they cannot insure that the images they 
are comparing are in fact comparable, which leads researchers to fear inaccurate 
results) .  The mental images are also elusive (one person's bird may last longer as 
a mental representation than the next person's,  and when the subject tries to 
regain the bird image, she or he may find a different bird or no bird at all) .  These 
difficulties make imagery research, Finke says, controversial. 
These concerns resemble the classical disagreement on the viability of 
mental imagery as a mnemonic device. This debate hinges on the utility of the 
loci mnemonic, an imagery-based mnemonic art consisting of a series of mental 
images an individual imposes on memory to enhance the recall of information. 
The individual forms unusual and violent images and stores them in a sequence 
of previously selected holding places in the mind. For example, to remember five 
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name s ,  a person might image each individual wi th various bruises  in a 
separate room in the person's home. This strategy for layering images,  called the 
loci mnemonic, was embraced by Cicero ( 1 948) in De Oratore as a longstanding 
and highly regarded mnemonic, but was rejected by Quintilian ( 1 922) in his 
Institutio Oratoria a century later. Though the loci strategy was taught and used 
consistently through the Middle Ages, Quintilian's attack on it  made its presence 
circumspect. Quintilian 's argument against the loci mnemonic included some of 
the same strictures that Finke pinpoints as inhibiting mental imagery research 
today. Although Quintilian provided a clear description and analysis  of the 
imaging strategy, he declared it overly complicated and unteachable, saying, in 
fact, "My precepts . . .  will be of a simpler kind" (p. 227). We are given to under­
stand that since the loci method was difficult to recreate, to track, and, as 
Quintilian believed, to teach, its value was suspect. At best, it  was appropriate 
for remembering long lists of names but otherwise an incumbrance. Indeed, 
because it relied on a solitary learner, the loci did not lend itself to the rote 
memorizing that Quintilian favored. In part, the medieval use of alphabet books, 
commonplace books listing prescribed images for each corresponding letter, 
reflected a retreat from independent images. This same disregard of the loci as 
unteachable was repeated by Geoffrey of Vinsauf ( 1 97 1 )  in the early thirteenth 
century when he said, "Tully [Cicero] relies on a theory of exotic images,  which 
it is  well to remember; but he is  teaching himself and is, as it  were, the sole 
devotee of his subtle system which is  of a subtlety unique to himself" (p. 1 05) .  
Quintilian ( 1 922) also foreshadowed the debate on the nature of the image 
that is  argued by the pictorialists and descriptionalists. As a descriptionalist, 
Quintilian believed that images were simply metaphoric representations of ideas 
and language which he did not believe could be adequately visualized. Quintilian, 
in analyzing the loci mnemonic, worried that words would be lost or confused as 
images replaced them in individuals' mind. He argued against using the loci strat­
egy to help remember texts: "How can such an art grasp a whole series of con­
nected words?" (p. 225). In fact, he saw the method as a hindrance to a rhetor: 
"Will not the flow of our speech inevitably be impeded by the double task im­
posed on our memory?" (p. 227). This double task is  translating words into im­
ages and then retranslating them back into words. Quintilian feared that the rhetor 
would be unable to translate some words, a decidedly descriptionalist perspec­
tive. He also feared that the images when recalled later for linguistic transcrip­
tion would not accurately match the words that triggered the image. Quintilian 's  
position, which valued the verbal over the visual, ignored Cicero's  contention 
that images were more vivid and more easily recalled than words. 
Research methodologies today create difficulty for those examining mental 
imagery, by muddying research results and complicating discussions. When 
testing memory strategies, psychologists often investigate the classical directive 
to use bizarre or violent images to enhance recall (Rollins, 1 989; Riefer, 1 992). 
This particular component of the classical imagery mnemonic (Rhetorica ad 
Herennium, 1 954)  has been studied broadly in psychology, perhaps in part 
because it allows for a relatively straightforward empirical design that measures 
whether or not exotic images are recalled more easily than neutral images (Riefer, 
1 99 2 ) .  To es tabl i sh  this  empirical  d e s i g n ,  researchers need only  g i v e  
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directions for storing images that differ in their description of the nature of the 
image (one group gets bizarre/violent, while the other does not) . Researchers 
have tested this principle with uneven results (Richardson, 1 987;  Rollins, 1 989). 
In memory research that examines the loci mnemonic, this empirical design also 
recurs, with often inconclusive or contradictory results. 
Studying violent images may in itself be problematic in contemporary 
Western culture. If subjects used for these tests are desensitized to unusual im­
ages in the films they watch or the news they see, the classical prescription for 
those images may not be effective for them. I make this suggestion in part based 
on the work of John Richardson, a psychologist who questions the research 
methods used in memory work. In his 1 987 critique "Social Class Limitations on 
the Efficacy of Imagery Mnemonic Instructions," Richardson suggests that the 
socio-economic backgrounds of the typical research subjects (college students) 
skew the results of that research. These subjects, he argues, are empowered by 
social class and believe themselves capable of performing well on such tests, are 
empowered to learn, and consequently may use  learned s trategies  more 
effectively than those from less privileged backgrounds. Richardson ' s  critique of 
memory testing can apply to the bizarreness tests. Would Riefer and Rouder 's 
study ( 1 992) have yielded the same results had their subjects not been University 
of California-Irvine students? Richardson encourages us to doubt the ability to 
generalize from these and the results of other studies. 
Major shifts in the treatment of the image, I believe, began in Western culture 
during the Middle Ages. We again see something of a fringe science when imagery 
was relegated to the status of memory enhancer to help Christians adhere to virtue 
and avoid vice (Carruthers, 1990; Yates, 1966). To claim that imagery was used 
during this extended period to teach illiterate people religious principles is an 
oversimplification, but a useful one. The architecture of the times used statuary ex­
tensively to represent virtue and condemn vice, especially in its cathedrals. Relics 
that were valued as talismans of goodness and power were housed in containers that 
recreated the artifact in some fashion. A fragment of St. Louis's jaw, for example, is 
enclosed in a gold bust in Paris's Cathedral of Notre Dame. Symbolizing the relic this 
way reminds viewers of its strength and its material wealth and of the value of living 
virtuously. The notion that illiteracy necessitated the iconography of the Christian 
faith may be partially responsible for the devaluing of the mental image in a literate 
culture. If words are preferred as efficient codes of thought and if images are tied to 
lower class illiterate cultures, then valuing images reveals social class and ignores 
literacy as a status symbol. 
In contemporary thinking, mental imagery, even when discussed by those 
who support its validity, is often described in preliterate terms as well. For 
example, Finke ( 1 990), in Creative Imagery: Discoveries and Inventions in Visu­
alization, endorses using mental imagery as a "preinventive form," an almost 
primitive term which Finke uses to identify "the products of combinational play 
of visualization" (p. 3), wherein individuals form, combine, and manipulate im­
ages in ways we might call a prose invention strategy. This view of the mental 
image is also reflected in Flower and Hayes ' s  ( 1 984) "Images, Plans,  and Prose," 
in which non-verbal imagery is  listed as a preconscious form of cognition along 
with structural relationships and procedural knowledge. In a chapter of his book 
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called "Imagery on the Bounds of Cognition," Mark Rollins ( 1 989) tells us that 
"a theory of mental imagery can elucidate a range of i s sues from animal 
cognition to artistic creation" (p. 1 32) .  Though Rollins' statement does not 
intend to disparage mental imagery, I am struck by the marginalizing language 
he chooses. Mental imagery as a mode of thinking is  something done by dogs and 
artists; medievally, thinking in images was something done by the uneducated, 
and only those on the fringe of our field seem to be studying or endorsing its use. 
When we begin to look at where in composition studies the use of mental 
imagery is most often cited, we see continued neglect. Mental imagery is used by 
some cognitive psychologists in a range of applications: to solve problems, think 
creatively, and enhance memory; in psychotherapy mental imaging is used to 
reduce stress and combat phobias; and in athletic training to improve physical 
performance. Yet, currently mental imagery is  not seriously considered by most 
mainstream composition theorists as a viable component of the process.  It is  an 
area of concern within NCTE's  Assembly for Expanded Perspectives on Learn­
ing (AEPL), established in large part by Alice Brand and Richard Graves. This 
concern is further endorsed in Brand and Grave ' s  Presence of Mind, which 
includes essays on mental imagery. But apart from its inclusion in the work of 
AEPL, what little work is  being done in mental imagery is in technical writing. 
Though this application represents a beginning, it unwittingly reinforces some of 
the same marginalizing of mnemonic imagery strategies of the ancient Roman 
rhetoricians. In an article, "Using Visual Mnemonics to Make Instructions Easier 
to Remember," in the Journal of Technical Writing and Communication, for in­
stance, Hirst ( 1 990) endorses visual mnemonics but does so in a way that contra­
dicts both the principles of the classical loci mnemonic and contemporary 
psychological thinking. However, this treatment is  in keeping with the spirit of 
medieval imagery. 
Though Hirst cites the work of contemporary imagery psychologists and 
memory researchers, along with the class ical mnemonic imagery strategy 
discussed in the Rhetorica ad Herennium, his strategies contradict these sources. 
Hirst instructs those who write technical instructions to use cartoon images to 
enhance their readers' recall of information. These cartoon images toy with the 
physical properties of objects, thereby exaggerating cartoons even more. For 
example, to create an image for tuning an engine, the cartoon might show a man 
drawn much smaller than a car engine handling an enormous and angry spark 
plug. (This same strategy was used by the Pentagon in the 1 950s  when i t  
enlisted Will Eisner ' s  talents to  prepare comic books for soldiers to  train them 
in auto mechanics.) 
Hirst 's  use of mental imaging falls short of both classical and contemporary 
strategies. First, one essential element of the classical mnemonic is the idiosyn­
cratic nature of the image; for the image to be recalled, persons storing the image 
must create their own image. According to the author of the Rhetorica Ad 
Herennium ( 1 954):  
Often in fact when we declare that one form resembles another, we 
fail to receive universal assent, because things seem different to 
different persons. The same is  true with respect to images:  one that 
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is well-defined to us appears relatively inconspicuous to others . 
Everybody, therefore, should in equipping himself with images suit 
his own convenience. (p. 223) 
Hirst's treatment of images echoes the medieval creation of stock images and 
reinforces the historical marginalizing of the image. 
Although Hirst's treatment of the image does not coincide with the classical 
mnemonic system, his modern, technical version does mimic a strategy used in 
constructing "emblem" books of the early Renaissance (Freeman, 1 970; Lechner, 
1 962; Thompson, 1 924). These books used a text to exemplify a woodcut that 
v i sually represented a virtue or vice, teaching a lesson both v isually and 
verbally. Problems arose, however, in producing emblem books due to new and 
often faulty technology. The woodcuts that the emblematic texts were meant to 
gloss were difficult and expensive to produce; therefore, it became routine for 
printers to use whatever woodcut they had on hand. Rather than create text and 
image, authors of emblem books chose to write texts to match the available 
woodcuts. This practice resulted in a kind of seventeenth-century clip art, wherein 
often inappropriate images were used as a gloss on texts. The image became 
secondary to the text, functioning as an ornament rather than as the subject of the 
lesson and the means by which the lesson was  effectively learned .  This  
standardization of the image relegated it  to  a secondary status, mirroring again 
its position as less valuable than verbal representations. 
Today, the difference between emblem books and mental imagery echoes the 
polarization between pictorialists and descriptionalists by refocusing attention 
on their competing status. Which is predominant? Which has more validity, more 
integrity? Are mental images real pictures (Platonic embodiments of the thing 
itself) or are the pictures simply metaphors, constructed from visually powerful 
terms to articulate ideas? Can researchers develop tests that measure whether 
subj ects are translating v isual images into external pictures ,  or trans lating 
picture images into words, or combining these two operations in some way? Can 
we answer the philosophical question of which comes first, the image or the word? 
(Finke, 1 989;  Rollins, 1 989). 
In contemporary writing pedagogy we must be aware of the complexities 
implicit in the use of mental imagery and of the problematic history that sur­
rounds it. But more important, we need to consider how mental imagery can help 
writer create texts, how mental imagery reinforces the way writers arrange texts, 
and most difficult perhaps, how readers of texts use mental imagery to enhance 
their understanding of, their enj oyment of, and their use of those texts. The ways 
in which we discuss mental imagery in our discipline should not further divide 
us into those who fit the mainstream and those who are peripheral to it. 
And although we need to study the psychological processes in mental 
imagery, we need to remind ourselves that this work is  not without limitations. 
Not only must we consider the cultural interferences Richardson warns us of, but 
we also need to be aware of the mechanization of the mental image. Prominent 
cognitive psychologist, Geoffrey Loftus ( 1 989), alludes to these limitations when 
he says, "Computer simulations are seducing us away from doing real creative 
thinking in the behavioral sciences" (as cited in Finke, p.  145) .  Even today we 
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fall into the trap that beset the late emblem authors. Current psychological work 
in mental imagery constructs computer simulations. It attempts to pinpoint the 
relationship between mental and physical images and discusses them in technical 
vocabulary that mimics the mechanical. Even Kosslyn and Shwartz's ( 1 977) model 
of mental images, which arises from a pictorialist view, describes mental images 
as having scanning, zooming, and rotating computer-like properties. Though we 
cannot deny this view of imaging, we must not be seduced by it, away from the 
creative thinking we need to make mental imagery a valuable part of composi­
tion theory and practice. cQj 
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Images at the Heart of Things : 
The Writer's Unconscious Speaking 
Hildy Mil ler 
Y ears ago Janet Emig ( 1 983 )pointed out that we know little about the effect of writer 's  unconscious on their writing. She remarked: "There i s  no wisp 
or scent anywhere that composing is anything but a conscious and antiseptically 
efficient act. Nowhere in such an account is there acknowledgment that writing 
involves commerce with the unconscious self" (p. 48).  I recall being struck by 
the need for such research when reading a story told by Fan Shen, a Chinese 
student new to the American classroom. A kind of extended reverie, her writing 
was an example of the concept of "yij ing," which is  "a creative process of induc­
ing oneself, while reading a piece of literature or looking at a piece of art, to 
create mental pictures, in order to reach a unity of nature, the author, and the 
reader" ( 1 989, pp. 463-464). Intrigued with her response to the assignment, I 
wondered then why we so seldom allow our students the wholeness of their intel­
lectual processes in a way that could include such unconscious imagery. If, as 
Wallace Stevens once said, "A poem is at the heart of things," surely the mental 
images evoked in readers were also reflective, from a Jungian standpoint, of not 
only self-but soul. Such writing is  potentially rich with meaning for students. 
Yet we rarely see it, as Moffett ( 1 994) explains, "because writing to heal and to 
grow .. .is alien to universities" (p. 258) .  Despite several decades of research in 
writing, we still know so little about this cognitive area. Yet, in my research into 
the cognitive processes of writers, my students have discovered many compel­
ling mental images which, like Fan Shen 's, seem to be examples of the personal 
unconscious of writers speaking. 
Beneath the usual concerns of purpose, audience, thesis, and structure, writ­
ers are really often preoccupied with i ssues far more reflective of self and soul. 
Their mental images are ones of trying to learn the lessons of life-why some­
thing has happened to them, what an event has meant, or how they can establish 
a sense of connection to others .  Through the work of two writers who partici­
pated in a study of mental imagery in writing processes, I wish to illustrate some 
ways that the unconscious may contribute to the intellectual activity of writing. 
Mental Images and the Unconscious 
From a Jungian perspective, the personal unconscious is assumed to be as 
much a part of an individual as conscious awareness .  The unconscious is not just 
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a repository of repressed thought, like infantile tendencies that are better left 
undisturbed. Rather, it contains all the psychic material that has not yet reached 
consciousness, the "seeds of future conscious contents" (Jung, 1 97 1 ,  p.  7 1  ) .  Jung 
said: "The thought we shall think, the deed we shall do, even the fate that we 
shall lament tomorrow, all lie unconscious in our today" ( 1 968, p. 279). Dreams 
and fantasy are its common modes of expression. But these narrative forms of 
discourse are really grounded in images,  conceptualized in psychoanalysis as the 
"royal road" to the unconscious .  Images often communicate core human 
concerns that underlie everyday reality. They deal, you might say, with issues 
of eternity, not time. "[A]n image presents a claim," as psychologist James Hillman 
( 1 983) says, "-moral, erotic, intellectual, aesthetic-and demands a response" 
(p. 1 4) .  We may be accustomed to thinking of an image only as a passive 
pictorial representation rather than as an enlivened rhetorical vehicle. Yet, it  i s  
through image that the unconscious, or soul ,  i s  said to speak. As Hillman 
goes on to say: 
The primary intention of this verbal work with image is the 'recov­
ery of soul in speech . . .  which at the same time reveals the erotic and 
aesthetic aspect of images-that they captivate, charm, persuade, 
have a rhetorical effect on soul beyond their symbolic content. Many 
images represent motifs in our individual lives. (p. 1 5) 
As Jung explains:  "These images are balancing and compensating factors that 
correspond to the problems which life confronts us with in reality" ( 1 970, p. 44) .  
Yet, for all their psychic and rhetorical power, such images are not easy to 
translate into conscious endeavor. Many times, as the two cases that follow illus­
trate, their meaning can be best captured artistically or philosophically. They 
appear to drive writing from what I call the "metaphoric substrata" (Miller, 1 994, 
p. 1 14 ) ,  those figurative layers of symbols beneath our conscious awareness  from 
which writers fashion abstract meaning. 
Image psychologists (Klinger, 1 978;  Pope & Singer, 1 978)  who conduct 
naturalistic research on images in thought, say that we are constantly generating 
a steady stream of mental images. This stream forms the "flow of thought," which 
is itself composed of bits and pieces of different mental representations of 
meaning. Images are ongoing, lively, and complex. They contain traces not only 
of actual outside visual stimuli that we deal with day-to-day but of our deeper 
personal concerns. Such a view of the mind runs counter to the kind of cognition 
embraced by the rationalist academy in which conscious, logical thought is 
emphasized. Yet, as Klinger ( 1 987) and others have pointed out, we are not as 
"conscious" as we might expect. In his experimental work, he finds that most 
people are absorbed in the contents of their unconscious at least 25 percent of 
their waking hours. That is ,  we are immersed in states that are dream-like­
preoccupied with images arising spontaneously in reverie. 
In the processes of writers we still know little about the effect of images 
generated by the unconscious .  Early on, Mandel ( 1 980) proposed that much of 
the writing we do originates there, that "planning" is largely a process  of 
responding to unconscious impulses. Flower and Hayes ( 1 984) in their protocol 
studies noted at one point that beneath writers' verbal articulation lies what they 
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"multiple representations" of meaning, including images ,  metaphors,  and 
geometric patterns .  More recently, studies have pointed to some specifics. Graves 
and Becker ( 1 994) have explored the effects of using cultural archetypes to guide 
writing, and Mullin ( 1 994) has discovered what she calls "traces" or eruptions of 
unconscious material that periodically disrupt texts. Fleckenstein ( 1 994) has found 
that mental imagery coincides with writers ' fullest engagement with their texts. 
And Worley ( 1 994) teaches her students imaging techniques that they can em­
ploy deliberately as a way of familiarizing themselves with what is  an unrecog­
nized and often unconscious part of writing. 
In my own research on mental imagery ( 1 993;  1 994), I have found that it is 
an ongoing part of the thoughts of writers as they work. In a study of 1 48 writers, 
I assigned a writing task during which I interrupted them three times at approxi­
mately eleven to thirteen-minute intervals and asked them to fill out written 
thought-sample questionnaires. Such self-reports are based on standard measures 
of internal imagery (Anderson, 1 98 1 ;  Klinger, 1 978;  Sheehan, Ashton & White, 
1 983) .  Writers also indicated where in their texts they had been interrupted, so 
that I could compare the images in their thoughts with what they were actually 
writing at the moment. On a post-sample questionnaire, participants also reflected 
on their writing, particularly on any images that had been outstanding for them. 
Later, I spoke with twenty-nine students in extensive (l l /2 hour) interviews to 
gather retrospective accounts of their imagistic activity and to understand them 
as writers generally-their history, attitudes, and habits. 
Results of this study revealed that fully half the thoughts of writers 
contained some evidence of visual activity-far more than most composition 
specialists might suppose would be characteristic of responses to an abstract 
writing project. Mental images were ongoing for most writers, though they var­
ied in intensity, clarity, and detail. Yet 4 1 %  of the images reported in written 
thought samples never actually appeared in the texts themselves. Therefore, 
thought processes rich with images are not necessarily reproduced in the actual 
writing that is underway. Furthermore, on post-sample questionnaires, 5 1 .4 % of 
the time participants identified a controlling image as containing the essence of 
their main idea. Taken together, what these findings suggest is that there is a 
great deal of imagistic and unconscious mental activity that we know little about 
since this material is seldom captured in studies of writers' cognitive processes 
(Brand, 1 987; Flower & Hayes, 1 984). Yet, it i s  precisely here that a conjunction 
of images,  emotions, motives, and private purposes may be found. Here the 
unconscious appears to affect writing in many ways, most often generating in­
sights that reflect deeply personal issues of individual writers. 
The Unconscious Speaking 
Through the Mental Imagery of Two Writers 
Warren and Ethan, two of the writers who participated in the study, illustrate 
how issues arising from unconscious mental imagery are translated into conscious 
awareness,  with Warren writing about his creativity and Ethan speculating philo­
sophically. Even in response to a fairly bland writing prompt (Explain to me how 
you learn best), their thought processes appeared more driven by the unconscious 
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than previous research has indicated. Perhaps other students are also inscribing 
such psychic contents in their work without teachers knowing it. 
Warren: Establishing Connections With Others 
Warren, an architecture student, was strikingly preoccupied with images of 
his personal relationships. In fact, if images from the unconscious reveal themes 
that are current in an individual 's  life, family would be Warren 's  chief concern. 
In his case, interest in personal connection underlay much of his creative work in 
architecture and furniture design. For example, he told me that recently he had 
crafted a special table only one and a half feet high. The inspiration for the un­
usual design originated in a daydream he had about a picnic table for himself and 
his friends that he could set up on the slope of a hill. Unlike the sterile designs of 
so much of modern mass production, his vision of human connection infused the 
style of the piece with meaning. His interest in architecture was also rooted in a 
pivotal family experience, in which, as a teenager, he collaborated with his fa­
ther in remodeling his bedroom. Warren was allowed to put forward his own ideas, 
and it was from this warmly recalled family project that his own design interests 
later developed. 
Such underlying relational concerns extended also to writing .  One of 
Warren's earliest memories was of talking his third grade friends into giving up 
recess to perform a play he had written. During our writing session, two of the 
thought samples revealed family images .  In the first, he was interrupted in his 
text at a point at which he was explaining why he did not want to study foreign 
languages: 
I know I almost feel guilty for this kind of an attitude. I must stress 
I ' m  not prej udiced. I j ust don ' t  seem to have any interest in  
language. I guess I like to learn what seems to enlight [sic] me for 
my everyday interests. Here I am an architecture student and classes 
that I can tie relevance (STOP) to--that is exciting. It may seem 
ironic that an architecture student is not interested in foreign 
languages but that's the way I am ! 
In his written thought sample he reported: 
Sure I bet your [ sic] thinking that someone with an attitude toward 
foreign language like me and thinks he'll make a good architect is 
fooli sh.  Don't get me wrong. I love foreign architectural variety. I 
just realize you can' t  do everything, and I ' ve chosen not to try to 
fluently speak a foreign language. 
As he explained in our interview, his playful defensiveness stemmed from 
mental images that he was seeing of his si ster with whom he had a mock 
disagreement over the value of foreign cultures.  As Warren put it, "She teases me 
about being a bigot-the kind of American the French don 't like." Though the 
reference to family never entered the actual text, it was this personal connection 
that enlivened the thought for him. He cared what his sister thought as much as 
he did the readers of his writing sample. 
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During another interruption the thought of his grandfather seemed to gener­
ate a series of remembered images.  In the text he wrote: 
I ' m  motivated to draw so I can bless people around me with touch­
ing pictures (STOP) . For example, I strongly desired to draw a pic­
ture of my family. And I strongly desire to draw a picture of my 
grandfather before he passed away. 
At this moment he was actually seeing all the pictures of his grandfather that 
he wanted to draw-even specific scenes of him hiking in the woods.  In this 
image he wanted to use art to connect to his grandfather, just as in the previous 
image he worried that his views on architecture would alienate his sister. For 
Warren, these ongoing images of family reflected a concern for using his  
creativity to express this  love and care. In all  his creative efforts, whether 
writing, architecture, or furniture design, his mental images seemed to reveal his 
underlying wish to create and sustain relationships with family. 
Ethan: Exploring the Function of Faith 
Ethan, an English and philosophy major, was focused on the tension between 
what he felt was demanded of him in academic writing and what he really wanted 
to say. Ideas that most concerned him were philosophical searches for meaning 
in human experience . Yet he recognized that much academic writing was 
concerned with simply conforming to convention. As he said:  "After you' ve writ­
ten for a couple of years, you get the forms-introduction, ideas, conclusion. 
That's all you can really do." But he found on reflection: "I always read a page 
and think, God, this is  really boring ."' Still, he was seizing chances in which to 
explore safely the issues uppermost in his mind . The writing sample he produced 
for my study provided just such an opportunity. 
Ethan was aware that he had been mulling over the question of the function 
of spiritual faith throughout the past year. In a medieval philosophy class, he 
had been exposed to the theoretical concept of faith, principally the idea that 
hope can sustain people through life's vicissitudes. But he questioned how deeply 
he "knew" what he had learned: "We take a test. I can write down such things as 
'We only must believe in order to understand. ' Or ' Reason inspires faith and 
faith inspires reason. '  It all sounds so correct; the professor grades my test. I get 
an A. Thus I 'know' these things ."  In the writing sample for the study, he found 
himself unconsciously sifting through mental images of people he had encoun­
tered on his job-a search that ultimately enabled him to explore the concept of 
faith more fully. As an intern in a county attorney 's  office, he escorted families 
of murder victims to court and remained with them throughout their ordeal. At 
his first thought-sample interruption, he was mesmerized by these recollections. 
He said to me in our interview: 
I didn 't  think of what I wanted to say-just thought of a woman in 
the courtroom her face, the suspect and the way he looked, impen­
etrable eyes-you want to get the feeling . . . .  Everyone's life has a 
life that extends far beyond them. How do they deal with a murder? 
From the multiple images that surfaced he selected two cases to explore. 
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Later in the essay he was interrupted just as he began to expound on the 
function of faith: 
To thi s  I say, what is wrong with faith, what is wrong with 
believing in this greater justice, this one single concept that makes 
people live when there seems to be nothing to live for. I now (STOP) 
understand these lectures of these great men. 
In both the written thought sample and in reflecting back during our interview, 
he explained that he again saw multiple images as he wrote this section. Not only 
did he visualize himself as an orator speaking to an imaginary audience and an­
ticipating their response, but he also saw past conversations with people over 
similar issues on which he wished he had spoken his mind. 
Ethan found this opportunity to write about something especially satisfying. 
He noted too that at other times,  genuine commitment to an idea had led to much 
the same writing style. In a paper on Rupert Brooke, for instance, he recalled 
also saying in ringing oratorical fashion, "To this I say . . . .  " And on another occa­
sion: "Yes, in a Henry Miller paper-same thing-I really believed in what I was 
trying to get across ."  He summed it up: "There are certain things that you just 
read and understand; then there are other things where you say, 'Yes, I know 
that ! "' For Ethan, the mental images of the families of victims that had haunted 
him for a year finally found expression in an essay that enabled him to explore 
the philosophical issue of human resilience. 
Writing as "Unconsciousness-Raising" 
Annas Pratt ( 1 985) has characterized the exploration of repressed feminine 
archetypes as "unconsciousness-raising," and this term might also aptly apply to 
the writing generated by the mental images of Warren and Ethan. In embracing 
the role of the unconscious in composing, some counterbalance is provided to 
the dominant rationalist view that emphasizes an impersonal reason (Johnson, 
1 987 ;  Lloyd, 1 984 ) .  This rationalist tradition and the discourse conventions that 
have arisen from it have a long rhetorical lineage (Brody, 1 993) .  Yet, as Esther 
Harding ( 1 97 1 )  has noted, academic thought devoid of spirit is likely to become 
increasingly sterile. The psyche or spirit that is repressed will, in turn, become 
more energized and compelled to seek expression elsewhere. Indeed, as Brand 
and Graves ( 1 994) have said of our need to go beyond rationalist definitions of 
cognition: "The greatest need for growth in composition studies lies now in the 
ways we create meaning beyond what is  currently considered acceptable knowl­
edge" (p. 5 ) .  The heartfelt writing of Warren and Ethan suggests too a way in 
which students can develop themselves both as individuals and as writers. Rather 
than appearing as inappropriately confessional, this expression of the unconscious 
self manifests what Jung ( 1 968) has called an individual 's  "reality in potentia" 
(p. 279).  Some students, like Warren, may find their unconscious concerns 
covertly inspiring their writing. Others, like Ethan and Fan Shen, may produce 
new and energized shapes of discourse. Thus, "unconsciousness-raising" may 
lead to significant changes in the ways we describe cognition, the development 
of the writer 's  self, and the writing processes and products that emerge from it. cQ 
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Mastery: Or, Where Does True Wisdom Lie? 
Martha Goff Stoner 
A story is told of a student who yearned for the wisdom of a master. Every 
morning the student climbed a mountain to reach her teacher who lived at the 
summit. When she arrived at his hut, she would ask him where she might find 
wisdom. Then she would stand, gazing at her teacher, waiting for his answer. 
Always the teacher remained silent, sitting on his cushion. 
Each new day the student would climb the mountain, again hoping to receive 
an answer to her question. Each time she rephrased her question, believing that 
if she found the correct wording, the teacher would answer her. But every evening 
she returned home downcast. 
Finally she decided this day would be her last climb. She would tell her 
teacher that she would visit him no more. But when she arrived at the hut, the 
teacher had gone. As the student turned to leave, her gaze rested upon the teacher 's 
cushion. It occurred to her then that she might sit there, that she might see from 
his perspective. She walked to the opposite side of the hut and sat. 
Days passed. The student forgot her home. She watched the light grow and 
recede. Day and night, night and day, she sat. A time came when the light and 
dark that she watched on the wall before her mingled and became one. 
After a time, a seeker came to the hut. He had heard of the wise one who 
lived there. He bowed to the student sitting on the teacher's cushion, and asked, 
"Where does true wisdom lie ? "  
The student did not answer, but she knew. 
Pearl 
I wrote this fable in the tradition of a Zen teaching story to illuminate the na­ture of the journey toward wisdom. It is a West-meets-East fable. The student 
represents the methods typically used by the earnest seeker-of-wisdom in the tra­
ditions of the West. The teacher represents the way Zen philosophy teaches .  
Rightly experienced, the fable shows how these two ways,  rather than opposing 
each other, create a whole. The lesson of the fable is not that West or East is 
better, but that in the West we tend to favor a single approach and that approach 
can undermine wisdom until we understand and include in our awareness insights 
such as those offered by Zen philosophy. 
Martha Goff Stoner, Ph.D., The University of Michigan, teaches meditation in her writing and literature 
classes. She is currently developing a book that applies Zen philosophy to pedagogy. She writes fables 
under the name of Pearl. 
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In our Western system of formal education, we tend toward a mountain­
climbing approach to wisdom. That i s ,  we perceive the search as a j ourney 
toward a goal that is  tangible, that can be held, as one might hold a crystal globe 
in the hand. What the East, as represented by Zen philosophy, has to offer the 
West is an awareness that wisdom comes not when the individual is busy climb­
ing a mountain, aggressively focused on grasping the goal, but when the indi­
vidual is quietly sitting, apparently doing nothing. In the West our training is 
never to sit down. We are encouraged to keep on trying, keep on climbing, eyes 
ever on the goal. But Zen philosophy teaches us to stop focusing on the goal, to 
stop climbing, to let go of trying and to sit down. Thus,  in the fable, it is only 
when the student gives up her quest that wisdom arises. 
What can it mean to suggest that by giving up, we gain? The Zen perspective 
on the goal-oriented search for wisdom was popularized for Westerners in the 
mid- l 950s by the German philosopher Eugen Herrigel. In his slim volume, Zen 
in the Art of A rchery, Herrigel ( 1 97 1 )  described his experience of learning 
archery from a Zen master. Herrigel began to notice his preoccupation with 
hitting the center of the target. He became aware that he was determined and 
effort-full every time he pulled the bow string. The master called Herrigel 's 
attention to this attitude: 
"The right art," cried the Master, "is aimless ! The more obstinately 
you try to learn how to shoot the arrow for the sake of hitting 
the goal, the less you will succeed in the one and the further the 
other will recede. What stands in your way is that you have a much 
too willful will.  You think that what you do not do yourself does 
not happen." 
"What must I do, then?" I asked thoughtfully. 
"You must learn to wait properly," [the master replied.] (p. 34) 
But how can we wait properly ? What is  the quality of mind or attention that Zen 
offers as a replacement for the attitude of ceaseless striving so familiar to the 
West? 
Waiting properly happens when we are fully aware in the present moment. 
Typically, our minds are occupied with thoughts of the past or plans for the 
future. In thinking about the past or the future, we miss what is happening in the 
present moment. Yet, all we ever truly have is the present. Consider, for example, 
a woman driving a country road, lost in thought. She may be thinking about a 
particularly difficult encounter with a co-worker or family member; those thoughts 
may shift to thoughts about her dinner plans;  next she may consider a project that 
she has underway. The radio has been on all the while, but she has not been aware 
of it; then, a particularly resonant piece of music captures her attention. Perhaps 
the music is Samuel B arber 's  Adagio for Strings. Now the driver feels a call, an 
emotional shift, as the deepening strains of the music awaken her. She begins to 
notice the scenery around her. She sees lush green fields and summer light 
touching the wheat. She becomes aware of an arch of reddening gold where the 
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wheat begins to ripen and merge with the sunlight. She breathes in the awe of the 
present moment. She forgets what came before and what will come after. She is  
no longer constrained by a consciousness that concerns itself with linear time. In 
that moment, she ceases trying to control and maneuver her life. Instead, she 
allows herself to flow with the journeying motion of the car and with the fields 
and sunlight as they envelop her. The haunting violins become the swelling wheat: 
She notices the mingling of worlds. In this condition of awareness,  the woman's  
sense of  herself shifts. No longer is  she isolated, immersed in  problems that re­
quire personal effort if they are to be solved. By losing awareness  of her ego­
based concerns, she experiences herself both as an individual who witnesses life 
around her and as a participant in a mysterious drama that is  unfolding without 
her effort. She experiences her connection to the flow of life. 
We have all experienced such moments. Such moments come to us because 
we have let go of the intention to make something happen-thus, the paradox 
suggested by the master of archery when he says, "You think that what you do 
not do yourself does not happen." To wait properly, we must stop trying to make 
something happen; we must even stop waiting. We must simply be, with our aware­
ness tuned to the multiplicity of life. 
In the fable, the student is blocked from this state of being by her own 
perception-what Herrigel 's  master called a "too willful will ."  The student 
decides. Deciding is  an act of will, an exertion toward, a choosing to perceive in 
a certain way. The student decides that wisdom is  of a certain order and that it 
requires a certain approach. Deciding this ,  she exists in a state of too willful 
will.  Convinced of the validity of her own perception (lost in her thoughts as our 
driver of country roads was), the student misses what is  around her. Missing what 
is around her, she also misses what is inside her. When she finally sits on her 
teacher ' s  cushion, what is about her and what is inside her mingle-as did the 
wheat and the sunlight-and, thereby, wisdom emerges .  
The student' s  too willful will i s  the mountain-climbing approach to  wisdom. 
This approach reveals a habit of mind that the student should overcome. Funda­
mental to the student' s  approach is her belief that wisdom exists outside herself. 
The student assumes that she herself lacks wisdom and, therefore, that someone 
else must possess it. Her climb is the climb toward the one she believes can help 
her. Similarly, the student assumes that either she must find the right question in 
order to elicit the desired response from her teacher or  she must fail in her search. 
Her belief in the teacher and her focus on the phrasing of her question reveal the 
student' s  tendency to think in an either/or fashion. Either I have wisdom or some­
one else does. Either my question is phrased correctly or it is phrased incor­
rectly. Either I must climb up the mountain or I must retreat. No room exists for 
a third possibility. 
Because, as Rudolf Steiner ( 1 984) put it, "consciousness determines events," 
the student' s  decision that her world is  one of opposites creates precisely such a 
world (p. 1 67).  That the student inhabits a world of oppositions is evident in the 
alterations of light and dark, in the climbing up and the retreating downward, in 
the hope in the morning and in the despair at night. The student is  female; the 
teacher is male. She sits on one side of the hut; he sits on the other. They face 
each other. 
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Such duality is  familiar in the Western tradition. We need look no further 
than the Judaeo-Christian Genesis to discover its presence. As Joseph Campbell 
( 1 99 1 )  stated, "The trouble that began [in Eden] was the discovery of duality. 
That was the Fall" (p. 29). When Adam and Eve tasted the apple, they opened the 
door to a world of polar opposites. They became aware of male and female, of 
inside Eden and outside Eden, of good and evil. Their discovery ejected them 
from paradise. In paradise, humanity knew the union of opposites as well as such 
mutually exclusive states as non-differentiation and multi-differentiation at the 
same time. Paradise was the realm of infinite possibility. After the fall, earthly 
existence, by contrast, became the realm of opposition and of limitation. The 
pain of the fall is this separation from the paradise of familiarity with a universe 
in which all things are possible. 
No longer one with all of creation, the human being is  now an outsider-one 
who is not in synchrony, one who is separate. Now the individual does not 
recognize his or her essential kinship with that which is  different. Instead, the 
Self says ,  "I am I. I am not You."  Divided from all that surrounds, we begin to 
fear the very context in which we live. This fear wells up in us and is projected 
on to the forces that seem to be most unlike ourselves .  Self fears Other. 
Opposition becomes both our perception of how the world is  and terrifying at the 
same time. 
In this context, the Other becomes essentially repellent. When a dualistic 
mindset divides the universe into Self and Other; inside and outside; matter and 
energy; presence and absence; being and not being, the tendency is  to go one step 
further and pit these apparently opposite forces against each other. The tendency 
of Western tradition to assume that opposites repel is apparent as early as Plato. 
In the Phaedo, Plato ( 196 1 )  quotes Socrates as saying, "Opposites themselves do 
not admit one another" (p. 85) .  This "not admitting" of the opposite in the West­
ern tradition often means defining the poles of any two opposing things as good 
or evil. A thing cannot be a thing in itself. Thus, if X is  good, its opposite must 
necessarily be bad. If day is  safe, night is frightening. If white is  familiar, black 
is  threatening. If male is  powerful, female is  weak. If life has value, death does 
not. If Eden is good, outside Eden (human beings ,  nature, the earth) is bad. 
So it is, writes Plato, that "opposite forms cannot face one another ' s  approach" 
(p. 85) .  
But isn't  duality our very nature? Because our bodies exist on a material, 
physical plane, we are invited to inhabit a dualistic consciousness. In order to 
move in the physical plane, we must experience boundaries, edges ,  sides, differ­
ences that are visible and felt. And because our physical senses teach us night 
and day, dark and light, cold and warm, sour and sweet, hard and dry, we cannot 
simply decide not to think dualistically. As Robert Frost ( 1 969) put it, "Nature in 
her inmost self divides/ To trouble man with having to take sides" (p. 92). 
However, while duality is  inherent in our way of perceiving, it is  not the 
nature of the universe. Quantum physics tells us that reality both is and is not a 
place of division. The table on which we write appears stable, formed, finite, and 
static, yet we know that it  is composed of energetic forces in constant motion. 
As Danah Zohar ( 1 990) writes in The Quantum Self, the new physics suggests 
that "reality at the everyday level on which we commonly experience it does 
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indeed consist  of actual things like bodies and desks and chairs , while at 
the quantum level there exist no actual 'things' but rather myriad possibilities 
for countless actualities" (p. 3 1 ) .  What this implies is  that division-boundaries, 
edges, separations between things-is not the whole picture. If the world as we 
perceive it with our eyes is not the whole picture, what is? Wrote Einstein, "There 
is no place in this new kind of physics both for the field and matter, for the field 
is the only reality (as cited in Capek, 1 96 1 ,  p.  3 19).  In the field, matter or reality 
becomes indeterminate. The universe seems to be in constant flux, in a process 
of forming and unforming. Physicist David Bohm ( 1 957) writes :  
[T]he empirical evidence available thus far shows that nothing has 
been discovered which has a mode of being that remains eternally 
defined in any g i ven way. Rather, every element,  however 
fundamental it  may seem to be, has always been found under 
suitable conditions to change even in its basic qualities, and to 
become something else. (p. 1 53)  
True wisdom lies in  being open to  this unseen, flowing realm, the terrain of rela­
tionships, the place of interplay between forms, forces, and possibilities. There 
is no place here for an either/or consciousness .  What is required is a both/and 
awareness .  According to quantum physics,  reality can neither be said to be 
stillness or motion, being or force, particle or wave, but it  can be said to be both. 
[A]ll being at the subatomic level can be described equally well 
either as solid particles, like so many minute billiard balls, or as 
waves, like undulations of the surface of the sea. Further, quantum 
physics goes on to tell us that neither description is really accurate 
on its own, that both the wavelike and the particle-like aspects of 
being must be considered when trying to understand the nature of 
things. (Zohar, 1 990, p.  25) 
The teacher in the fable calls the student' s  attention to the true nature of 
wisdom by awakening her from her tendency to believe only what she perceives 
with her eyes. He does so not by lecturing to her, or even, after a time, by 
demonstrating through his own physical presence the example of the conscious­
ness (sitting) that he is  referring her to. Instead, he simply leaves. He presents 
the student with absence to consider. In so doing, the teacher withdraws from his 
position as the student ' s  opposite. He draws her awareness beyond the percep­
tions available to her through her physical senses and invites her into that realm 
of consciousness that she had believed to be permanently outside herself. When 
the student sits in the opposite place from her accustomed way of being, she 
experiences transformation. That transformation is  apparent in the mingling of 
the light and the dark on the wall. 
This mingling is  the essence of wisdom, a condition in which multiplicity 
and non judgment prevail. It is  a form of wisdom sometimes accessed through the 
arts. I recently saw a painting by Whistler in which this mingling of worlds was 
apparent. Whistler combined gray, white, blue, brown and black to depict a cold, 
misty scene of beach, water and sky. On the beach but somehow also in the water 
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and in the sky appeared a solitary figure of a person. This person seemed to be 
substantial and insubstantial at the same time-a figure that drifted in and out of 
the mist surrounding it. Whistler's painting did not represent reality in a dichoto­
mous fashion. That is, I did not see a blue sky, distinct ocean waves, and a sandy 
beach. Rather, I saw a fluidity of colors mixing with each other in such a way 
that no single color could be said to exist in any part of the canvas. In the middle 
of this fluidity, a single human form attempted physical reality without quite 
succeeding . 
The student's  experience of wisdom at the end of the fable is precisely such 
an experience of wavering between and within alternate worlds. As she sits on 
the teacher 's  cushion, she becomes quiet. Becoming quiet, she is  and is  one with 
a universal energy, an experience that has come to her because she has shifted 
her perspective. 
The mingling of worlds that the student experiences is  characteristic of Zen, 
a philosophy in which all forces are held simultaneously. While the student sees 
contradictions and is  disturbed by them, the master simply exists with the contra­
dictions. Thus the ancient book of Chinese wisdom, the Tao te Ching, tells us :  
The Master stays behind; that is  why she is  ahead. She is detached 
from all things; that is why she is one with them. Because she has 
let go of herself, she is  perfectly fulfilled. (Mitchell, 1 99 1 ,  p .  7) 
Mastery requires letting go of fixed forms and fixed ideas. As we let go, we 
become fluid. Becoming fluid, we become open to experiencing life as it is,  rather 
than trying to make it become something we think it ought to be. In Hindu the 
sound "Aum" represents the universe in motion, the cyclical process of birth, 
being, dissolution, and renewal. When the Zen aspirant chants "Aum," it is an 
affirmation of this process  and an acknowledgment that the answers to our 
questions lie within and about us in every moment. Writes Joseph Campbell 
( 1 99 1 ) :  
Now you are inward turned. The secret t o  having a spiritual life as 
you move in the world is to hear the AUM in all things all the time. 
If you do, everything is transformed. You no longer have to go any­
where to find your fulfillment and achievement and the treasure that 
you seek. It is here. It is everywhere. (p. 1 25)  cQj 
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REVIEWS 
O'Reilley, Mary Rose. 1 993.  The Peaceable Classroom. 
Portsmouth, NH: Heinemann Boynton/Cook. 
Zoe Keith ley 
Question:  What do a bi l l  of rights for students ,  a spiritual 
handbook for teachers, a manifesto for liberal education, a searing 
analysis of the war mentality of twentieth century America, and the 
book The Peaceable Classroom have in common? 
Answer:  Mary Rose O ' Reille y :  Catholic ,  Buddhist,  Quaker, 
pacifist, professor of English at St. Thomas University in St. Paul, 
Minnesota. 
M ary Rose O' Reilley harnesses the teaching of literature directly to a politi cal position of pacifism, joining ranks with a select group often labeled 
educational mavericks-Ivan Illich, Ira Shor come to mind-who have pursued 
their passionate conviction that education should aggressively further the well­
being of students, teachers, and community. 
O 'Reilley explains how she became yoked to the question, "Is it possible to 
teach English so that people stop killing each other?" (p. 20) proposed by a 
mentor some twenty years ago in graduate school-a question so surprising as to 
qualify as a koan. 
The Peaceable Classroom sets forth an argument for the coming to the 
academy of what Martin Luther King, Jr. called "beloved community" (p. xvii). 
It uses an unorthodox, collage-like form that not only offers readers hands-on 
participation in the author 's  own process, but mirrors the way a class or course, 
under a pedagogy of peaceful teaching and learning, might appear and proceed. 
Look at this partial table of contents: Inner Peace Studies and the World of 
the Writing Teacher; "Exterminate the B rutes" and Other Notes Toward a 
Spirituality of Teaching; S ilence and Slow time; The Retro War; The Sibyl in the 
B ottle .  We are swimming in spirituality and poetry, in personal reflection, 
surprising opposites. 
Listen to Peter Elbow, the Lewis-and-Clark of Voice, in the Foreword: "[T]his 
book constructs a wide-ranging exploration of teaching derived from her focus 
on peaceableness or nonviolence " (p. ix). " There is anything but easy optimism 
here . . . .  But she gives courage about having the vision and letting teaching grow 
out of i t . .  .. respecting the inner struggle and disappointment as part of the real 
life of a teacher" (p. xiii). 
The book begins with the "pedagogy of the depres sed" drawn from 
O' Reilley ' s  experiences with Special Learning/Behavior Disordered (SLBD) 
students at what she names the Black Hole School. The trip is  not linear but 
JAEPL, Vol.l,  Winter 1995-1996, 95-97 95 
96 JAEPL, Vol. l ,  Winter 1995-1996 
rather one "of stories, tropes, and images that nudge up against each other" 
(p. xvii), moving quietly among the years of formation and rumination, arriving 
at tentative positions, reaching forward. An uneven pedagogy of peace unfolds 
itself through an unexpected authorial intimacy. We see where academic 
concerns necessarily meet the roots of humanity, whether we like it  or not. 
"I wondered if we can discover the seeds of war in the interactions of the 
typical classroom or wherever our treasures happen to lie" (p.  22) . O ' Reilley 
introduces the systemic evidence of war in academia, its pervasiveness in 
policies and practices, in administration, in our teaching, and in our students' 
ingrained attitudes and expectations. 
But O' Reilley also reveals to us that counter-balancing light at the very heart 
of our studies, the awakening and energizing of our spiritual life. "This act of 
'entering in' and the transformations of consciousness that accompany it is the 
essential moral transaction of the literature of the classroom," O'Reilley tells us 
(p. 26). On these grounds she calls the teaching of literature a radical act. "I try 
each Monday to set up utopian communities of reflection, acceptance, and useful 
work" (p. 28).  "We know .. .little about cooperation; more about the male than the 
female ; the outer world than the inner; the rational than the intuitive;  the 
machine than the garden" (pp. 34-35).  She brings to her students a syllabus of 
l istening to the texts. She stopped lecturing, she says, so that her students could 
hear each other, and the literature, and her. 
O ' Reilley goads-herself and us-into the radical change of peaceableness 
in the classroom, in all of academic life. "The arrangement of our classrooms 
should tell us, if we do not consciously know, what horizon we have set for the 
next generation" (p. 40). 
She points out solid beginnings already made . "By incorporating such 
strategies as group process and freewriting, by defining the concept of voice . . .  
Macrorie, Elbow and their colleagues were laying out, I believe, a pedagogy of 
nonviolence" (pp. 38-39). She speaks of our work as teachers as being one of 
helping students to find a "sacred center," that place at the crossroads of human 
experience, beyond that, to point out the wider circle of community within which 
each exists. "To find voice and to mediate voice in a circle of others is  one of the 
central dialectics of the peaceable classroom," O' Reilley holds (p.40). 
The English classroom, she contends, is  one place whose actual business is 
to help students access their spirits, their personal voices, as well as the voices 
of others. The finding of voice, O 'Reilley holds to be a spiritual event of major 
proportion. 
O ' Reilley acknowledges The Peaceable Classroom is  a compilation of 
previously published articles yoked to fresh material. This may explain a certain 
unevenness in the book: distinct changes in respiration, stylistic quarrels, a sense 
of patchwork. It might explain some overblown treatments, or the giving of depth 
but no breadth to a subject which the form of the book cannot accommodate 
adequately. The treatment of "maleness" and the roots of anti-feminism come to 
mind, an opus maximus in itself, let alone applied to the academy, or to the En­
glish classroom and its relationship to peace. 
But whether you teach at a university or in a public school, if you don ' t  
demand a perfect ride, and if your taste runs to  astute observation, to  books which 
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are frank and funny, rich in personal anecdote and literary attribution, from an 
author widely and deeply read in the humanities who integrates what she reads 
and practices what she preaches, you will want the adventuring, the mentoring, 
the friendship of The Peaceable Classroom. cQj 
Brand, Alice G., and Richard L. Graves, Eds. 1 994. 
Presence of Mind: Writing and the Domain Beyond the Cognitive. 
Portsmouth, NH: Heinemann Boynton/Cook. 
Gerd Brauer 
B ack in Germany I often thought about how to  change the common way of introducing students to literature by just reading and discussing it  from the 
teacher ' s  point of view. As the years went by, I favored the link between 
storytelling, theater improvisation, and writing, believing in the necessity of in­
terweaving the wisdom of the literary text with students '  own experiences. What 
else can make learning more important than seeing knowledge in its deep con­
nections to one' s  own life? 
Departing from there and starting research on American writing pedagogy in 
1 992, I naturally came across works by Janet Emig, Peter Elbow, James Moffett, 
Gabriele Rico, and others. By reading books such as Elbow's Writing Without 
Teachers ( 1 973)  and Writing With Power ( 1 98 1 ), Moffett 's  Active Voice ( 1 98 1 ), 
and Emig' s  The Web of Meaning ( 1 977), later on Rico' s  Pain and Possibilities 
( 1 99 1 )  and again Moffett with Coming on Center: English Education in 
Evolution ( 1 9 8 1 )-especially his essays on writing and meditation-! finally 
introduced myself to Knowing and Being: Essays by Michael Polanyi ( 1 969), 
Reclaiming the Tacit Dimension: Symbolic Form in the Rhetoric of Silence ( 1 993) 
by George Kalamaras, and Free Play: Improvisation in Life and Art ( 1 990) by 
Stephen Nachmanovitch. As I listened to Janet Emig at the 1 993 NCTE Confer­
ence on Teaching English and the Language Arts in Portland, Oregon, honoring 
James Moffett ' s  influence on English education, I finally found what I was 
searching for in my analysis of writing curricula in American grade schools, 
colleges, and universities: the teaching of writing as a tool for individual and 
institutional growth toward creative and collaborative learning. 
When I talked to Moffett about my research, he mentioned a new book, 
Presence of Mind: Writing and the Domain Beyond the Cognitive, edited by Alice 
Brand and Richard Graves, quite worth reading, but not just for academic pur­
poses, Moffett said. I got the book the same day, started reading it and soon after 
I knew this book was a most valuable discovery for my work. Later, after I had 
already put some of the teaching and writing methods from the book into prac­
tice-first just by myself, later with my classes-I began to realize the value of 
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the book for my personal growth. 
Through Presence of Mind: Writing and the Domain Beyond the Cognitive 
( 1 994) I started to understand the complexity of the term, "writing as a mode of 
learning," which here goes much further than Janet Emig's initial definition in 
the essay of the same name (The Web of Meaning, 1 983) .  Such learning is  no 
longer limited merely to the conscious,  but reaches "beyond the cognitive," as 
the subtitle of the book signals. What that exactly means is  not easily said in a 
few words. In one of the first meetings of the interest group "Beyond the Cogni­
tive Domain," the participants came up with 34 different terms (p. 1 )  for defin­
ing their area of attention, all heading somehow in a similar direction but no two 
of them having precisely the same meaning. I would like to focus on just three 
terms-writing and learning through silence, writing and intuitive learning, and 
writing and therapeutic learning-giving examples of how I have read the book 
and in what ways it has influenced me. 
From time to time I get into an argument with my daughter. After a while our 
voices rise, joined by sharply gesticulating hands. I can almost see the air burn­
ing between us. When, in such moments, I step off the stage of overheated verbal 
combat, take my daughter 's  head, and gently bury it under my arms, all of a 
sudden, I feel silence physically. It takes away pressure from both forehead and 
neck, clears my sight, and frees my chest of a heavy weight. I am now able to 
breath again. 
When I was in a conflict with myself, wanting to write better, faster, more, 
I used to think writing comes through writing-a consideration which, I still 
believe, is  not wrong, but one which does not always work. Silence (Part One of 
the book)-waiting, meditating, recentering myself-is another way of overcom­
ing obstacles to a harmonious flow of human communication, whether it be on 
paper between my own voices, in the classroom between me and my students, or 
at home between my daughter and me. Peter Elbow's restructuring of silence (p. 
9), Donald Gallehr's demand to "wait, and the writing will come" (p. 2 1 ), and 
Charles Suhor 's  "pedagogy of silence" (p. 3 1 )  have helped me to discover the 
creative impact of the moments before, between, and after the act of writing. 
Elbow writes :  "I have a hunger for silence" and "In fact I ' ve always been 
interested in people who don ' t  write or talk-the silent ones" (p. 1 0) .  In his 
collage he looks for a relationship between silence and voices, the ones in us and 
around us .  What do they sound like in silence? He is concerned about what 
happens in the writer 's  body when there is  no writing. Are we able bodily to feel 
the energy of the voices we deal with? Does the meaning-making of something 
we wrote or wanted to write about stop? What response do we get from our felt 
sense about our writing process? 
Years ago in a class on German poetry, I got stuck trying to get students to 
interpret a text. They didn 't  see anything other than heavy, blurry metaphors in 
the poem and by complaining about the "stupidity" of the text they successfully 
aggravated the frustration. "What happens in the text?" I shouted over their ducked 
heads, frustrated myself, and without thinking about what I was actually saying. 
I promptly received a response telling me clearly that the subject of the discus­
sion was poetry, not prose or drama, and, therefore, nobody understood me 
asking about the story line. I called myself stupid, impulsive, and incapable of 
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consistent thinking in l iterary genres .  I was about to excuse myself to rearrange 
my material, when suddenly a young woman stood up and ambled across the 
classroom, transforming the heavy, blurry poetical metaphors into a light,  
transparent movement of a short improvisation. What we weren't able to see on 
paper by thinking in theoretical terms became instantly visible and emotionally 
understandable by the woman's  physical performance. 
Being under pressure and not thinking any longer about the boundaries be­
tween l iterary genres, I intuitively grasped for help by asking them to identify 
the dramatic action in the text from my most abiding interest-theater. Neverthe­
less, the step "from intuition to insight" (p. 67)-I want to call it here intuitive 
learning-was also taken by the young woman and, later on, by the students, 
who for the rest of the class, enthusiastically told me personal stories related to 
the subject of our initially so-badly-handled poem. 
Wisdom of the Unconscious (Part Two) and Wisdom of the Body (Part Three), 
make up, to  my understanding ,  the backbone of  the book.  The e s s a y s  
provided m e  insights into the psychic and physical links between intellect and 
emotion in the process of writing and learning. The authors, Anne Mullin, 
Richard Graves and Susan Becker, Elizabeth Holman, Sondra Perl, Karen Klein 
and Linda Hecker, and Trudelle Thomas make visible processes which we all 
experience every day, without, unfortunately, being aware of them: an intuitive 
learning, a learning through our senses. "The unconscious speaks in many voices," 
so the introduction to Part Two refers one more time to Part One and its state­
ments about silent voices. Here the voices come as traces in writing which lead 
and link to unconscious parts of our memories (pp. 4 1 -52) ,  or as personal 
metaphors , mysteries,  and memories,  deeply connected to the inexhaustible 
unconscious of the writer (pp. 5 3-64). In the book our inner voices are also shown 
as physically present: as felt sense (pp. 73-88), spatial kinesthetic (pp. 89-98),  
and acoustic sense (pp. 99-1 1 2) .  They enrich our writing when we are able to 
notice and understand their messages within a process of intuitive learning. 
By working with Sondra Perl 's  guidelines for composing, my class and I 
followed the "writer 's  way of knowing" (p. 77).  I taught Perl ' s  model in contrast 
to a German program by Gert Ueding, a current-traditional rhetorician from the 
University in Ti.ibingen. In his book, Rhetorik des Schreibens (Meisenheim: Verlag 
Anton, 1 99 1 ), Ueding introduces a model where writing is understood as a tool 
for describing reality objectively. Ueding proposes step-by-step programs for 
writing in different nonfictional genres .  One of his major concerns is "controlled 
writing" (p. 20), that i s ,  tailoring one 's  exact language use to the rhetorical 
situation and audience. The central method Ueding relies on is imitatio (Cicero 
and Quintilian), the imitation of recognized authors through extensive reading 
and writing. 
Here are a few statements about the differences my students experienced 
throughout the writing process :  "With Perl I was concentrating on what I wanted 
to write after a few minutes"; "Confronted with Ueding's  rule-canon I felt as if I 
were becoming smaller and smaller"; "When we did the breathing, it connected 
my thoughts and emotions" ; "With Ueding I felt very comfortable and safe, be­
cause the stuff I was writing about didn ' t  really belong to me. I just documented 
it" ; "By reflecting on my own writing process as well as my feelings and thoughts, 
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writing for the first time became personally important"; "Ueding's model is good 
for class: clear structure and academic value. Perl ' s  model is  good for a therapy 
session: It opens up a lot you can ' t  easily stop after the class is over." 
Writing as therapeutic learning? While Ueding's model embodies strict rhe­
torical patterns to be followed for the purpose of correct writing by fulfilling 
stylistic rules, Perl ' s  approach is directed toward the inner self of the writer. 
Hers are guidelines for an active, individual search for one' s  own voice as a hu­
man being. Understanding the history of rhetoric and its results as an institution, 
Ueding's  writing becomes institutional, public, even though it might be intended 
for private use. Perl 's  writing is personal, though it would seem to aim for a 
larger audience. To my understanding, education needs to combine both ways, 
writing and learning within and beyond the cognitive, so that they may go hand 
in hand. 
The essays by Hildy Miller, Kristie Fleckenstein, and Demetrice Worley in 
Part Four of the book, entitled Images,  reminded me of Janet Emig ' s  1 9 8 3  
essay, "Hand, Eye, Brain: Some 'Basics ' in the Writing Process" (The Web of 
Meaning), in which she quotes Jean-Paul Sartre describing his vision loss as the 
end of his career as a writer. Emig at that time searched for answers of how the 
eye participates in the writing process, focusing on the cognitive effort of the 
eye. The authors of Part Four of this book concentrate on the intuitive, the invis­
ible of the visible like part one was on the silent voices: It is  the recognition of 
images as something which fosters writing that interests Miller. For Fleckenstein 
it is  the interplay between image and emotion that is  a key for creating texts 
successfully. Worley bridges the gap between cognition and intuition:  She 
suggests exercises for improving the ability to visualize for effective detail­
writing and problem-solving. 
Coming from a rather rationally oriented German culture and education, I 
found that the essays by Brand and Teich on Emotions (Part Five) in the writing 
classroom were beneficial to my understanding of the theoretical and practical 
connection between intuition and cognition. In these essays, sensual experience 
is characterized as important in the process  of unfolding personality and 
establishing a system of human values within society. Learning through writing 
"beyond the cognitive domain" is  described as a matter of individual and of 
social learning. Living as I do in a society that overrates science and technology, 
I found Alice Brand's conclusion about the system of human values personally 
exciting: "The most important human values are emotional, not intellectual" 
(p. 178) .  Unfortunately, I cannot claim to have already learned how to live this 
wisdom. To know something and to be able to put it  into practice are two 
different shoes.  Writing about this conflict might be a chance to get used to the 
new shoe. 
The Open Door (Part Six) led me to the historical dimension of writing: nar­
rating, searching, recalling, listening, viewing, and imagining. The process of 
composing integrates past, present, and future, even though we as writers might 
sometimes not be aware of it. Our autobiography is part of history; our daily life 
stories embody the present; hopes, dreams, and fears are our vision of the future. 
To discover their often hidden richness, it needs techniques tapping into the un­
conscious:  Donald Murray introduces story writing as writing personal history; 
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personal writing as healing is  the focus by Sandra Burkett and Gabriele Rico; 
Richard Murphy Jr. recounts the relationships between teacher and student needed 
to hold open the door toward our past, present, and future. 
The progression of the parts in Presence of Mind, evocative of the move­
ment of one's  personal growth, almost persuades me to believe in the existence 
of a "right way" to reach the root of creativity: Silence, Wisdom of the Uncon­
scious, Wisdom of the Body, Images, Emotions, and The Open Door. Neverthe­
less, no single essay within the parts listed above made me feel able to count on 
anything more than myself. To believe in oneself (as a writer) here means to trust 
oneself as a whole person: one 's  body, experience, and language. From there one 
can go on as far as one wishes. "What a miracle," Peter Elbow exclaims, "we can 
write anything . . .  we can say anything. Language doesn't fail" (p. 9). For the dif­
ferent paths of this journey the articles do not provide recipes, but rather sugges­
tions ,  examples ,  experience, tips for remembering-all in  all, a space for 
personal growth. cQ 
Humphrey, Nicholas, 1992. A History of the Mind: Evolution and the 
Birth of Consciousness. New York: Simon & Schuster. 
La rry Anderson 
N icholas Humphrey sets no small task for himself; he states boldly in his  preface that this book is  "an evolutionary history of how sensory conscious­
ness has come into the world and what it is  doing there . . . .  It sets out not just to 
define the problem of consciousness but to solve it" (p. 1 7) .  Humphrey succeeds 
by the end of book in solving a theoretical problem. But what we are unaware of 
at the start is that he will continually narrow the scope of his key terms, so that 
by the end we are not sure that what he has solved is the problem of conscious­
ness. I think of someone who is  about to explain the internal combustion engine, 
but ends up actually just explaining the carburetor because in the process he de­
fines the carburetor as the place where it all begins. We certainly learn some­
thing about the internal combustion engine, but not exactly what we at first thought 
we would. 
The most fascinating part of the book is its overview of evolutionary history 
from the origin of the cosmos to the present. Humphrey is  careful to begin at the 
beginning, imagining the time when there were no sentient creatures and how 
they-our ancestors-came to be. He takes the long view to avoid making any 
assumptions about either the emergence of mind and consciousness or about ob­
jective physical reality. He spends a little time criticizing other theorists for mak­
ing just such assumptions but quickly moves into evolution. As organisms devel­
oped, their membranes became increasingly important in that they eventually cre­
ated the distinction between "me" and "not-me." These boundaries, though, were 
also frontiers at which the outside world made an impact on the organism. 
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Over time there would have developed (so Humphrey's argument goes) or­
ganisms that could select among various influences those that were "good" and 
those that were "bad"; these were early sensations. As the sensitivity of this fron­
tier increased, the organism could make progressively selective and specific re­
sponses. This brings us to Humphrey's definition of mind: the faculty of organ­
isms that stored "action-based representations of the effects of environmental 
stimulation on their own bodies" (p. 42). That is, the stimulation that evoked an 
action has become meaningful;  the mind developed in response to the "phenom­
enology of sensory experiences" (p. 42). Due to these representations we have a 
clear distinction between "that which is happening to me" and "that which is 
happening out there."  
In  this distinction we have the difference between sensation and perception; 
for Humphrey, the distinction rests on the act of interpretation. For instance, or­
ganisms during the first stage of evolution constantly processed input through 
their sense organs, which allowed them to create a subjective presence. But in 
order to create "intentional objects of cognition and objective knowledge of the 
external world" (p. 44) , a new style of processing had to evolve, a style that 
depended on the organism interpreting the sensation as representing something 
"out there."  As an illustration, Humphrey describes a scene in which he is sitting 
at his desk writing. He is being bombarded by stimuli: approaching thunder, sights 
and smells from the garden outside the window, an ant crawling up his leg. At 
one level, he processes these stimuli as sensations that affect his private world; 
he likes some and dislikes others. But at another level, he interprets these stimuli 
as signs that signify the state of the external world. "At the second level," 
Humphrey states, "I am the spectator of a public world (not my world now) of 
independent physical phenomena" (p. 45) .  
With this phenomenological background, Humphrey illustrates the nature of 
sensory experience using the sense of smell, drawing on Thomas Reid's  Essays 
on the Intellectual Powers of Man ( 1 785) .  With Reid's  help, he points out that 
when we smell a rose, sensation answers the question "What is happening to 
me?" Perception answers the question, "What is happening out there?" The 
crucial determination to be made is whether sensation and perception exist in a 
serial or parallel relationship. He goes on to argue, convincingly, that the rela­
tionship is a parallel one. But he first bemoans the nineteenth century 's  obses­
sion with perception to the exclusion of sensation, the effects of which we feel to 
this day. In the process he applauds the Romantic poets (Coleridge, Wordsworth, 
Byron) and the Impressionistic painters (Van Gogh, Monet) for turning away from 
perception and focusing on sensation. 
He returns to his argument, then, by pointing out that if he can show that it's 
possible to "decouple" sensation and perception, then that would tell us if they 
were serial or parallel. He accomplishes this by drawing on experimental and 
clinical evidence as well as thought experiments based on questions like, "What 
would happen if you could wear glasses that reversed all colors?" and "What 
would happen if you could wear glasses that inverted everything?" Having 
arrived at this juncture, we seem poised on the brink of reaching Humphrey 's  
definition of the term "consciousness." But he isn't  ready to deliver yet. 
He anticipates potential criticism of his argument at this point on the basis 
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of imagery. He recognizes that we can create images of sensations (visual ones 
being the easiest), which pose a problem for his theory: How do we know if a 
sensation is actual or imagined? He provides an answer to this question. But it 
rests squarely on evolutionary history. 
Having addressed this potential criticism, he defines what it means to be 
conscious :  "to have affect-laden mental representations of something happening 
here and now to me" (p. 1 20).  He immediately recognizes the narrowness of this 
definition, for it says nothing about other states of mind that we obviously have 
but that also obviously do not arise from the stimulation of our sense organs .  
This  narrows his territory considerably; in effect, he removes the concept of 
consciousness from discussions of cognition. He apparently feels that the latter 
has been explored all too thoroughly by those psychologists who have focused 
on perception. Humphrey separates perception from sensation, having shown their 
relationship to be parallel rather than serial. So what we end up with is a theory 
of sensations,  with an argument for the centrality of affect in our lives-our 
subjectivities-since sensations are affect-laden. In other words, Humphrey re­
vises Descartes dictum: "I feel, therefore I am" (p. 1 15 ) .  
At  this point, h i s  argument takes a bold turn. If we  agree that sensations 
require some state of control over the responses evoked by outside stimulation, 
then perhaps it is we who control our sensations. Humphrey proposes that we are 
the authors of the sensations we typically believe "happen to" us .  In order to 
argue this ,  he claims that the "I" experiences two different durations of time, 
which he calls physical and subjective. For example, imagine persons climbing a 
spiral staircase. As they climb, they naturally feel that they are continually ad­
vancing; yet on a spiral staircase half the time they are actually retreating. For 
Humphrey, a unit of physical time (the time needed to reach the top of the stair­
case) contains an entire sequence of units of subjective time (the time needed to 
raise one foot and place it on the next tread). Consequently, "what constitutes the 
conscious present is largely the immediate sensory afterglow of stimuli that have 
just passed by-the dying-away activity in reverberating sensory loops" (p. 1 89). 
It is  from the reverberating loop that Humphrey claims we actually send outward 
the instructions for the sensations we want. He summarizes it: "What it is for 
someone to feel a particular sensation i s  just for him to issue whatever ' instruc­
tions '  are required to bring about the appropriate activity" (p. 1 92). The weak­
ness in this argument is  Humphrey's assumption of such a thing as physical times, 
as opposed to subjective time. It could be argued that all time is  subjective time 
because time is  always processed mentally. 
And so we arrive at the solution he promised to the "problem of conscious­
ness" (p. 17) .  In his preface he warned us to not expect too much: "Could the 
solution to the problem of consciousness be boring?" He returns to this question 
at the end, defending the critique I made earlier about narrowing the scope of 
what we take to be the original topic. After all, Humphrey seems to imply, 'the 
problem is  not as complicated as we all thought! Of course, the way he has framed 
the problem, the answer is a bit boring, not for what he says but for what he does 
not say. He knows he is  leaving some readers dissatisfied. Mmmm. But he finds 
he can 't stop there; he concludes with a two-page final chapter which may be 
summarized in one sentence: "It is  consciousness [as he, of course, has defined 
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it] , with its power to make the vanishing instant of physical time live on as the 
felt  movement of  sensat ion,  that makes i t  LIKE S OMETHING TO B E  
OURSELVES-and s o  sweetens and enriches the being o f  the external world 
FOR US" (p. 228). I ,  for one, find myself not persuaded. 
Humphrey presents his ideas in a readable, almost folksy style. He does a 
convincing job of redirecting our attention to the importance of sensations and 
makes a strong case for the parallel existence of sensation and perception. But 
with the focus on sensation, I was puzzled by the complete inattention paid to 
research on sensory-deprivation. Likewise, he makes no reference to Julian Jaynes '  
The Origin of Consciousness in the Breakdown of the Bicameral Mind ( 1 976) or  
Gerald Edelman's  Bright, Air, Brilliant Fire: On the Matter of the Mind ( 1 992), 
which would seem to have some natural points of overlap. c9 
Hughes, Elaine Farris. 1 994. Writing from the Inner Self. 
New York: HarperCollins. 
Debora F. Van H oorn 
Writing from the Inner Self provides both teachers and students with 48 writing exercises and nearly 300 writing ideas designed to foster self-aware­
ness through self-examination. Elaine Farris Hughes claims these writing and 
meditation activities will free students' creativity, inspire their imagination, and 
help them overcome writer 's  block. The book is designed so that students can use 
it  on their own and the instructors can choose their own level of involvement. 
Each of the exercises employs some type of inner focus, meditation (meditation 
is  used here as a catch-all phrase for a variety of inner-focusing techniques, in­
cluding conscious breathing, visualization, sensory awareness, guided imagery, 
and memory recall), encouraging readers to look inside themselves first and 
discover personal connections with the subject before they even begin to write. 
Hughes, retired from Nassau Community College in New York City, developed 
these exercises as a way to generate in-class j ournal entries. Many of these ideas 
were first published in 1 9 9 1  in a trade book for the general public. Hughes re­
vised and expanded that book of 63 exercises into this text for college students. 
An instructor 's  guide is  also available. 
The exercises are arranged into three sections with each of the twelve 
chapters containing four exercises. The exercises are grouped in such a way as to 
lead writers progressively deeper into themselves and into their writing. While 
the starting point is  the physical body, the exercises quickly lead into the broader, 
more abstract realms of feelings, memories ,  self-awareness,  observations, events, 
and imagination. Each exercise contains some form of meditation, introspection, 
body awareness,  observation, or a reliving of past events. 
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Part One,  The Inner World, contains twenty exercises  on The B ody 
(e .g . ,  Recapture a feeling of yourself as an infant) , Childhood Memories 
(Remember your first love), Intense Emotions (Contemplate an incident of early 
rejection),  Memorable Moments (Remember a moment of rebellion),  and 
Observing Your Life (Think about your life in relation to popular songs) .  
Part Two, The Outer World,  c ontains  s ixteen exerc i s e s  on Seeing  
(Objectively examine a kitchen utensil), People (Observe people in  a public place), 
Places (Explore your ideas of home), and Events (Think about a modern hero). 
Part Three, The World of Invention, contains twelve exercises on Reading 
(Bring a character from literature to life in your mind), Mind Play (Imagine you 
wake up to find you ' ve changed sex overnight), and Imagination (Relive a 
nightmare you ' ve had). 
Part Four of the text is  a handbook of sorts, covering among others such 
concepts as voice, audience, and revision.  Here Hughes guides students in 
molding their freewriting into an essay, using the multiple drafts of prologue as 
an example. The book closes with an appendix of sources and some sample 
student writings that correlate to exercises given in the text. 
Hughes, acknowledging the often difficult task of writing, encourages and 
explains a traditional method of process writing that "requires all your resources­
mental alertness, imagination, emotional response, a relationship with chaos, 
physical stamina, and the courage to face the critics who will read what you have 
written" (p. 3) .  The exercises presented in this text are easy to follow intellectu­
ally ; however, the number and types of questions may prove a bit overwhelming 
emotionally to some students. While this text could prove interesting in the 
classroom, the instructor must be prepared to deal with students'  innermost 
thoughts, sometimes frightening and messy, which result from this type of 
assignment. The Inner World section causes some concern. Several of the 
writing exercises might prompt some deep levels of sharing best handled by a 
trained counselor. Consider the following suggested writing assignments and the 
manner in which some students might respond: 
Write a personal essay about all the major scars you have acquired 
(physical, psychological, or emotional) (pp. 34-36). 
Write a short essay that details an early rejection and explain how this 
experience has affected your concept of yourself and your life (pp. 63-65). 
Write out your full confession of an incident that continues to cause you 
shame, guilt, or embarrassment (pp. 66-68). 
Recall an incident in which you felt intense anger. Stay in touch with the 
anger until it begins to dissolve. Don't turn away from it or talk yourself out 
of it. Give up your anger only when you're ready (pp. 68-70). 
Hughes gives little advice, and there has been little written on what the 
instructor should do with such self-disclosure. Marti Singer ' s  1 990 article 
"Responding to Intimacies and Crises in Students' Journals" (English Journal, 
79) addresses the issue of self-disclosure in the composition classroom. When 
Singer received some personal revelation via a student's  writing, she was "flat­
tered and awed by the trust and confidence displayed through long detailed 
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accounts of students' lives and experiences" (p. 72). However, she then won­
dered how to respond to such sharing and sought out answers in composition 
theory. She found that "there is  very little written about ways of responding 
to . . .  personal writing" (p. 73) . While other articles and books deal tangentially 
with the issue of self-disclosure, there is a gap-no, more of a gaping hole-in 
the research in this area. Until such research is undertaken, the following books 
may help clarity the instructor 's  and the student' s  role in a classroom where per­
sonal writing occurs: Inside Out: A Guide to Writing by Maurice Scharton and 
Janice Neuleib ( 1 993), The Hero Within by Carol S.  Pearson ( 1989), Presence of 
Mind: Writing and the Domain Beyond the Cognitive, edited by Alice G. Brand 
and Richard L. Graves ( 1 994), and Coming on Center by James Moffett ( 1 9 8 1 ) .  
Overall, Hughes'  textbook could b e  a catalyst for some wonderful expressive 
writing. However, be prepared to deal with the ensuing writing which may be 
uncomfortably personal. Qj 
Kalamaras, George. 1 994. Reclaiming the Tacit Dimension: 
Symbolic Form in the Rhetoric of Silence. 
Albany: State University of New York Press. 
Susan Becker 
This slim volume is  a short course in both quantum physics and the humani ties: philosophy, religion, music, and literature. Hinduism, Buddhism, Tao­
ism, Christianity, Plato, Aristotle, Descartes, Levi-Strauss, Keats, Coleridge, Eliot, 
and Pirsig all play a role in developing the author 's  argument that silence is a 
mode of knowing. 
Kalamaras opens with a reference to the Eastern mystic Rumi who stated 
that we know each other in unspoken ways .  Nevertheless, notes the author, "As a 
practitioner of silence, I have sometimes felt at odds with the intellectual and 
academic community" because in the West silence is often cast as the "bad guy" 
(p. xi). The argument for promoting silence that follows is logical, informing, 
and engaging. Kalamaras shows reader awareness by using the first person "I" to 
personalize sometimes convoluted thinking, allowing the reader to share not only 
in the author ' s  mental process but also in his  conclusion:  Practitioners of 
silence no longer need to keep silent because silence is a demonstrable mode of 
knowing. 
To support this thesis ,  the author provides seven chapters replete with 
endnotes and a glossary of thirty terms from Eastern philosophy and religion. 
The one hundred and thirty works consulted identify AEPL scholars and charter 
members James Moffett and Charles Suhor alongside Jung, Suzuki, Eckhart, 
Shakespeare, Bakhtin, Britton, Elbow, Vygotsky, and others. 
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With the definition that silence is an emptiness that is full ,  Chapter One, 
"Reclaiming the Tacit Dimension," sets up the argument that silence is  a mode of 
knowing. The culprit for silence as emptiness, claims Kalamaras, is  Western ra­
tional thought. By associating power with language (i .e . ,  discourse as enfran­
chisement), it follows that silence or lack of discourse is annihilation. Mistrust 
of silence in the West is  the result of Plato's classical view reinforced by Aristotle, 
objectivism, feminism, and poststructuralism (p. 9).  
B ut Eastern philosophy cultivates paradox by locating reciprocity in 
opposites .  Contrary to the dualistic Western view of language and silence as  
opposites, these dualisms construct knowledge in reciprocal fashion. Meaning 
need not be dependent on language in oral or written form. If rhetoric is  defined 
as a symbolic act that makes meaning, then silence is a rhetoric. 
Kalamaras personalizes his thesis in the second chapter before investigating 
theory, poetics, and the symbolic complexity in later chapters. Chapter Two, 
"Into the Chaos:  Writing Across the Curriculum and the Tao of Change" answers 
the question: What role does the teacher of process writing play in writing across 
the curriculum? Kalamaras uses James Moffett's  and Charles Suhor ' s  emphasis 
on the reciprocity of silence and meaning to investigate theories of composing 
and curriculum development as shaped by intuition, ambiguity, tenuousness,  and 
chaos. Ever present is  the paradox of chaos and order. Comparing his position as 
writing consultant in the biology department to a zebra fish in an aquarium of 
leeches, Kalamaras explains that he survived the challenging consultancy not by 
trying to overcome contradictions but by immersing himself in them. Talking 
and listening (i .e . ,  collaborating and reciprocating) led to a synthesis of discourse 
with silence, separate with connected knowing. When the language of the con­
sultant and the language of the biology faculty actually inhabited each other, the 
two sides arrived at a condition of mutual understanding and eventual success in  
what had appeared to be a doomed consulting assignment across the curriculum. 
Chapters Three and Four provide the meaty center of the book. "Classical 
Rhetoric, Objectivism, Mysticism, and the Great Divide" examines the ways clas­
sical rhetorical theory, objectivism, and Western mysticism have fostered a mis­
trust of silence. Starting with the Gospel According to John and moving back­
ward and forward thorough times and places, Kalamaras traces the relationship 
between words and origins via Plato's  Phaedrus, Aristotle 's  development of Plato's  
binary vision, and Cartesian perceptions. The author then examines Eastern modes 
of thought that allow a less dichotomous and more fluid approach. Jung and 
Eckhart, Western thinkers who have examined Eastern modes, authenticate the 
"vacuum-plenum" paradox as a legitimate merging of words into silence as in 
"OM" (p.  90). Britton and Polanyi have, in  turn, enlarged this interpretive 
framework, showing that individual utterances do contribute to meaning. Never­
theless, the presence of a fixed categorical reality in Western thought makes it 
difficult for Westerners to accept as valid the complex ambiguity of mystical 
experience and practice necessary to the language/silence paradox. 
As Chapter Four posits, although our culture fosters the binary thinking so 
antithetical to silence, Western art relies on the nonconceptual as a way of 
making meaning. "Paradox and the Sacred: The Still Point of the Turning World" 
uses poetics to validate movement and stillness, word and silence. Sound devices 
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and metaphor have been used by such poets as Shakespeare, Shelley, Keats, Blake, 
and Eliot to expand the perception of reality by altering time and emotion. Their 
successors in projectivist (open form) verse and talk poetry have added tricks of 
typography for short-circuiting the categorical to focus on symbolic form. 
Language and its gaps reciprocally create meaning. Kalamaras recalls an early 
awareness  to "both the harmony and the melody, the stillness and the dance" 
(p . 1 44) .  Their method is not unlike the Zen koan or nonsensical statement 
designed to prepare the mind for a nonverbal experience of reality. 
The three final chapters are "An Intimate Immensity : S ilence and the 
Paradox of Attention"; "The Physics of Meditation: Silence and the Garland of 
Letters" ;  and "The Death of the Self: Poststructuralism and a Rhetoric of 
S ilence."  Together they round out Kalamaras ' argument that s ilence i s  not 
transcendental. The quantum model reveals silence as generative, a symbolic act 
that makes meaning and is therefore a rhetoric compatible with dialogic theories 
of composing. The following are highlights of the author's argument: 
Yoga or "union" is a practice that leads to oneness of mind and body, 
stillness in movement, the "zero" experience. This paradox is genera­
tive. 
According to Gaston Bachelard, the paradox of knowing is  not 
knowing: "Behind dark curtains, snow seems to be whiter" (p. 1 53) .  
The apparent contradiction is  reciprocal. 
Ralph Waldo Emerson dissolves dualities with awareness of "the wise 
silence" when within man lies "the soul of the whole" (p. 1 56). 
T.S .  Eliot writes a corollary for silence and language when he says, "at 
the still point, there the dance is" (p. 1 60).  
The mantra, "OM," reveals that silence is  constituted of sound, and the 
word constitutes and dissolves itself endlessly. 
Awareness of silence is  a symbolic form of interpretation that makes 
meaning as does any rhetoric .  
Quantum physics via vacuum diagrams verifies that empty space is  not 
empty (the vacuum-plenum). 
Since reality is  not a stable, definable condition but is  shaped through 
acts of perception, nonconceptual understanding itself is a symbolic 
form that makes meaning. 
Silence retains the potential of language by expanding the complexity 
of language into "its 'original way' or 'radical vital potential' from 
which all form manifests" (p. 1 96).  
Maurice Blanchot's concept of the paradox of life and death simulta­
neously decenters and reconstitutes the self in symbolic form. 
Thus, concludes Kalamaras, if both quantum physics and deconstructionist 
theory suggest that symbolic forms construct knowledge and silence has been 
shown to be such a form, then silence is a way of knowing that makes meaning. 
With bold erudition and much documentation, the author comes full circle to vali-
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date the paradox of discourse and its void, silence, as a valid methodology in the 
teaching and learning of writing. 
This landmark little book is  a volume of the SUNY series, Literacy, Culture, 
and Learning:  Theory and Practice, with Alan C. Purves as editor. George 
Kalamaras, a writing professor at Indiana University-Purdue University and a 
recent recipient of a poetry fellowship from the National Endowment of the Arts, 
was present at the AEPL session on silence during the Conference on College 
Composition and Communication 1 994 in Nashville. From the cover of his book, 
which features an attractive pen and ink rendering named "Yogi," to the detailed 
index at its conclusion, Kalamaras takes readers on an intellectual journey through 
Eastern and Western culture. His challenging argument is a viable contribution 
to knowledge on the affective domain to which AEPL is dedicated. Q_j 
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